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Abstract 
 
 
Ever since the late 1950s, one of the main objectives of child protection policies in the United States 
has been to reduce the amount of time children spend in out-of-home care.  For nearly four decades, 
policymakers have sought to achieve this goal primarily by providing various types of services to help 
children reunify with their parents more quickly.  However, in recent years a new approach has 
emerged which emphasises the use of quantitative targets to expedite exits from care, even when this 
entails terminating parental rights or pursuing alternatives to family reunification such as child 
adoption. Since then, states have adopted very different policy approaches to promote timely exits 
from out-of-home care.  Yet relatively few comparative studies have been undertaken to examine 
which approaches have yielded better outcomes. Further, the evidence base on whether some 
approaches may be associated with negative distortionary effects, particularly with regard to 
permanency outcomes, remains limited.  
In this research, I focus on performance-based contracting (PBC); a type of policy approach which 
links compensation of child welfare agencies to the achievement of specific quantitative targets. My 
analysis focuses on four states: two that have employed PBC to reduce the amount of time children 
spend in care—Illinois and North Carolina—and two that have not—New Jersey and Washington 
state, using multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts based on the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (AFCARS).  I find that PBC states recorded greater improvements in the timeliness 
of permanency outcomes compared to states that do not employ PBC during the period considered.  I 
also find that compositional effects related to the race of children entering care and the type of 
placement setting chosen, in combination with other influences including secular trends, may play a 
part in shaping this outcome for particular groups.  I am, however, unable to conclude whether these 
outcomes are the result of PBC alone or a combination of other factors, which I am not able to capture 
or control for with the data utilised.  Further, my analysis cannot conclusively determine whether 
some of these outcomes might be accompanied by various distortionary effects, including “cherry 
picking” or other types of gaming.  My research, however, does cast doubt on some of the 
“mechanisms” through which changes in the timeliness in permanency outcomes are achieved as well 
as raises the need for a more nuanced and complex theoretical framework to explain how PBC might 
shape the timeliness of permanency outcomes. 
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1 Performance based contracting as a tool to improve the timeliness 
of permanency outcomes 
 
1.1 The scope of the research: an overview 
Ever since the late 1950s, one of the main objectives of child protection policies in the 
United States of America (henceforth United States) has been to reduce the amount of time 
children spend in out-of-home care; defined here as any formal arrangement, whereby a 
child is cared for in a temporary, alternative residential setting (Lewit 1993).
1
  For nearly 
four decades, policymakers have sought to achieve the goal of timeliness
2
 primarily by 
providing various types of services to help children reunify with their parents more 
quickly.  However, in recent years a new approach has emerged which emphasises the use 
of quantitative targets to expedite exits from care and achieve permanency,
3
 even when this 
entails terminating parental rights or pursuing alternatives to family reunification such as 
child adoption. 
Since then, states have adopted very different policy approaches to promoting timely 
exits from out-of-home care.  Yet relatively few comparative studies have been undertaken 
to examine which of these approaches has yielded better outcomes (examples of such 
                                                 
1
 I use the term “formal” to convey the fact that my research focuses on children who are under the legal 
responsibility of the state.  The term “temporary” was chosen to express the provisional nature of out-of-care 
arrangements, which are to be completed in the shortest time possible, without endangering the safety and 
wellbeing of the child.  The expression “foster care” is used only when it is a direct citation.  Throughout the 
study, the term “care” is used as a synonym of out-of-home care.   
2
 In this study, I consider placements that last more than twenty-four months from the time of entry to be 
long-term or untimely, while exits that occur within twenty-four months of the child entering care are 
considered to be timely.  Exits that occur within twelve months are considered “very timely”, while those 
which occur after twelve months but within twenty-four months of placement are deemed to be of 
intermediate timeliness.  The choice of these thresholds is based on the composite measures outlined in the 
Child Welfare Outcome Reports to Congress (CWOR) and in the Child and Family Service Reviews 
(CFSR)—the two main analytical tools used by the U.S. Children's Bureau to monitor the implementation of 
federal child welfare policies (see also Table A.1.1).  
3
 I define achieving permanency as finding a legally permanent, nurturing home for every child in out-of-
home care.  Permanency outcomes include reunification, adoption, legal guardianship and emancipation.  For 
reasons of analytical convenience, throughout this research I equate exiting care with achieving permanency.  
The implications of this choice are discussed in chapter 10. 
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studies include Golden and Macomber 2009; Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Courtney, et al. 
2011a, 2011b; Courtney and Hook 2012).  In this research, I seek to address this gap by 
focusing on performance-based contracting (PBC); an approach to programme 
management which links compensation of child welfare agencies to the achievement of 
quantitative targets.  Specifically, I explore the extent to which the use of PBC is 
associated with the timeliness of exits from out-of-home care. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  First, I briefly describe the rationale for this 
study focusing on the policy relevance of PBC and timeliness.  I then offer an overview of 
the evidence base on the relationship between PBC and timeliness and outline the expected 
as well as the actual contributions of my study to existing knowledge.  I also present my 
research questions and define the research hypotheses explored in my analysis.  Lastly, I 
outline the structure of the study. 
 
1.2 What is PBC and what factors contributed to its emergence as a policy tool? 
PBC is an approach to programme management whereby a contractor’s compensation is 
tied, in whole or part, to the achievement of certain quantitative targets.  Instead of paying 
contractors through a flat, per diem rate based on the number of persons served, PBC 
“focuses on the outputs, quality and outcomes of service provision” (Martin 1999 p. 8).  In 
practice this means that agencies that are unable to meet specific quantitative targets 
receive either a smaller amount per child—as in the case of the caseload models or the 
models based on incentives and penalties—or none at all such as in the case of the pure 
pay-for-performance model.
4
 
PBC
5
 was first introduced in child protection and welfare services in the mid-1990s 
(Alpert and Meezan, 2012; McBeath 2006; McBeath and Meezan 2010; Stecher, et al. 
                                                 
4
 In models based on incentives and penalties, providers receive a flat monthly fee for services as well as a 
small bonus for achieving certain quantitative targets.  In caseload models, providers are required to accept a 
certain share of their caseload in new referrals, and move a certain percentage to permanency each year, 
while in the pure pay-for-performance model contracting agencies are compensated only when they have met 
specific quantitative targets (Planning and Learning Technologies, Inc. and The University of Kentucky 
2006, 2009). The incentives and penalties model tend to present the lowest risk for providers while the pay-
for performance model tend to be the highest. 
5 PBC was first employed in public procurement in the United States in the 1980s in the area of defence 
(Else, et al. 1992; Martin 2002). 
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2010).  Since then, the number of states availing themselves of PBC has risen sharply 
(Collins-Camargo, et al. 2011a; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 2007).  According to a 2009 survey by 
the Quality Improvement Center on the Privatization of Child Welfare Services, more than 
half of all states utilised some form of PBC in their child welfare service contracts; 
compared to only a handful of states a decade earlier (Planning and Learning Technologies, 
Inc. and The University of Kentucky 2009).   
In my opinion, three main factors help explain why the use of PBC became so 
widespread in the U.S. child protection and welfare system in so short a time span (see also 
Axford and Morpeth 2013; Collins-Camargo, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Flaherty, et al. 2008; 
Lynch-Cerullo and Cooney 2011).   
First, there was mounting pressure on government entities to reduce the costs of child 
welfare and protection programmes.  During the first half of the 1990s, the cost of 
providing for children in care had risen rapidly, climbing to 4.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1996 
up from less than 0.9 billion U.S. dollars a decade earlier (Anyon 2011; U.S. Congress, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means 1998, 2000).  In an 
attempt to cut costs, many state and local authorities began to hire external contractors to 
provide services on their behalf.  Among the services frequently subcontracted were those 
related to placement, reunification and permanency, as well as various services aimed at 
promoting the safety and wellbeing of children in care.  Government entities generally 
retained the role of “referring children for care, holding legal custody, and reporting to the 
court” (Berlin 2007 p. 6) as well as the responsibility for overseeing the performance of the 
various subcontracting agencies.
 6
 
Faced with the need to cut costs, many policymakers turned to PBC as a means of 
inserting “quasi-market competition into a historically noncompetitive service 
environment” (Shaver and Taylor 2010 p. 295).  Specifically, by compelling providers to 
compete with one another for the renewal of contracts (Berlin 2007 p. 8), many 
policymakers saw PBC as a tool for inducing private contractors to become more cost-
                                                 
6
 An exception is the state of Kansas, where the “government (…) contracted with the private sector to 
purchase certain outcomes” (Berlin 2007 p. 2).  In Kansas the legal custody of children shifted from the 
county or state social services system to a private sector “lead agency” which reported directly to the courts. 
This approach remains relatively uncommon. 
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efficient in order to remain profitable and “stay in business”.
7
  This, in turn, was expected 
to lower overall service delivery costs. 
Second, there was growing public dissatisfaction with the quality of child protection 
and welfare services.  Several high-profile cases of child abuse in the late 1980s and early 
1990s had created a sense that children were not safe while in out-of-home care (Allen and 
Bissell 2004).  At the same time, the number of children in care had doubled (see Figure 
1.1).  Policies such as the Family Preservation and the Support Services Program Act 
(FPSSPA) of 1993 with their emphasis on family reunification were blamed for the rising 
number of children seemingly “adrift” in care (Epstein 1999; Gainsborough 2010; Ingram 
1996; Testa 2004).  This contributed to a sense that the child welfare system was not doing 
enough to find permanent homes for children and help them exit care in a timely manner.  By 
delinking providers’ compensation from the number of children served, PBC was seen as 
addressing the potential conflict of interest agencies might have to retain clients in care 
beyond what was strictly necessary. 
 
Figure 1.1. Number of children in care, entering care and exiting care, 1980-2010 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2006a, 2012a); U.S. 
Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (2000). 
 
Third, an increasing number of state and federal policies began to embrace 
quantitative targets as a way of promoting performance.  In the domain of child protection, 
                                                 
7
 While PBC often involves the use of private contractors, it should not be confused with privatization.  
Rather, as Stecher, et al. (2010 p. 6) point out, PBC aims to improve the efficiency of a system, “through 
goals, incentives and measures”, regardless of whether the provider of the services is a public or a private 
entity. 
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federal laws such as the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997
8
 made federal 
funding partially contingent on meeting a series of quantitative outcomes related to the 
children’s safety, permanency and wellbeing.
9
  Specifically, the ASFA was perceived to 
have shifted the emphasis away from merely fulfilling various administrative or service 
targets—the traditional benchmarks of performance for the out-of-home care system in the 
United States—to achieving better “outcomes” for children and their families (Beem 2006; 
Elder, et al. 2012).
10
  This focus on achieving concrete “results”, which is so central to the 
ASFA, is also viewed by authors such as Berlin (2007) and Shaver and Taylor (2010) as 
one of the main factors that contributed to the emergence of PBC.  Shaver and Taylor 
(2010 p. 295), in particular, contend that PBC shifted provider agency accountability from 
“Did you do what you were told to do?” to “Did what you do work?” and “What difference 
did it make in the outcomes for children?”   
In outlining these factors, I do not contend that this is how PBC works in practice.  
On the contrary, I question many of the assertions presented above—for instance, I am 
skeptical that an analytical framework developed to monitor PBC can shed light on such 
conceptually and methodologically complex child welfare outcomes as those outlined in 
the ASFA.  Nonetheless, I believe that presenting these factors is important as it provides 
some insight into the context in which this policy tool emerged as well as its intended 
objectives. 
 
                                                 
8
 According to Spar and Shuman (2004 p. i), the ASFA sought to ensure that “consideration of children’s 
safety is paramount in child welfare decisions, so that children are not returned to unsafe homes” and that 
“necessary legal procedures occur expeditiously, so that children who cannot return home may be placed for 
adoption or another permanent arrangement quickly.”  In relation to these areas, namely the child’s safety, 
permanency and wellbeing, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services created a series of outcomes 
measures to monitor and assesses state performance in operating child protection and child welfare systems. 
These measures are also discussed in chapter 2. 
9
 For instance, the ASFA’s Adoption Incentive Program stipulates that states should be compensated through 
monetary bonuses for performing above certain targets (Hansen 2007).  
10
 Taylor and Shaver (2010 p. 296) provide a helpful description of the difference between outcomes and 
administrative or service inputs.  Outcomes in context of the child protection and welfare system in the 
United States refer to improving the child’s safety, permanency and wellbeing.  Administrative or service 
inputs refer to services that are “paid for” such as the number of beds available for child placements or the 
resources dedicated to counseling and care management.  
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1.3 Why is it important to study PBC? 
While the use of PBC in the child welfare system has become more widespread since the 
1990s, it still remains highly controversial.  Proponents, who believe that child welfare 
agencies perform better when fiscal accountability is linked to programmatic accountability 
(Kearney, et al. 2012a p. 96), tend to view such contracts as a useful management tool, 
which can lead to a greater focus on performance outcomes rather than the fulfilment of 
administrative or service measures (Martin 2005; Taylor and Shaver 2010).  They also tend 
to view the free-market competition between various contactors occasioned by PBC as the 
best way to ensure an agency’s responsiveness to client needs (Steen and Smith 2012; 
Steen and Duran 2013), resulting in what Lawler and Foster (2013 p. 139) have referred to 
as “a win-win-win to government, providers, and, most importantly, the people being 
served”.   
Conversely, critics view PBC’s emphasis on competition as disruptive to 
organizational capacity as well as detrimental to institutional integrity and neutrality 
(Armstrong and McCullough 2010; Center for Public Policy Priorities 2008; Lee and 
Ensign 2007; Martin 2002; Zullo 2009).  Further, a number of authors have expressed 
concern that the use of PBC may not necessarily prioritise the best interests of children and 
their families.  Instead, it may give rise to conflicts of interest, whereby the decision-
making process of agencies is shaped by the pressure to meet specific targets rather than 
the needs of their clients (Chuang 2010; Freundlich and Gerstenzang 2003; Johnston and 
Romzek 2008; Karatekin 2014; McBeath 2006; McBeath and Meezan 2008).  According to 
Carnochan, et al. (2010 p. 5) this can lead to the so-called  “performance paradox, in which 
external accountability designed to improve outcomes results in agency responses that 
either have no effect on true outcomes, or, in the worst cases, decrease service quality and 
lead to more negative outcomes.” 
The lack of consensus that surrounds the use of this performance management tool in 
the literature, underscores, in my opinion, the need for more research on PBC (see also 
section 1.8).  My analysis does not, however, address whether these views, some which are 
both theoretically complex and difficult to assess in practice, are well founded or not. This 
is something that, I argue, should be pursued in future research (see chapter 10). 
 
1.4 Why focus on the timeliness of exits from care? 
As anticipated in the previous section, reducing the amount of time children spend in out-
of-home care so that they can achieve permanency more rapidly is one of the mainstays of 
22 
child welfare policies in the United States
11
 (Lawrence-Webb, et al. 2006; Raghavan 
2010).
12
  Yet since the mid-1990s the emphasis on promoting timeliness has increased.  
Laws such as the ASFA of 1997
13
 introduced a number of provisions aimed at reducing the 
amount of time children spend in care
 
including some perceived as controversial such as the 
so-called 15 of 22 month standard (Beem 2007; Freundlich 2010).
14
  Subsequent federal 
laws in the United States have continued to emphasise expediting permanency outcomes, 
especially through adoption, as an important goal (Table A.1.2).  The Adoption Promotion 
Act (APA) of 2003, for instance, added financial incentives to encourage the adoption of 
children known to be slower in achieving permanency.  Likewise, the Fostering 
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (FCSIAA) of 2008 retained the 
importance accorded in the ASFA to promoting timely permanency outcomes by renewing 
the adoption incentives programme and doubling the financial incentives for the adoption 
of older children and other children with special needs
15
 (Golden and Macomber 2009). 
As a result of this, nearly all states recognise the importance of promoting timely 
exits from care in their statutes.  For instance, all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
have adopted the so-called fast-track provision, meaning that they exonerate child services 
from making reasonable efforts to reunite children with their families or prevent their 
                                                 
11 Both the CFSR and the CWOR contain a number of composite measures related to the timeliness of 
permanency (see Table A.1.1). 
12
 The theoretical assumptions underlying permanency planning are that children are best raised in a 
permanent and stable family setting and that the child’s development depends on his or her capacity to create 
a continuous and stable bond with a parental figure (Breen 2002). 
13 An example of another law that emphasised time-bound targets is the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. 
14
 Parents whose children remain in care longer than fifteen of the previous twenty-two consecutive months 
and who do not meet certain criteria can see their parental rights terminated. Such criteria include when: 
(1) the child is being cared for by a relative, (2) the Department of Human Resources has documented a 
compelling reason for determining that filing a petition would not be in the best interests of the child, or 
(3) the department has not provided the family of the child with the services deems necessary for the safe 
return of the child to his or her home (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2013a).  
15 Children with special needs include those with a disability, those who belong to an ethnic or racial 
minority, and those who have siblings who are also in need of adoption. 
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removal from home under a prescribed set of circumstances.
16
  Likewise, all but twelve 
states limit the maximum amount of time a child can spend in care before initiating 
termination proceedings (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2010a).  Overall, forty states 
plus the District of Columbia meet or exceed federal standards for timeliness, while ten 
states fall short of those provisions. 
While improving the timeliness of exits from out-of-home care continues to be a 
widely shared policy objective in the United States, it also remains highly divisive.  Those 
who support timeliness tend to cite the research on the psychological parent by Goldstein, 
Fraud and Solnit (1973, 1979) arguing that, because children perceive the passing of time 
differently than adults, permanency should be achieved in the shortest time possible.  They 
also tend to cite the extensive body of literature suggesting that children who spend long 
amounts of time in out-of-home care may have more difficulties in forming intimate, trusting 
adult relationships as well as have a higher incidence of medical and developmental 
problems as evidence for limiting long-term placements (Bellamy 2008; Buehler, et al. 2000; 
Clausen, et al. 1998; Connell, et al. 2009; Hollander 2002; Klee and Halfon 1987; Kools 
1997; Lloyd and Barth 2011; Simms, et al. 2000; Villegas, et al. 2011; Villegas and Pecora 
2012; Wexler 1990).  Partially because of these arguments, proponents of timeliness often 
call for public funds to be used to promote various permanency options, including 
adoption, rather than for long-term care (Barth, et al. 2006; Bartholet 1999; Hansen 2007).  
A number of studies, however, have expressed reservations about pursuing 
timeliness as a goal in-of-itself.  Specifically, they have cast doubt on the validity of the 
findings that long-term placement in care has a negative impact on children’s wellbeing 
(Beem 2007; Roberts 2002).  Others have shown that children who exit care too quickly 
may have a higher likelihood of re-entering care and may be at higher risk of being 
exposed to abuse and maltreatment (McDonald, et al. 2006; Wulczyn, et al. 2000; Wulczyn 
                                                 
16
 Under the provisions of ASFA, reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family are not required when 
the court has determined that the parent: (1) subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as defined by 
State law,  including, but not limited to, abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse; 
(2) committed murder of another child of the parent; (3) committed voluntary manslaughter of another  child 
of the parent; (4) aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or voluntary 
manslaughter; (5) committed a felony assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or another 
child of the parent; and (6) involuntarily lost the parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child (Child 
Welfare Information Gateway 2009a). 
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2004).  Others still have raised concern that an excessive emphasis on timelines may 
arbitrarily attenuate parental rights and even lead to an unwarranted decision to terminate 
such rights, when, with appropriate support and services, parents might have been able to 
regain custody of their children (Beem 2006; Cowan 2004; Myers 2008; Wilkinson-Hagen 
2004). 
In my research, I do not seek to address these aspects, nor do I contend that long-
term placements are predictive of, or associated with, the wellbeing of children in out-of-
home care.  Rather, I recognise that timeliness is currently an important policy objective in 
the United States.  Having established this, my research seeks to explore how different 
approaches to promoting timely permanency outcomes, particularly through the use of 
PBC, are associated with this stated objective. 
 
1.5 What do we know about PBC as a tool to improve the timeliness of exits? 
At least fourteen states
17
 have employed PBC with either the direct or indirect purpose of 
reducing the amount of time children spend in care (Alpert and Meezan 2012; Chuang 
2010; Steen and Dura 2013).  States have employed different models of PBC to promote 
timeliness.
18
  In Illinois, for instance, private agencies are under contractual obligation to 
move at least one-quarter of their caseload to permanency within twelve months (Berlin 
2007; Kearney, et al. 2012a).  Contractors that do not meet those targets receive fewer 
resources per child and can be removed from the list of eligible providers.  Missouri and 
Tennessee have employed a similar approach (Alpert and Meezan 2012; Planning and 
Learning Technologies, Inc. and The University of Kentucky 2009).  In North Dakota, 
providers receive additional payments for completing adoptions in a timely manner,
19
 
while in North Carolina contractors bare all costs for adoption, including for recruiting, 
supporting, and training prospective adoptive families, until the adoption had been 
finalised, implying that they have a considerable financial incentive in ensuring that 
                                                 
17
 Some twenty-seven states were using PBC in their child welfare system in 2009; though not necessarily 
with the goal of reducing the amount of time children spend in care (Planning and Learning Technologies, 
Inc. and The University of Kentucky 2009). 
18 See also note 4. 
19
 Within twelve months of the termination of parental rights (TPR). 
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adoptions take place as quickly as possible (Planning and Learning Technologies, Inc. and 
The University of Kentucky 2006, 2009).  
The evidence base on whether PBC has been effective in expediting exits from care 
remains quite limited (for a more detailed literature review see chapter 3).  Further, many 
of the studies that have examined the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes have been methodologically flawed, relying on point-in-time (PIT) 
estimates
20
 or exit cohorts, rather than perspective cohort measures.  Other methodological 
limitations of these studies include focusing on a small number of permanency outcomes, 
restricting the scope of the analysis to one locality or point in time, or failing to control for 
various “compositional” effects, namely differences across states in the type of out-of-
home care populations served. 
In addition to the methodological limitations listed above, still relatively little is 
known about the mechanisms through which timeliness is affected in PBC states, including 
various negative effects—which I refer to henceforth collectively as negative distortionary 
effects—associated with the use of PBC.  One concern, for instance, is that PBC might lead 
to creaming or “cherry picking” clients, whereby contractors favour clients who they 
perceive to be more likely to achieve a desirable outcome by providing additional services.  
Another, is that the use of PBC may be associated with another type of gaming behaviour 
known as “parking”, which occurs when providers “avoid serving more difficult children 
to improve their likelihood of achieving contract performance benchmarks” (Kearney, et 
al. 2012a p. 91).
21
  While various forms of gaming have been documented in the sphere of 
health or employment policies that tie compensation to the achievement of certain targets 
(see for example Courty, et al. 2011; Koning and Heinrich 2013), they remain largely 
unexplored in relation to child welfare policies.   
The effect of PBC on permanency outcomes is another negative aspect which has 
been raised in the literature.  In particular, a small number of studies have shown that the 
use of PBC may be associated with a lower likelihood of exiting care to reunification 
                                                 
20
 Point-in-time estimates, in this study, refer to the out-of-home care population at a certain date in time. 
21
 While it is unlikely that children who are victims of severe abuse or considered to be at high risk of abuse 
would remain out of the care system simply because of a provider’s desire to perform better in relation to 
certain quantitative targets, it is possible that low-risk cases, perceived to be less likely to exit care in a timely 
manner, could be diverted from the formal care system and placed in informal guardianship (see also chapters 
8 and 9). 
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(McBeath and Meezan 2006, 2008, 2010).  This could be construed as a negative 
distortionary effect since, according to the Social Security Act (SSA),
22
 reunification 
remains the primary permanency objective in the United States.  
 
1.6 Research questions 
In this study I have identified four interconnected research questions.  With regard to the 
first question, I seek to explore whether states that have employed PBC have been more 
successful in improving the timeliness of exits from out-of-home care compared to states 
that have not.  I then focus on how different models of PBC might relate to differences in 
the amount of time children spend in out-of-home care.  In the third question, I consider 
whether states that employ PBC experience various forms of gaming or whether other 
factors might also come into play in modifying the timeliness of exits.  In the fourth, I 
examine whether the use of PBC is associated with different trends in terms of permanency 
outcomes and in particular distortionary effects on family reunifications. 
My four research questions are as follows: 
• Do states that employ PBC record more timely exits from care compared to 
states that do not employ PBC?  
• Do states that employ different models of PBC experience different 
outcomes in terms of the timeliness of exits?  
• Is there evidence of various types of gaming, including “cherry picking” 
among states that employ PBC?  What other mechanisms might influence 
the timeliness of exits in PBC states? 
• Is the use of PBC accompanied by reductions in reunifications compared to 
other permanency outcomes? 
 
To address these questions I chose to utilise multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts (see 
chapter 4) and compare changes in the timeliness of permanency outcomes over time and 
across different localities.  I also decided to control for factors commonly associated with 
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 The SSA endorses, in order of preference, the following permanency outcomes: (1) reunification with the 
child’s own family; (2) adoption; (3) guardianship; (4) long-term foster care; and (5) emancipation (Altstein 
and McRoy 2000; Henry 1999).  The attachment theory developed by John Bowlby (1973, 1980, 1984) is one 
of the central concepts cited by authors who endorse this hierarchy of placement. 
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the timeliness of exits from care, namely selected characteristics of children entering care 
and their placement setting.
23
 
 
1.7 The hypothesized impact of the use of PBC on the timeliness of exits from out-
of-home care 
On the basis of these four research questions, I put forward six hypotheses.  It is important 
to stress that these hypotheses do not reflect my own views about how PBC would relate to 
timeliness in the “real world” but rather what I believe to be the “intended” purpose for 
which this policy tool was developed (see also chapter 2 for a discussion of the theoretical 
and analytical underpinnings of my research hypotheses).  By testing these hypotheses 
against what I view as their intended outcomes, I seek to cast light on whether PBC 
achieved its intended objectives.  This is an important exercise given what Patton (2008 
p. 349) has referred to as the need for testing “plausibility of theory and the likelihood that 
stated goals will be accomplished”. 
My first hypothesis is that states that employ PBC
24
 would record more timely 
permanency outcomes compared to non-PBC states.  Specifically, I hypothesise, based on 
the theory of social exchange (see section 2.4), that agencies operating in states where 
compensation is tied in whole or in part to the achievement of specific performance 
outcomes would have a greater incentive to meet their stated objective compared to other 
states which follow more traditional methods of programme management, which link 
compensation to caseload size. 
Further elaborating on the theory of social exchange, I hypothesise that states which 
employ different models of PBC (see also section 1.2) would record different outcomes in 
terms of the timeliness of exits from care.  In particular, my second hypothesis is that states 
which use a more stringent model of PBC such as the pure pay-for-performance model, 
which ties all compensation to the achievement of specific targets and goals, would 
experience more timely exits from care compared to states that use PBC merely as an 
incentive to promote better performance.  Because child protection agencies operating in 
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 Settings in care, or placement settings, include unrelated foster families, kinship care, group homes and 
institutions, and other settings including pre-adoptive homes, supervised independent homes and trial homes. 
24 Henceforth, states that employ PBC are also referred to PBC states or treatment states, while states that do 
not employ PBC are referred to as non-PBC states or control states.   
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the former states have more to “lose” if they fail to meet their stated goals—namely they 
receive no compensation for their services—I expect their “culture” on the ground to be 
more supportive of the goal of promoting timely exits from care.   
Based on the theory of social exchange, child welfare agencies operating in states 
that link compensation to the timeliness of permanency outcomes would have an incentive 
to reduce the average amount of time children spend in out-of-home care.  I argue that 
there are at least three ways in which this goal might be achieved.  The first way is for 
agencies to focus on improving the timeliness of groups of children known to be slowest in 
attaining permanency.  As indicated in the literature review (see also section 3.3), African 
American children,
25
 infants, as well as children placed with relatives (kinship care)
26 
 are 
less likely to exit care in a timely manner compared to other children (Becker, et al. 2007; 
Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Shaw 2010; Yampolskaya, et 
al. 2007; Wulczyn, et al. 2007).  My third hypothesis, therefore, is that in states that 
employ PBC, the timeliness of exits of the most “underperforming” groups would improve, 
narrowing the gap—i.e., the disparity—in the amount of time various groups of children 
spend in care.  I expect these changes to account for some of the difference, post-PBC, in 
the timeliness of exits between treatment and control states.  
While child welfare agencies have an incentive to improve the timeliness of their 
out-of-home care population by closing gaps in performance, at the same time they have 
limited ability or resources to influence those outcomes.  For instance, parents with drug or 
alcohol dependencies, or who are incarcerated may not be able to care for their children 
simply because an agency has a financial incentive for them to do so.  Further, the child 
protection system cannot generate would-be adoptive parents at will.  After an initial 
outreach to persons who have not considered adoption as an option before, the “pool” of 
persons interested and willing to become adoptive parents of children in care is likely to 
plateau.  Therefore, agencies that are operating under a rational assumption of self-interest 
have an incentive to modify the conditions which they can more easily affect and which are 
known to be associated with the timeliness of exits.  Faced with these limitations, child 
welfare agencies operating in states that employ PBC could either: (1) focus on improving 
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 Throughout this study, I use the terms African American and black interchangeably.  
26 In this study, kinship care refers to the formal care provided to an offspring by a relative of blood or 
marriage. 
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the timeliness of permanency for the so-called “marginal cases”, namely children for 
whom timely exits are more likely, or (2) attempt to alter the composition of children in 
care by, for example, placing fewer children in settings known to be associated with slower 
permanency outcomes.  
 
Table 1.1. Relationship between the research questions and hypotheses  
Research questions Research hypotheses and expected outcome 
 
My fourth hypothesis, therefore, is that the timeliness of exits of marginal cases 
would improve in PBC states, thus increasing the gap in the average amount of time 
various groups of children spend in care, while my firth hypothesis is that states which 
employ PBC would record a decline in the proportion of children with characteristics 
known to be associated with less timely permanency outcomes compared to the control 
states.  The former could be construed as a form of “cherry picking”, with contractors 
favouring clients they consider to be more likely to exit care in a timely manner, while the 
latter could be interpreted as “parking” (see section 1.5), with providers reducing their 
reliance on, among others, settings perceived to be associated with longer permanency in 
care.  I expect some of the difference in the timeliness of exits between PBC and non-PBC 
1) Do states that employ PBC record more timely 
exits from care compared to states that do not 
employ PBC?  
1) PBC states record more timely permanency 
outcomes compared to non-PBC states 
2) Do states that employ different models of PBC 
experience different outcomes in terms of the 
timeliness of exits? 
2) States which employ more stringent models of PBC 
(i.e., the pure pay-for-performance model) experience 
more timely exits from care compared to states that 
use PBC merely as an incentive to promote better 
performance 
3) Is there evidence of various types of gaming, 
including “cherry picking” among states that 
employ PBC? What other mechanisms  
mightinfluence the timeliness of exits in PBC states? 
3) In PBC states, the timeliness of exits for the most 
“underperforming” groups improves, narrowing the 
disparity, i.e., the gap in the amount of time various 
groups of children spend in care 
4) In PBC states, the timeliness of exits for “marginal 
cases” improves, increasing the gap in the amount of 
time various groups of children spend in care 
5) In PBC states, the proportion of children with 
characteristics known to be associated with less timely 
permanency outcomes, such as children placed with 
kin, declines 
4) Is the use of PBC accompanied by reductions in 
reunifications compared to other permanency 
outcomes? 
6) PBC states experience an increase in the 
permanency goals and outcomes that are alternatives 
to reunification, particularly adoption and 
guardianship 
30 
states to be associated with differences in those factors and how they have changed over 
time. 
Lastly, I hypothesise that states which employ PBC would experience an increase in 
the permanency goals and outcomes that are alternatives to reunification, particularly 
adoption and guardianship (sixth hypothesis).  The reason for this is that states which tie 
the compensation of child welfare agencies to expediting children’s exits from care would 
have an incentive to pursue alternative permanency outcomes, once timely reunification for 
a child has been ruled out.  
 
1.8 Expected contribution of my study and challenges encountered 
Initially I had expected my study to contribute to existing knowledge in two ways.  My 
first expected contribution was to provide a more methodologically sound evaluation of 
differences in the timeliness of exits from care for PBC and non-PBC states than the one 
available in the literature.  I viewed this as important since many of the studies available at 
the time had either focused on one state or county (Koh and Testa 2011; Rockhill, et al. 
2007; Vericker, et al. 2007; Wells and Guo 1999, 2006; Wulczyn, et al. 2007), one type of 
permanency outcome (Blackstone, et al. 2004; Hansen 2007; Wulczyn, et al. 2009) or one 
point in time (Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; McDonald, et al. 2006; Peters 2012; 
Snowden, et al. 2008) (see also section 3.4).  Having completed this study, I believe to 
have addressed some of the methodological limitations of previous research by using 
multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts.  Further, my research considers differences in the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes both before and after the enactment of PBC, examines 
a more complete spectrum of permanency outcomes, and controls for differences among 
states in some of the factors known in the literature to be associated with the timeliness of 
exits from care, including some of the characteristics of children entering care and their 
placement setting. 
However, in undertaking this study, I have also come to realise that I had initially 
underestimated the complexity inherent in measuring the relationship between a 
programme management tool such as PBC and its desired outcomes (see also my second 
point below).  While these methodological advances are not sufficient to allow me to draw 
causal inferences about the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes, I contend that they represent a step towards being able to more critically assess 
the impact of a programme management tool such as PBC. 
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My second expected contribution was threefold.  First, I sought to add to the existing 
body of literature on the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes as well as on the possible negative distortionary effects of PBC.  I considered 
this an important objective since a number of previous studies had called for more research 
on policies and practices associated with reductions in the amount of time children stay in 
out-of-home care, including PBC (see for example Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Courtney, 
et al. 2011a, 2011b; Flaherty, et al. 2008; Golden and Macomber 2009; Wulczyn, et al. 
2009).  Further, much of the literature on the relationship between PBC and timeliness 
available at the time focused on one state: Michigan.  Second, I expected my study to make 
a contribution from a policy perspective since several states including California, 
Louisiana, Texas and Washington, as well as a number of countries outside of the United 
States were exploring the idea of introducing PBC in some part of their child welfare 
system (Haly 2010; Stanley et al. 2013), despite a relatively limited evidence base on the 
relationship between PBC and the timeliness of exits from care.  Third, since the 
theoretical framework underpinning PBC (see chapter 2 for a discussion and critique of 
this theory) presumed a positive relationship between the implementation of this 
programme management tool and the timeliness of permanency outcomes, I sought to 
explore whether this assumption might be true. 
Having completed this study, I find that my analysis contributes to expanding the 
existing body of literature on the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of exits from 
care by shedding some light on this relationship in some additional states, namely Illinois 
and North Carolina.  In conducting my analysis, however, I also came to realise that I am 
unable to make policy recommendations since both the data and research design utilised do 
not allow me causal to draw inferences regarding the relationship between PBC, timeliness 
and permanency outcomes.  My findings suggest that states that employ PBC may 
experience an improvement in the timeliness of exits for certain groups of children.  I am, 
however, unable to conclude whether these outcomes are the result of PBC or a 
combination of other factors, including secular trends, which I am not able to capture or 
control for with the research design, methods and data utilised.  Further, my analysis 
cannot conclusively determine whether some of these outcomes might be accompanied by 
various negative distortionary effects, including “cherry picking” or other types of gaming.  
I raised the latter as an important question but was unable to examine it extensively owing 
to limitations with my research design and data.  My research, however, does cast doubt on 
some of the “mechanisms” through which changes in the timeliness in permanency 
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outcomes are achieved as well as raises the need for a more nuanced theoretical framework 
to explain how PBC might shape the timeliness of permanency outcomes (see also chapters 
2 and 10). 
 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
This study is comprised of a total of ten chapters, including the present one.  Chapter 2 
reviews the three main theoretical and analytical frameworks referenced in this research, 
while chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes and PBC as well as gaps in the evidence base.  
Chapter 4 presents the data source, research design, and statistical models employed 
throughout this study, while chapter 5 provides an overview of some of the basic 
contextual information on the states considered in the analysis.  Chapters 6 through 9 
address the four research questions outlined in section 1.6.  Lastly, chapter 10 reviews the 
main findings of the study, offers some comments on its limitations, and outlines some 
implications for practice, theory and future research. 
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2 Theoretical underpinnings of my study: system theory, the 
relational models theory and the theory of social exchange 
 
2.1 The three theoretical models underpinnings my research hypotheses 
There are a number of possible analytical frameworks and theoretical constructs to explain 
how policy approaches such as PBC might be related to the amount of time children spend 
in care.  In this chapter, I make reference to three distinct models, which provide the 
analytical or theoretical underpinnings of my research hypotheses outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
The first, developed by Wulczyn, et al. (2010), serves as a framework for 
conceptualising how the implementation of different policy approaches aimed at expediting 
children’s exits from care might relate to specific timeliness outcomes at the state level (the 
first research hypothesis outlined in section 1.7).  The model, which draws on systems 
theory, also offers the theoretical justification for an important methodological objective of 
this study: namely, to better control for differences at the state and county level in selected 
characteristics of the out-of-home population and other contextual variables (see also 
chapter 4).   
The second model, based on the analytical framework by Testa (2001, 2008), 
provides a conceptual tool for classifying different approaches to promoting timely exits 
from care.  Specifically, I use the analytical categories identified by Testa to develop a 
simple typology, which serves as the basis for selecting the treatment and control states in 
my analysis.  As seen in chapter 1, the distinction between treatment states (PBC) and 
control states (non-PBC) is central to my first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses.  
This framework is also useful for addressing my second research hypothesis, which 
focuses on the relationship between various models of PBC and timeliness outcomes. 
Lastly, the third model, based on the theory of social exchange, provides the 
analytical construct for framing my research hypotheses.  In particular, it offers the 
justification for why PBC states should, at least in theory, record more timely exits from 
care compared to states that do not utilise this programme management tool (first 
hypothesis) as well as the rationale for why states that employ more stringent models of 
PBC should experience more timely exits compared to states that use PBC merely as an 
incentive to promote better performance (second hypothesis).  Lastly, the model establishes 
the conceptual underpinnings for the possible distortionary effects of PBC in terms of 
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various gaming behaviours (my fourth and fifth hypotheses) and permanency outcomes 
(sixth hypothesis).  
In the chapter, I present an overview of each of these models and describe how they 
are relevant for my research.  In addition, I provide a justification for why I chose them and 
discuss some of their more salient strengths and limitations.   
 
2.2 System theory and the “new” approach to child protection 
The analytical framework developed by Wulczyn, et al. (2010)—referred to by its authors 
as a “new” approach to child protection— represents a particularly useful model for 
conceptualising the relationship between a policy tool—in this case PBC—and a child 
welfare outcome such as reducing the amount of time children spend in out-of-home care.  
The model, which builds on system theory,
27
 identifies a number of elements which are 
central to my analysis (see Figure 2.1).  I briefly discuss four of these below. 
First, the framework recognises that systems—defined as “a collection of 
components or parts that are organized (i.e., connected to each other) around a common 
purpose or goal” (p. 10)—are influenced by their stated objectives within the normative 
framework of “laws, policies and commitments”.  In my research, the normative 
framework is represented by the various federal laws which emphasise timeliness as an 
important policy objective, including the ASFA, the APA and the FCSIAA (see chapter 1); 
while the child welfare goal is to expedite children’s exits from care in order to achieve 
permanency in a timely manner (see Figure 2.1).  
Second, the framework acknowledges that there is a critical relationship between the 
stated objectives of a system and its functions, i.e., the organised activities the system 
undertakes to achieve its goals.  In my research, federal laws have established a series of 
provisions aimed at reducing the amount of time children spend in care.  These include, as 
indicated in chapter 1, time-sensitive measures for the termination of parental rights (TPR), 
shortened judicial and administrative timeframes for hearings as well as measures to 
promote adoptions as a permanency alternative for children who were unlikely to exit care 
in a timely manner (Freundlich 2010) (see also Table A.1.2).  Yet, while many of these 
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 The basic premises of systems theory—an interdisciplinary, overarching body of theory used in sociology, 
biology and engineering—is that systems do not function in isolation.  Rather, there are interactions, 
interdependencies and synergies between the system and the context in which that system was developed.   
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federal laws are top-down, requiring states to modify their statutes or potentially lose all or 
part of their federal funding, states have followed different approaches to promoting timely 
exits from care (Beem 2006).  For instance, some states have employed PBC, while others 
have relied on more traditional models which do not tie the compensation of child welfare 
agencies to specific performance outcomes.  Wulczyn’s framework, therefore, recognizes 
that, while the functions of various state and local actors are shaped by the federal 
normative framework, they may pursue those objectives through different approaches and 
with different means.  This distinction is important in the context of my research since I 
seek to compare changes in the timeliness of permanency outcomes in PBC and non-PBC 
states.  
 
Figure 2.1. Analytical model for describing how different policy approaches 
might relate to the timeliness of exits from care at the state level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Wulczyn, et al. (2010 p. 19). 
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originates from, as well as the state they live in—what Wulczyn, et al. (2010) refer to as 
“actors and contexts”—also influence the ability of a system to achieve its stated 
objectives.
28
  Hence the amount of time children spend in care is not only related to various 
normative and policy frameworks at the state and local levels, but also to the characteristics 
of individual children, such as their age and race, as well as the characteristics of their 
families and their environment at large.  
Fourth, while the objectives of the system influence its functions, structures and 
capacities, the latter are also shaped by contextual factors.  For instance, even though states 
might share a common objective of reducing the amount of time children spend in care, 
they continue to differ in their availability and preference for certain types of placement 
settings, with some states, for instance, favouring placement with kin, and others placement 
with unrelated foster families (Mitchell, et al. 2005).  These differences also relate to 
contextual and other factors at the state and local level, including the administration and 
structure of service provision within child welfare agencies (McBeath and Meezan 2010; 
Wulczyn, et al. 2009).  
While these elements represent a useful starting point for framing my research, the 
framework by Wulczyn, et al. also relies on a number of assumptions that warrant further 
discussion.  First, underlying the framework is a deterministic interpretation of the 
relationship between a policy intervention and a specific set of outcomes—what Lynch-
Cerullo and Cooney (2011 p. 370) have referred to as “why, based on research, a 
program’s key components are expected to achieve results”.  Yet, in practice, being able to 
ascribe a cause-and-effect relationship between a policy tool and an outcome is far from 
straightforward.  The fact that a policy is accompanied by a positive outcome, for instance, 
does not necessarily imply that the policy is effective; rather other confounding factors, 
which might have been neither observed nor controlled for, could have intervened to obtain 
that result.  The same applies to negative outcomes.  In addition, outcomes might be 
positive for certain groups of children but not for others or be confined to a certain period 
time, as was the case in the state of Kansas where an initiative to “shorten stays and 
decrease the number of children in the foster care system” was so successful at first that it 
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 In this aspect, the framework by Wulczyn, et al. somewhat resembles the socio-ecological models 
developed by Urie Bronfenbrenner according to which outcomes are influenced by interactions at different 
levels. 
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distorted the composition of the population left in care, ultimately resulting in a significant 
worsening of the overall outcome measured (Berlin 2007 p. 4).  In practice, being able to 
establish a cause-effect relationship between a dependent variable and a set of explanatory 
variables depends largely on the type of research design employed as well as the type of 
data available.  As indicated in section 1.8, my analysis is ill suited for exploring this type 
of relationship (see also sections 3.3 and 4.3); a realization that I came to recognise in the 
course of my analysis. 
Second, the framework by Wulczyn, et al. embraces an evidence-based approach to 
policy-making (EBP).  This approach is essential to ensuring that a system has the ability 
to adjust and recalibrate itself to achieve what Testa (2010b p. 78) has referred to as 
“double-loop learning”, meaning the ability to “curtail current operations or develop 
alternative theory of action for attaining the desired outcomes” when policies fail to 
achieve their expected effects.  Yet this emphasis on EBP can be questioned.  Axford and 
Morpeth (2013), for instance, have put forward an articulate critique of EBP based on five 
distinct grounds (scientific, ideological, cultural, organizational and professional).  In my 
opinion, one of their strongest arguments relates to the meaning of “good practices” when 
the outcome measure employed lacks validity, meaning that it fails to capture what it is 
intended to measure.  This is why ensuring that outcome measures are adequately specified 
and measured is an important objective of my study (see section 1.8).  It is also the main 
reason for my extensive discussion of the validity of the measures of timeliness presented 
in the literature review (see section 3.3) as well as for my decisions to measure timeliness 
both as a categorical variable and as a continuous one (see section 4.5 for a more in-depth 
discussion of the rationale for this choice).   
 
2.3 The relational models theory and the PSBI/ND framework 
The analytical framework developed by Testa (2001, 2008), henceforth referred to as the 
primordial solidarities-bureaucratic institutions/narrow-diffuse (PSBI/ND) framework, 
provides a useful model for classifying different state approaches to expediting exits from 
care.  Specifically, Testa (2008 p. 110), building on the relational models theory developed 
by the anthropologist Alan Fiske (1992),
29
 categorized child welfare policies within a 
                                                 
29 While Testa and Poertner (2010) refer to Fiske’s relational models theory, earlier versions of the model did 
not. 
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rectangle (see Figure 2.2).  Two sides of the rectangle are defined by the scope of public 
interest, which can be either narrow or diffuse,
30
 while the other two sides are defined by 
the principle of social organization, which can either be informed by primordial solidarities 
or by bureaucratic institutions. 
31
  
 
Figure 2.2. The PSBI/ND framework 
 
 
 
Sources: Based on Testa and Poertner (2010 p. 49) and Testa (2008 p. 110).  
Notes: The above figure represents a simplified, combined representation of two versions of the 
framework by Testa. The text in italics refers to the categories identified by Fiske.  The light shaded area 
refers to the BI approach. 
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 The narrow scope of public interest recognizes that “intervention into autonomous family life is justified 
only if the physical safety, health, and sustenance needs of the child are jeopardized, e.g., when there are 
bruises, burns, malnutrition, or other bodily threats (…).  Under a more diffuse scope of interest, public 
intervention into the family is justified whenever it advances the overall well-being of the child” (Testa 2008 
p. 109). 
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 According to the primordial perspective, biological and kinship ties are paramount in making decisions 
regarding a child’s wellbeing.  Specifically, birth families, extended kin as well as close approximations of 
biological kinship “based on ethnicity, nationality, and religion” (Testa and Poertner 2010 p. 50) are the most 
suitable agents for promoting the best interests of the child.  Conversely, according to the bureaucratic 
perspective, parental rights are to be subordinated to considerations regarding who is the best agent to 
advance “the child’s well-being regardless of continuity with birth family or ascribed heritage” (Testa 2008 p. 
109). 
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According to Testa, policies that establish time-bound goals to improve the 
efficiency of the child welfare system fall under the bureaucratic institutions (BI) principle.  
In choosing the relational models theory, I decided to restrict my analysis to these so-called 
“BI states”.  My reason for doing so was simple: namely, to select a set of states that were 
all “highly” committed to the goal of improving the timeliness of permanency outcomes, so 
that, from a policy perspective, the main difference between the treatment and control 
states was whether or not they use PBC, rather than their normative stands towards 
timeliness.  
To identify the so-called “BI states”, I used the five provisions outlined in the ASFA 
related to promoting timely exits from out-of-home care.
32
  For each measure, I assigned a 
score of one to states that complied with the guidelines for timeliness set out in the ASFA, 
while states that fell short or exceeded those provisions were given a value of either zero or 
two, respectively.  I then summed the scores across the five measures.  States that had a 
score of four or higher were classified as “meeting or exceeding” the guidelines related to 
promoting timely permanency outcomes established in federal law.  Conversely, states that 
scored less than four on the index were considered to have fallen short of those provisions.  
On the basis of this classification, forty states plus the District of Columbia met or 
exceeded federal provisions related to timeliness, while ten states fell short.  I considered 
all states that met or exceeded those provisions to be following the BI approach and 
restricted my analysis to this set of states.   
The PSBI/ND framework also provides a useful analytical construct to distinguish 
between states that employ (treatment) or do not employ (control) PBC.  Specifically, 
according to Testa and Poertner (2010 p. 51) under a narrow, market based interpretation 
of public interest, “bureaucratic agents are best held accountable by financial incentives, 
performance contracts, and monitoring systems (…) that discourage self-interested 
defections from norms of responsible child caring”.  I, therefore, classified states that 
follow a BI approach and use PBC as BI/N, while I considered all other states BI/D,
33
 
where “N” stands for “narrow” and “D” for diffuse scope of public interest.  Based on the 
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 The five measures are as follows: (1) concurrent planning, (2) the 15 of 22 month standard, (3) case reviews 
within six months, (4) permanency hearings within twelve months of the initial placement; and 
(5) permanency hearings every twelve months thereafter. 
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 For simplicity, I also classify states that fall between the narrow and diffuse scope of public interest a “D”. 
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above classification, eight states, including Illinois, Kansas and North Carolina, can be 
considered BI/N, while thirty-three states, including California, New Jersey and 
Washington follow the BI/D approach since they were not employing this performance 
management tool at the time of this research.  I used the former group to select my 
treatment states, while I used the latter to identify the controls (see also section 4.3).   
In addition, the above mentioned classification can be used to differentiate between 
various models of PBC.  Specifically, the more stringent models of PBC, such as the pure 
pay-for-performance model, can be conceptualised as falling under the narrower dimension 
of the spectrum of public interest, while models that rely on PBC merely as an incentive to 
promote better performance can be seen as following somewhere in between narrow and 
diffuse scope of public interest. 
While the PSBI/ND framework allows me to group states into a series of mutually 
exclusive categories, a number of decisions related to the operationalisation of this 
framework warrant further discussion.  One such choice was to limit my analysis to a 
sample of states rather than all children entering care in the United States.  This decision, 
which was informed mainly by considerations related to data availability and completeness 
(see also chapter 4), raised the challenge of minimising potential selection bias.  I 
employed the PSBI/ND framework partially for this purpose.  In reality, nearly any sample, 
unless identified from a robust sampling frame, with a rigorous sampling design, is likely 
to introduce some sort of bias in the interpretation of results as well as limit the 
generalizability of findings.  I return to discuss this issue in chapters 4 and 10. 
A second aspect that requires further clarification relates to the research design 
employed.  Specifically, I chose to use a multiple baseline design (see section 4.3) which 
calls for both treatment and controls.
34
  While this type of design falls short of the more 
rigorous requirements for establishing causal relationships, using the PSBI/ND framework 
to distinguish between treatment and control states represents a step towards minimising 
some of the aspects which might confound the interpretation of results, such as states’ 
normative stands towards timeliness.  I consider the latter to be particularly important since 
states that actively pursue the goal of improving the timeliness of permanency outcomes 
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 In making this choice, I distanced myself from much of the previous literature on the relationship between 
PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes, which has tended to focus on one state at a time (see 
sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
41 
are more likely to experience a reduction in the amount of time children spend in care, 
regardless of whether or not they employ PBC.  Failing to account for such differences, 
therefore, could bias the interpretation of results.  However, I also recognize that limiting 
my analysis to BI states represents only a crude proxy of a state’s “commitment” to the 
goal of timeliness.  Further, the use of the PSBI/ND framework does not account for other 
confounding or intervening factors that might be related to timeliness of permanency 
outcomes such as states’ emphasis on reducing racial disproportionality at entry, their 
preferences for various placement settings or the fact that states which are less successful 
in expediting children’s exits from care may be more likely to adopt a more 
“interventionist” approach such as PBC (see also chapters 3 and 4). 
Lastly, my choice of using the five provisions outlined in the ASFA as a way to 
identify the BI states requires some further discussion.  While this decision can be justified 
in light of the importance the ASFA places on timeliness, my choice of using an index is 
probably too simplistic.  Further, other measures could have been chosen to complement 
the ones put forward, including responses by state or local administrators to the National 
Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being (NSCAW).  I decided not to use such 
measures because, owing to reasons of data confidentiality, I was unable to access 
NSCAW data with the appropriate level of disaggregation.  Future research could also 
consider collecting primary data from state or local policymakers and practitioners on this 
subject (see also chapter 10).  
 
2.4 Theory of social exchange: a theoretical framework for approaching PBC 
In my view, one of the most useful models for approaching PBC is the theory of social 
exchange; a body of theory widely used in sociology and psychology (Blau 1964; Thibaut 
and Kelley 1959).
35
  One of the central tenants of this theory is that systems, like 
individuals, are motivated mainly by rational self-interest and that, consequently, their 
performance can be influenced by financial incentives or penalties.  Under this 
deterministic assumption, monetary compensation alone would be enough to induce 
performance, without the mediation of other intervening factors, since the individuals 
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 A number of other theoretical frameworks have been used in relation to PBC, including principal agent 
theory, institutional theory, and resource dependency (Kearney, et al. 2012a; McBeath 2006; Taylor and 
Shaver 2010).  I briefly discuss the latter in relation to the limitations of the theory of social exchange. 
42 
which make up the system would collectively conform to more beneficial social behaviours 
while seeking to avoid the potential costs of noncompliance.  Implicit in this theoretical 
framework is also the assumption that without such incentives, rational actors would not 
collectively strive to achieve a stated policy objective, overlooking the value that 
individuals might assign to other non-monetary factors such as group solidarity or personal 
satisfaction.   
A second important aspect of this theory is that it presumes a positivist approach to 
programme evaluation, whereby not only there is consensus on which outcomes should be 
pursued, but also confidence that such outcomes can be adequately quantified and 
measured.  In the case of PBC, this means that all actors involved, be they caseworkers, 
administrators or managers of child welfare systems, are assumed to have access to 
information about the costs and benefits associated with their behaviour.  Further, it 
implies that the outcome measures on the basis of which penalties and incentives are 
apportioned are aligned with the policy objectives of the child welfare system and that the 
system discourages and seeks to correct gaming behaviours such as “parking”. 
In presenting the theory of social exchange, I am aware of some of its limitations.  
Below I outline three of the most salient of these in relation to the objectives of my study.  
A first limitation is that, according to the literature on institutional theory, entities tend to 
respond differently to institutional processes and pressures.  These responses include 
compliance, avoidance, defiance and manipulation (Lynch-Cerullo and Cooney 2011).  In 
systems with higher levels of resource dependencies, meaning that the benefits are closely 
aligned for various actors, there is often a higher tendency to comply with policy 
objectives.  While it is possible, as assumed by the proponents of PBC, that the interests of 
the contracting agencies generally converge with those of the state, it is probable that the 
existence of incentives might engender manipulative behaviours as well.  Private entities, 
for instance, might seek to meet quantitative targets by providing additional services to 
children who are more likely to exit care in a timely manner; the so-called marginal 
cases.
36
  This, in turn, might change the composition of the child population served, with 
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 As seen in section 1.7, if the timeliness of permanency was to improve for groups of children known to exit 
care more quickly, but not for groups known to be slower in achieving permanency, this might represent an 
indication of “cherry picking”. 
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the more “difficult” cases remaining in care, which, in turn, might have a negative impact 
on the timeliness of exits in the long run.  I return to explore these issues in chapter 8. 
A second limitation of the theory of social exchange is that it does not adequately 
address the complex nature of the relationship between the so-called principal—which in 
the case of this study is the state—and the various entities hired to provide the contracted 
services—the agents.  This issue, which has also been referred to as the “principal-agent 
problem”, arises when a principal “compensates an agent for performing certain acts in a 
world of conflicting interests, information asymmetry, uncertainty, and strategic action” 
(Taylor and Shaver 2010 p. 292).  Based on the theory of social exchange, for instance, 
both the principal and the agents operating in states that employ PBC should share the 
common objective of reducing the number of placements in care, particularly of children 
less likely to exit care in a timely manner.
37
  However, the interests of the state and 
contractors may not always converge, with the government entities responsible for 
investigating and making placement decisions primarily motivated by concerns about the 
child’s safety, and the private agencies hired to provide back-end services mainly seeking 
to expedite children’s exits from care in order to maximise their own profit.
38
  Further, 
even when the principal and agents share a common interest, they often lack access to the 
necessary information to make rational choices.  McCullough and Associates, Inc. (2005) 
identified at least fifteen distinct limitations which may go beyond the individual 
contractor’s ability to exercise agency and that might hinder results in a PBC setting.
39
  I 
return to discuss these types of principle-agent problems in conjunction with my fourth and 
fifth hypotheses in chapter 8. 
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 According to Taylor and Shaver (2010 p. 313) the state also has much to lose if placements in-care 
increase, while, “if intake decreas(es), PBC present(s) the public sector with a straightforward mechanism to 
capture savings”.  Likewise, the contracting entities benefit from having smaller number of children entering 
care since it is easier for them to provide high-quality services. 
38
 The theory of resource dependency also raises similar concern by highlighting the lack of strategic 
alignment between the entities that make decisions and control resources and those which are dependent on 
the latter. 
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 These include: (1) lack of coordination and poor communication between the staff of the principal and 
agents; (2) inadequate service capacity on the part of the agents; (3) inadequate financing for the services to 
be provided; (4) lack of understanding of legal issues and experience in engaging with the courts by the 
agents; and (5) lack of sensitivity to cultural and linguistic competence. 
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A third limitation relates to what Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) have referred to as 
the theory of new institutionalism.
40
  According to this theory, the rational-actor models of 
classical economics are not always appropriate for explaining performance in more 
complex social systems.  Specifically, the authors reject the notion that a system’s 
outcomes can be “reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals’ attributes 
or motives”.  Instead, they argue that every system’s performance is largely shaped by its 
broader social, economic and political environment.  Whether individual agent’s decisions 
are affected by PBC and how the latter interact with broader environmental aspects is a 
complex issue.  It is likely, however, as anticipated in section 2.2, that a number of 
contextual factors, including policies at both the federal and state level, as well as secular 
trends contribute to shaping the timeliness of permanency outcomes which cannot be 
attributed to the influence of financial incentives alone.  While my analysis, owing to 
constraints in both the data and research design, is unable to address these aspects in detail, 
I recognise the need for a more nuanced theoretical framework to shed light on the 
relationship between PBC and timeliness (see also chapter 10).   
In spite of these limitations, there are at least two reasons why I believe that the 
theory of social exchange provides a useful construct for “framing” the research 
hypotheses outlined in section 1.7.  First, I think that it reflects the broader theoretical 
assumptions of how PBC is designed to work, at least on paper.  Government entities hire 
contractors to provide a series of services and monitor their performance in relation to a 
series of quantitative outcomes, which in turn reflect the broader objectives of the child 
welfare system.  The contractors strive to achieve the stated outcomes because doing so 
will maximise their own utility, expressed in monetary terms.  As a result, they chose to 
conform to the “culture” and norms promoted by the state.  Further, the government is 
presumed to have the necessary information and analytical tools to assess and evaluate 
contractors’ performance through changes in outcomes.  Contractors that perform well are 
rewarded through additional contracts and higher compensation for their services, while the 
underperforming contractors are forced out of business by market pressures.  In presenting 
these narrow set of assumptions, I do not suggest that this is how PBC operates in reality.  
Rather, I contend that this is a simplistic approximation of how PBC is intended to work. 
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  The theory of new institutionalism is part of the broader institutional theory. 
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Second, I believe that any evaluation of the “effectiveness” of PBC should be 
undertaken within a framework that reflects its intended policy objectives.  My reason for 
choosing this approach is simple: if PBC were to fall short of achieving its own stated 
objectives, measured in terms of outcomes, even within the narrow “confines” of the 
theoretical framework in which it was formulated, then I would argue that this policy tool 
needs to be examined more critically.  For this reason, I content that the theoretical 
assumptions underlying PBC, which are central to the hypotheses outlined in section 1.7, 
need to be evaluated and tested alongside the outcomes themselves. 
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3 Performance based contracting and the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes: an overview of the evidence base and gaps in knowledge 
 
3.1 Scope and structure of the literature review 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between the use of 
PBC and the timeliness of exits from care, as well as on various negative distortionary 
effects which might accompany the use of this performance management tool.  The chapter 
considers forty studies out of some eighty articles and reports that were reviewed overall.
41
  
To identify these studies, I carried out a search in several online bibliographic databases, 
including ScienceDirect and ProQuest using, among others, the keywords and phrases 
“performance-based contracting”, “foster care”, “timeliness”, “permanency” and “exit”.  
For titles which I deemed of particular importance, I carried out a reverse citation search.  
In addition, I undertook an extensive review of the so-called grey literature on the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes, comprising reports, statistical analyses and policy 
briefs prepared by the federal government, state authorities, as well as by non-profit 
organizations, including the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Urban Institute.  In 
conducting the literature review, I also made use of the comprehensive bibliography on the 
subject compiled by the Child Welfare Information Gateway of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Children’s Bureau, covering research published between 
2007 and 2012. 
The chapter is structured as followed.  First, I provide a brief overview of the 
literature that has examined the relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes.  I then focus on some of the methodological limitations of existing 
studies.  I briefly describe some of the main findings regarding possible negative 
distortionary effects of PBC both in terms of gaming as well as on permanency outcomes.  
Lastly, I summarise the main findings in the literature relevant to my study and describe 
how my research seeks to address some of the gaps in the evidence base. 
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 Because the body of literature on PBC is relatively limited, I decided to include in this review papers and 
articles, which I deem to be methodologically or otherwise relevant, even when they do not explicitly seek to 
explore the relationship between this particular type of performance management tool and the amount of time 
children spend in care. 
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3.2 Evidence on the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of exits from care 
The majority of the studies that have focused on the relationship between the use of PBC 
and the timeliness of permanency outcomes, have found this type of programme 
management tool to be positively associated with timely exits from care (see also Table 
3.1).  For instance, according to Garstka, et al. (2012) Illinois recorded a significant 
reduction in the amount of time children spent in residential care following the 
implementation of PBC.  Likewise in Florida, where PBC came into effect between 1998 
and 2003 (Myslewicz 2008), the percentage of children exiting care within twelve months 
of entry rose from 30 per cent in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2004 (Office of Program Policy 
Analysis and Government Accountability - OPPAGA 2006 pp. 4-5).  Other studies that 
have found a positive relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes include those by Alpert, et al. (2011) for Tennessee, Haslag, et al. 
(2012) for Missouri, Shaver (2006) for Cook County, Illinois, and Vargo, et al. (2006) for 
Florida.  
While this body of research suggests that the timeliness of exits may have improved 
in states that employ PBC, the validity of these findings has been challenged by a small 
number of studies that have used alternative measures of timeliness.  The Children and 
Family Research Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, for instance, 
focusing on cohorts of children who entered care in the 1990s, concluded that there had 
been little change in the median amount of time children spent in care in Illinois since the 
introduction of PBC (Fuller, et al. 2010 p. 2-16).  Likewise, Meezan and McBeath (2003a), 
focusing on Wayne County, Michigan, found that, after controlling for differences in child 
population served, the six agencies which employed PBC did not record more timely 
permanency outcomes compared to the three control agencies.
42
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 Timely exits in this study refer to exits that occurred within 300 days of placement; a “threshold” that was 
selected because agencies received a cash payment of 1,850 U.S. dollars for every child that achieved 
permanency within that timeline. 
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The Child Welfare Outcome Reports to Congress (CWOR) and the Child and Family 
Services Reviews (CFSR)
43
—the main tools employed in the United States to monitor 
performance with regard to federal child welfare requirements and standards—also appear 
to cast doubt on the positive association between the use of PBC and timely exits from 
care.  A number of states including Florida, Illinois and Kansas, all of which employ this 
performance management tool, have consistently performed below national standards in 
terms of the proportion of timely reunifications or adoptions.  However, because the 
CWOR and CFSR do not control for differences in levels of timeliness between states prior 
to the implementation of PBC, interpreting the meaning of this relationship based on these 
reports is not straightforward (see also chapters 4 and 7).  Specifically, states that have less 
timely outcomes to start with may be more likely to embrace a programme management 
tool perceived to be associated with improved permanency outcomes compared to states 
that are already satisfied with their performance.  The fact that states with less timely exits 
employ PBC, therefore, could be a consequence, rather than a “cause” of the longer 
amount of time spent by children in care in those states. 
The complexity of interpreting the evidence base on the relationship between the use 
of PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes is also apparent from the debate on 
whether various states should privatise their child welfare systems.  The report prepared by 
the Center for Public Policy Priorities (CPPP) (2008), a non-profit institute focused on 
public policies in Texas, provides an example.  The study, which was undertaken to 
explore whether the state should implement PBC, compares the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes in Texas with that of two states that privatised their child welfare system and 
employed PBC (Kansas and Florida), and concludes that Texas, which did not employ this 
performance management tool, fared better than the two PBC states in terms of both the 
percentage of children who were reunited with their families within twelve months of entry 
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 The CWORs are annual reports published since 1998 in accordance with section 203(a) of the ASFA, 
while the CFSRs, which were first introduced in 2000, aim to ensure greater conformity with federal child 
welfare requirements, namely Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (SSA)—the federal programme which 
oversees funding for out-of-home care and adoption services in the United States—and Title IV-B of the 
SSA—the federal programme which oversees funding for child and family services in the United States.  At 
the time of this research, two rounds of the CFSR have been conducted and a third round was being planned 
for the period 2015 to 2018. The CFSR and CWOR are both published by the Children Bureau of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families. 
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into care, as well as the proportion of adoptions within twenty-four months of a child’s 
placement in care.   
The Texas Alliance for Children and Family Services (TACFS), a nonprofit 
organisation dedicated to providing services to children and families, however, objected to 
the way in which the CPPP presented the evidence on the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes in Florida, arguing that while Florida had failed to meet many of “the state 
standards and goals for performance indicators”, agencies were “making progress in 
coming closer to the state standards”; a finding that the authors felt was not made explicit 
in the report by the CPPP (Texas Alliance for Children and Family Services 2008 pp. 10-
11). 
 
Table 3.1. Selected studies that refer to the relationship between PBC and the 
timeliness of various permanency outcomes 
Study Study population and sample size Statistical method 
 
A number of reports focused on the state of Washington raise similar issues.  The 
report prepared by Washington Federation of State Employees (WFSE) (2010), suggests 
that Washington recorded more timely adoption or reunification compared to a number of 
Alpert, et al. (2011) Survey with key informants in Tennessee 
conducted between February and April 2010 
(N=51) and aggregate data collected by the 
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services 
on all children in care in the state 
Descriptive statistics 
CPPP (2008) All children in care in Florida, Kansas and 
Texas based on the CFSR for the fiscal years 
2005 and 2006  
Descriptive statistics 
Fuller, et al. (2010) All children entering care in Illinois based on 
the Illinois Department of Children and 
Family Services for the years 2003-2010  
Descriptive statistics 
Garstka, et al. (2012) Survey with key informants in Florida, Illinois 
and Missouri conducted between 2007-2010 
(N=554) 
Descriptive statistics 
Haslag, et al. (2012) All children in care in Missouri for the years 
2005-2008 
Descriptive statistics 
Meezan and McBeath (2003a) Structured telephone interviews from pilot and 
non-pilot agencies (N=84) and a sample of 
children entering care (N=244) in Wayne 
County, Michigan in 2001 
Descriptive statistics and 
multivariate logistic 
regression 
Vargo, et al. (2006) All children entering care in Florida based on 
the State Child Welfare Information System 
for the years 2001-2005 (N=373,528) 
Descriptive statistics 
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states that employed PBC, including Florida, Illinois and Kansas.  Armstrong and 
McCullough (2010 p. 13 p. 15), however, criticised this study noting that “two of the 
comparison states (Florida, Kansas) have significantly lower median and mean lengths of 
stay than Washington”, further adding that “many factors must be considered when 
comparing one state’s performance to another on any one measure or across measures or in 
describing trends over time”. 
 
3.3 Some of the methodological limitations of studies focused on the timeliness of 
exits from care 
So far I have illustrated some of the challenges which can arise in interpreting the findings 
in the literature.
 44
  In the sections below, I further elaborate on why, on the basis of the 
current body of evidence, it is difficult to make inferences about the effectiveness of PBC 
in expediting timely exits from care.  These reasons fall into two broad categories: those 
which relate to the validity of the outcome measures selected, and those associated with the 
type of research design chosen.
 45
  In relation to the former, the outcome measures 
employed to assess the effectiveness of a policy have to be valid, meaning that they 
“capture” what they are intended to measure.  Measures of timeliness which rely on PIT 
estimates or exit cohorts, as well as measures which focus on a limited spectrum of 
permanency outcomes do not fulfil this criterion. 
In relation to the latter, because randomised experiments are often unfeasible in 
research on child welfare policies because of ethical or other considerations, most of the 
studies considered are based on quasi-experimental designs or case studies (see also 
chapter 4).  However, for such studies to have some degree of internal and external 
                                                 
44 As anticipated in the beginning of the chapter, I decided to include in this review papers and articles, which 
I deemed to be relevant, even though they did not directly explore the relationship between PBC and the 
timeliness of exits from care.  The fact that the objective of many of these studies was different from my own 
may explain, in part, the reason for the difference in outcome measures and design chosen.   
45
 According to Campbell (1957), there are two types of validity in a research design: internal validity, which 
refers to “the truth value that can be assigned to the conclusion that a cause-effect relationship between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable has been established within the context of the particular 
research setting” and external validity, which refers to the generalizability of causal findings (Brewer and 
Crano 2014 p. 12).  I discussion these aspects in more detail in the sub-sections related to the validity of the 
research design.   
51 
validity, they need to meet a number of requirements.  First they must include a pre- and a 
post-, meaning that evaluations are carried out over time, before and after the 
implementation of the policy being assessed.  Second, they need to contain a control group 
so that inferences about the impact of the intervention can be drawn based on a group 
which was not exposed to the policy being considered.  Lastly, they need to account for 
differences between the treatment and control groups in terms of various factors, and 
particularly those which are known to have a mediating or confounding effect on the 
outcome variables of interest.   
 
Validity of the outcome measure: PIT estimates or exit cohorts 
Most of the studies of children in out-of-home care in the United States, including the 
annual reports published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
46
 have 
focused on PIT estimates; an approach which is increasingly being viewed as unsuitable 
for studying changes in the timeliness of exits (Courtney, et al. 2004; McDonald and Testa 
2010; U.S. General Accounting Office 2002; Wulczyn, et al. 2007).  Specifically, there is 
concern that PIT estimates may give more weight to children who have been in care for 
longer amounts of time, thus potentially confounding the interpretation of policy 
interventions. 
The practice employed in both the CWOR and the CFSR of monitoring the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes through exit cohorts is also inappropriate; since it 
tends to underestimate the amount of time it takes for children to exit care, masking the 
challenges faced by children with longer placement spells, who also tend to be the most 
vulnerable and the most difficult to serve (Courtney, et al. 2004).
47
 
This is why the U.S. General Accounting Office (2002) argues that PIT estimates and 
exit cohorts are not suitable for studying changes in permanency outcomes over time.  
Studies based on prospective cohorts, that follow a group of children from the time of entry 
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 The CWOR and CFSR monitor the timeliness of permanency outcomes through a variety of indicators and 
composite measures; many of which are only presented for a cross-sectional “snapshot” of children in care at 
a certain point in time (McDonald and Testa 2010).  Further, this approach fails to account for truncated, 
selected and censored data. 
47 See also Table A.1.1 for a list of the composite measures related to the timeliness of permanency in the 
CWOR and the CFSR.  
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into out-of-home care until the time of exit, are preferable from a methodological 
perspective, although from a practical standpoint the data required are often difficult to 
obtain or generate (see also chapter 4).  
 
Table 3.2. Selected studies that employ entry cohorts to assess the timeliness 
of exits from out-of-home care 
Study Study population and sample size Statistical method 
Note: Relevant studies are reported in the tables as they first occur.  Hence the studies by Fuller, et 
al. (2010) and Vargo, et al. (2006) are presented in Table 2.1 but not in Table 2.2.  The same applies to the 
other tables in chapter 2. 
 
A relatively large number of studies, including those by Courtney and Hook (2012), 
Koh and Testa (2011), Shaw (2010) and Wulczyn, e al. (2007) have examined the amount 
of time children spend in care using entry cohorts without, however, explicitly focusing on 
the relationship between timeliness and PBC (see Table 3.2).  Only a handful of the studies 
that have examined the relationship between PBC and the amount of time children spend in 
care have used prospective cohorts (Fuller, et al. 2010; Taylor and Shaver 2010; Testa 
2010a; Vargo, et al. 2006).   
Courtney and Hook (2012) Children entering care between 2001 and 
2007 in Washington state, using data from the 
Case and Management Information System 
(N=36,797) 
Event history models for 
competing risks 
Koh and Testa (2011) Sample of all children entering care in Illinois 
between 2001 and 2007 using the AFCARS 
dataset (N=62,278) 
Propensity score matching 
and survival analysis 
Shaw (2010) All children who entered care between 2001 
and 2003 in California using data from the 
California Child Welfare Services System 
(N=74,321) 
Logistic regression and 
survival analysis 
Taylor and Shaver (2010) All children who entered care in Cook 
County, Illinois between 1990 and 2000 and 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 2002 and 
2005  
Descriptive statistics 
Testa (2010a) All children entering care in Illinois between 
1981 and 2007 using the AFCARS dataset  
Logistic regression 
Wulczyn, et al. (2007) Pooled multi-state cohort of children entering 
care between 2000 and 2005 using the 
MFCDA dataset (N=348,695) 
Cox proportional hazards 
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Validity of the outcome measure: a limited spectrum of permanency outcomes  
Another limitation of much of the evidence base reviewed in this chapter is that it tends to 
focus only on a specific permanency outcome, usually adoption or reunification (see for 
instance Blackstone, et al. 2004; Hansen 2007; McDonald, et al. 2000; Snowden, et al. 
2008; Wells and Guo 2004; Wulczyn, et al. 2009).  This can be misleading since, 
depending on the type of outcome measure chosen, a state can emerge as either very 
effective or very ineffective at promoting timely exits from care.  For instance, in 2010 the 
state of Vermont was among the most successful in promoting adoption in a timely 
manner, but among the least effective in expediting reunifications (see Figure 3.1).   
 
Figure 3.1. Percentage of children exiting care in a timely manner through 
reunification or adoption 
Reunification  
 
Adoption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families, Children's Bureau (2002, 2012c, 2012d) 
Note: The median value for children reunified or adopted within twenty-four months of placement in 
2010 was 90.2 per cent and 32.6 per cent, respectively.  
 
       Above U.S. median value in 2010 and increased between 1998 and 2010 
       Above U.S. median value in 2010 but declined between 1998 and 2010 
       Equal to or below U.S. median value in 2010 and increased between 1998 and 2010 
       Equal to or below U.S. median value in 2010 but declined between 1998 and 2010 
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Further, assessments which focus primarily on reunification or adoption,
48
 such as 
those in the CWORs and the CFSRs, tend to underreport other permanency options such as 
guardianship or placement with relatives, which are increasingly being pursued for children 
who are unable to exit care in a timely manner through other permanency outcomes.  In 
states such as Illinois or North Carolina, which rank among the lowest in terms of 
promoting adoption or reunification in a timely manner, guardianship has been used 
successfully to reduce children’s length of stay in care (Department of Children and Family 
Services, State of Illinois 2009; North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 
Division of Social Services 2007).  Examining the full range of permanency outcomes, 
therefore, is important to obtain a more complete and accurate picture of differences in 
timeliness of exits from out-of-home care across states. 
Another reason for including the full spectrum of permanency is that studies that 
have considered a broader range of such outcomes generally confirm that the timeliness of 
exits varies considerably depending on the type of permanency outcome children 
experience.  Specifically, children who exit care through adoption tend to be less likely to 
achieve permanency during the first year in care, but tend to exit more rapidly thereafter 
(Akin 2011; Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Connell, et al. 2006; Courtney and Wong 1996; 
Testa, et al. 2008; Wulczyn 2004; Wulczyn, et al. 2000, 2006b).  In contrast, among 
children who exit through reunification, the longer they remain in care the less likely they 
are to achieve permanency in a timely manner; a phenomenon known as negative duration 
dependence (Courtney 1994; Courtney and Wong 1996; Goerge 1990).  Since some 
permanency outcomes are associated with more timely exits from care, it is important to 
control for such differences across sites (Akin 2011; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b).  Specifically, 
actors—be they child welfare agencies or larger administrative entities such as counties or 
states—that favour one type of permanency outcome may experience, by virtue of that 
preference alone, very different overall durations in care compared to others that mainly 
pursue other permanency options.  Examining the full spectrum of permanency outcomes 
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 The emphasis on reunification and adoption in the CWORs and the CFSRs is consistent with the 
preference accorded to these two permanency outcomes in U.S. laws such as the SSA (see also footnote 22). 
Further, at the time when these measures were first developed for the CWORs, other permanency options 
respresented much smaller shares of all permanency outcomes. While the CFSRs added meaures focusing on 
the proprtion of  guardianship—though not with an emphais on timeliness—they mainly sought to maintain 
“consistency” with the existing CWORs. 
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is also important from a policy perspective, since “(t)he manner in which agencies and 
workers move towards different client outcomes, and the crowding out that may occur 
when one outcome is privileged over others, remain unobserved when linked program 
outcomes are studied in isolation” (McBeath and Meezan 2010 p. 103).   
 
Validity of the research design: studies that focus only on one point in time or locality  
As anticipated in chapter 1, it is difficult to assess the relationship between a policy and an 
outcome focusing on only one point in time since other factors, including secular trends, 
could confound the interpretation of results.  Yet, relatively few studies include a time 
component in their design and of these even fewer focus on the period preceding and 
following the implementation of the policy they seek to assess (see Table 3.3).  The need to 
include information on more than one point in time—preferably prior to and after the 
implementation of the policy being examined—stems from what McDonald and Testa 
(2010 p. 106) have referred to as the need for “historical controls”, namely the ability to 
compare outcome measures over time as a way of assessing performance with respect to 
specific child welfare goals or targets.   
 
Table 3.3. Selected studies on permanency that have incorporated a time component 
Study Study population and sample size Statistical method 
Green, et al. (2007)  Sample of mothers in Oregon who had at least one 
child placed in care either in 1996-1998 or in 1999-
2001 (N=1,911) 
Logistic regression 
McDonald, et al. (2000) Sample of children in care in Kentucky between 1994 
and 1998 using the state database CARE (N=2,538) 
Survival analysis 
Mitchell, et al. (2005) Interviews with public child welfare agencies from 92 
counties, 1999- 2000 using the Local Agency Survey 
Descriptive statistics 
Vericker, et al. (2007) All children entering care between 2000 and 2003 
using the AFCARS dataset (N=252,000) 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Wells and Guo (2004) All children entering care in Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
between 1995-1996 and 1998-1999 (N=903) 
Cox proportional hazards 
Wulczyn, et al. (2000) Children entering care in twelve states between 1983 
and 1998 using the MFCDA dataset (N=1,432,499) 
Cox proportional hazards  
Wulczyn, et al. (2005) Pooled multi-state cohort of children entering care 
between 1990 and 2002 in seven states using the 
MFCDA dataset (N=611,674) 
Cox proportional hazards  
Wulczyn, et al. (2006a) Pooled multi-state cohort of children entering care 
between 1990 and 2002 in six states using the 
MFCDA dataset (N=390,348) 
Discrete-time hazard 
Wulczyn, et al. (2006b) Children entering care between 2000 and 2005 in 
Tennessee using the MFCDA dataset (N=25,795) 
Descriptive statistics and 
regression 
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In addition to considering historical controls, it is also important to include more than 
one locality at a time.  This information is necessary to address one of the major criticisms 
levelled by various authors including Courtney, et al. (2011a, 2011b), Courtney and Hook 
(2012) and Golden and Macomber (2009) against studies that have attempted to examine 
changes in the timeliness of permanency outcomes, namely that they do not take into 
consideration cross-state variability in policy approaches or in populations served (see also 
Table 3.4).  Information on different localities can serve to differentiate the target or 
treatment population—in the case of my research the states that employ PBC—from the 
control group—namely, states that do not.
49
  
Why is it necessary to include such controls?  One of the main reasons is that, owing 
to what are often referred to as secular trends, states may record improvements in the 
timeliness of outcomes for reasons other than the policy being evaluated (Taylor and 
Shaver 2010).  In the case of PBC, if no controls were employed, one might erroneously 
attribute all change to the implementation of that policy intervention alone, rather than 
looking at other factors, which might have a mediating or confounding effect.  In my 
research, there are a number of normative and policy trends which might be relevant to 
consider (see discussion in section 3.5 below).  In reality, accounting for heterogeneity in 
populations is not straightforward and only comparative studies that use random 
assignment are able to minimise some of the systematic differences between groups (see 
also section 4.3 and chapter 5). 
Unfortunately much of the literature on the timeliness of permanency outcomes 
focuses on only one state or county at a time, meaning that many of these studies lack a 
control (Akin 2011; Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Cheng 2010; Elder, et al. 2012; Kearney, 
et al. 2012a; Koh and Testa 2011; McBeath and Meezan 2009; Rockhill, et al. 2007; 
Yampolskaya et al. 2011).  Others have pooled entry cohorts across states (Wulczyn, et al. 
2005, 2006a, 2007), making it challenging to assess whether approaches at the state level 
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 Finding an appropriate control is challenging and depends both on the purpose of the research as well as 
data availability and other constraints.  As indicated in chapter 4, random assignment is often viewed as 
yielding the most valid controls.  Statistical techniques such as propensity score matching can also be used to 
minimise some of the heterogeneity between groups, however, such approaches also have limitations, 
including the inability to control for unobserved variables and secular trends. 
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are associated with different outcomes in terms of the amount of time children spend in 
care.   
 
Table 3.4. Selected studies on permanency that have incorporated a spatial dimension 
Study Study population and sample size Statistical method 
 
To my knowledge, only a small number of studies have employed a multi-year, 
multi-state perspective to examine the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  The study by 
Wulczyn, et al. (2000), for instance, used cohorts of children who entered care between 
1990 and 1998 in seven states (Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and 
Wisconsin) and children who entered care between 1983 and 1998 in four states (Illinois, 
Michigan, Missouri, and New York) to examine the duration of spells in care.  The authors 
found that the median length of time in care varied greatly among the states considered, 
Courtney, et al. (2011a) Children entering care between 2001 and 2007 
in Washington state, using data from the Case 
and Management Information System 
(N=36,797) 
Event history models for 
competing risks and 
Kaplan-Meier estimate of 
survival 
Courtney and Wong (1996) A sample of children entering care in 
California during the first half of 1988 and who 
exited care by December 1992 (N=8,625) 
Cox proportional Hazards 
Marcenko, et al. (2011) A matched sample of children in out-of-home 
care (N=696) in Washington and their parents 
(N=408) between 2007 and 2010, using 
administrative data 
Cox proportional Hazards 
McDonald, et al. (2006) Children entering care on or after January 1, 
1999 in Oklahoma, using administrative data 
for thirty-three counties (N=20,291) 
Regression 
Peters (2012)  Sample of children in care who had their 
seventeenth birthday between 1997 and 2005 
in Illinois, using administrative data 
(N=12,272) 
Ordinary least squares 
regression 
Smith (2003) Cohort of children who became eligible for 
adoption following TPR in October 1997 using 
the AFCARS dataset (N=1,995) 
Cox proportional Hazards 
Snowden, et al. (2008) Random selection of a cohort of children in 
care based on the AFCARS dataset 
(N=60,000) 
Classification tree analysis 
Optimal Data Analysis 
(ODA) 
Testa, et al. (2008) Cohort of children entering care in four states 
using the AFCARS dataset 
Descriptive statistics  
 
U.S. Children Bureau, CWORs 
(annual) 
All children entering care in the United States 
using the AFCARS dataset 
Descriptive statistics 
U.S. Children Bureau, CFSRs 
(two rounds) 
All children entering care in the United States 
using the AFCARS dataset 
Descriptive statistics 
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with Iowa recording the lowest median value (around three months) and Illinois the highest 
(over three years).  The results are potentially confounded, however, because the study did 
not control for differences in the race or placement setting of children in care or for other 
policy or contextual variables at the state or local level; making it difficult to distinguish 
between the direct effect of state policies on the intended outcome—more timely exits 
from care—from the indirect relationship of the outcome to “population characteristics and 
agent choices” (Testa 2010b p. 84).  Other studies that have employed a comparative, 
multi-state perspective include Blackstone, et al. (2004) and Garstka, et al. (2012).  
However, again, these studies do not control for differences in the out-of-home care 
populations among the states considered, hampering the interpretation of the results. 
 
Validity of the research design: studies that fail to control for various mediating factors 
As indicated in the previous chapter, it is important to control for differences in various 
factors identified in the literature as being predictive of the amount to time children spend 
in care.  Studies that fail to do so, may reach erroneous conclusions regarding differences 
in the performance among states, since, as a result of compositional effects, states with 
higher proportions of children with certain characteristics as well as states that rely more 
heavily on certain types of placement settings may record different average lengths of stay 
in care compared to other states, regardless of how successful their policies are in 
expediting exits from out-of-home care. 
Yet many of the reports used to monitor the timeliness of permanency outcomes do 
not adequately take into account factors commonly identified in the literature as being 
predictive of the timeliness of exits, such as the social and demographic characteristics of 
children entering out-of-home care or the type of setting children are placed in while in 
care (see Courtney and Hook 2012; Testa 2010a, 2010b).  The latter is a particularly 
unfortunate omission, since the literature has consistently shown that children who belong 
to certain racial minorities, infant children
50
 as well as children placed with relatives tend 
to remain in care longer than other children (Becker, et al. 2007; Caplick Weigensberg 
2009; Connell, et al. 2006; Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Noonan and Burke 2005; Potter 
and Klein-Rothschild 2002; Romney, et al. 2006; Shaw 2010; Smith 2003; Yampolskaya, 
et al. 2006, 2007; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b, 2007).   
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 Infants in this study are children aged one year or younger.  
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A small number of studies have attempted to control for these factors.  Among them, 
the majority find that differences among states in terms of the populations served account for 
some, although not all, of the variability in the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  Smith 
(2003), for instance, using the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(AFCARS)
51
 dataset, concluded that the likelihood of exiting care varied greatly across 
states.  Controlling for differences in caseload demographics, notably their age, race and 
placement setting, Smith found that children from Northern and Western states experienced 
more timely exits from care compared to children from Midwestern or Southern states.  
Smith concluded that “the state variables represent proxies for state-level policies and 
practices which are not otherwise accounted for in the analysis” (2003 p. 978). 
Likewise, the study by Snowden, et al. (2008)—also based on the AFCARS 
dataset—found that, while the characteristics of children in care accounted for some of the 
variability in the timeliness of exits, states still recorded significantly different likelihoods 
of adoption.  The authors, however, did not discuss the reasons for those differences but 
called for more research to “explore potential policy explanations for state differences” 
(Snowden, et al. 2008 p. 1326).  Two more recent studies by Courtney, et al. (2011a) and 
Courtney and Hook (2012) also found that controlling for selected characteristics of 
children entering care—notably their sex, age, race and ethnicity—reduced some of the 
differences in the timeliness of exits among the six geographical jurisdictions considered.  
However, differences in the child population served did not explain all of the observed 
disparities.  The authors suggested that such variability might be attributable to differences 
in juvenile court practices and services available at the local level.   
A number of studies have found that controlling for policy and contextual variables 
at the state and local level is also important.  Peters (2012), for instance, in his study of 
exits from care among older adolescents, found that controlling for the individual 
characteristics of children did not explain all of the variability in the probability of children 
exiting care among the three groups of counties considered.  The study also found that 
including a county variable increased the predictive power of the models.  Likewise, 
McDonald, et al. (2006), in their paper on reunification and re-entry into care in thirty-
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 The AFCARS is a federally mandated administrative dataset containing information on all children in out-
of-home care in the United States, which is used to track progress with respect to the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes.  It is also the main data source employ in chapters 5 through 9 of this study. 
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three counties in Oklahoma, noted that one of their most striking findings was the range of 
reunification rates across the state.  The authors concluded that, while their research did not 
“[explain] this variation, the variation does raise questions about worker decision-making, 
the influence of county or agency policy on these decisions, or the influence of other 
systems and stakeholders such as juvenile and family court judges” (McDonald, et al. 2006 
p. 55); all of which required further investigation.  Other studies that have controlled for 
differences in child-level and other characteristics associated with the timeliness of exits, 
though not necessarily in relation to PBC, include those by Meezan and McBeath (2008), 
Yampolskaya, et al. (2011) and Wulczyn, et al. (2009).   
Several of the papers reviewed have made an explicit call for additional research 
controlling for various mediating or confounding factors.  Wulczyn, et al. (2006a p. 605), 
for instance, concluded that “[f]urther research is required to examine how state and local 
child welfare policies and practices have affected the implementation of various provisions 
in ASFA in attempting to speed up permanency”.  Likewise, Courtney, et al. (2011a p. 1) 
called for a better understanding of differences in permanency outcomes between 
geographic jurisdictions, arguing that: 
“if observed differences in outcomes are due entirely to differences in the 
characteristics of the populations served, in other words, if some jurisdictions more 
than others serve populations for which permanency is more difficult to achieve, then 
accountability mechanisms should take that into account. (…)  On the other hand, if 
differences in outcomes between jurisdictions cannot be explained by population 
characteristics, then it behooves program managers and policymakers to better 
understand the characteristics of child welfare and related systems that contribute to 
these differences in order to seek improvements in outcomes.” 
 
3.4 Evidence regarding the possible distortionary impacts of PBC 
In this section, I focus on two types of negative distortionary effects related to PBC that 
have been identified in the literature, namely: (1) various types of gaming behaviours, 
including “cherry picking” and (2) compositional effects on permanency outcomes.  I 
chose not to review the literature on other possible distortionary effects of PBC, including 
on placement stability, re-entry into care as well as recurrence of maltreatment (see for 
example the studies by the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability 2006; Yampolskaya, et al. 2011) because it falls outside of the scope of this 
research.  I return to discuss some of these aspects in chapter 4, where I focus on various 
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methodological considerations that shaped my analysis including the complexity of 
measuring placement stability and spells in out-of-home care, and in chapter 10, where I 
review the limitations of this study and outline areas for future research.  
 
Various gaming behaviours including “cherry picking” 
A number of authors have raised concern about the issue of gaming.  This type of 
behaviour ensues when an agency manipulates placement or permanency decision in order 
to achieve certain performance outcomes.  As anticipated in section 1.5, creaming or 
“cherry picking” occurs when contractors provide additional services to clients they 
perceive to be more likely to achieve a desirable outcome, while “parking” occurs when 
agencies seek to avoid serving children considered to be less likely to exit care in a timely 
manner (Kearney, et al. 2012a).  To my knowledge there is relatively little empirical 
evidence to either prove or disprove the existence of such behaviours among states that 
employ PBC in their child welfare system (Meezan and McBeath 2003b). 
McBeath and Meezan (2010 p. i121), in their study of the impact of PBC on 
permanency outcomes in Wayne County, Michigan, found some evidence of gaming.  
Specifically, they noted that “easier-to-serve” children, particularly youth, received more 
services and exited care more rapidly compared to children with greater social, emotional 
and physical needs.  A similar conclusion was reached in an earlier study by McBeath 
(2006). 
Berlin (2007) also made an indirect reference to “cherry picking” in discussing the 
impact of managed care and PBC
52
 in Kansas.  Specifically, Berlin (2007 p. 4) noted that 
as a result of the state’s success in reducing the amount of time children spent in care, the 
number of children in out-of-home care declined.  However, because the children 
remaining in care were “proportionately more difficult and more expensive to care for”, the 
cost of out-of-home care per child skyrocketed; a phenomenon also known as adverse 
selection. 
States that have implemented PBC appear to be aware of the risk of such practices—
particularly “parking”—and have employed a number of strategies requiring agencies to 
“share the risks” (Raghavan 2010).  Taylor and Shaver (2010 pp. 304-305), for instance, 
note that both Chicago and Philadelphia made a concerted effort to “level the playing field” 
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 See also note 6. 
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by among others, ensuring that “agencies had a similar client caseload mix at the start of 
PBC” and that each agency “received a similar mix of clients as referrals”. 
53
  Likewise in 
Missouri, caseloads were equalized by “distributing children and sibling groups to 
providers based on a number of factors associated with risk (gender, ethnicity, age, and 
length of time in out-of-home care)” and “randomly assigned subsequent referrals to help 
ensure (that) the caseload remained equitable” (Garstka, et al. 2012 p. 33).  
There is some circumstantial evidence that various types of gaming may be taking 
place in spite of these efforts.  In a presentation made in February 2012 to the Alliance for 
Children and Families’ Senior Leadership Conference, for instance, Kearney and Hollie 
(2012b p. 40) noted that staff in lower performing agencies often “blamed the children and 
youth for their poor performance”, arguing that in spite of efforts to adjust for difference in 
populations served through random assignment, some agencies still perceived their 
caseloads to be “tougher than anyone else’s”.  Evidence also suggests that agencies are 
uncomfortable with being held accountable for factors beyond their control, including the 
type of child population they serve.  According to Flaherty, et al. (2008 p. 817), for 
instance, private agency representatives interviewed in twelve states “explained that it was 
unreasonable to penalize providers for not meeting performance standards if providers 
could not make key decisions about services and placements”.   
In light of the principal-agent problem raised in chapter 2, more research is needed 
on the mechanisms through which changes in the timeliness in permanency outcomes are 
achieved, including the possible negative distortionary effects of PBC.  This is particularly 
important given that “(i)n high-risk environments, shifting financial risk to contractors may 
not be optimal because it provides incentives for child welfare contractors to reduce their 
own risk exposure, regardless of whether their actions have a detrimental effect on desired 
performance outcomes in the long term” (Chuang 2010 p. 20). 
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 This approach is meant to ensure that no agency is penalised by having to serve a “more difficult” out-of-
home care population.  Agencies cannot, for instance, decide to select or refuse children based on their 
preferences.  If the latter were the case, private contractors could manipulate the composition of the child 
population they provide services to, which, in turn, could affect outcomes. 
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Impacts on permanency outcomes 
A small number of papers have focused on the potentially distortionary relationship 
between PBC and permanency outcomes.  McBeath and Meezan (2008), using a 
longitudinal natural experiment,
 
found, after controlling for child, family, and caseworker 
characteristics, that children served by agencies using PBC “were less likely to be reunified 
and more likely to enter kinship foster homes” compared to those served through more 
traditional approaches (p. 388).  The authors attributed some of these differences to 
reductions in important services to clients, a finding that was supported in later research 
(McBeath and Meezan 2010).  In an earlier study, McBeath and Meezan (2006 p. 40), 
using telephone interviews with administrators and supervisors in nine child welfare 
agencies, found that “agencies’ service delivery patterns, interdepartmental activities, and 
inter-organizational relationships were substantially affected by the transition to this new 
contracting arrangement”, and that, as a result, children were less likely to receive the 
services required to promote reunifications.   
An important trend that emerges from the literature on PBC is that many of the states 
that employed this type of performance management tool, including Florida, Illinois, 
Kansas and North Carolina, recorded pronounced increases in the number of adoptions.  
According to Berlin (2007), for instance, between 1997 and 2002 the number of adoption 
and guardian cases in Illinois increased by nearly four-fold.  Likewise, Blackstone, et al. 
(2004) concluded that the use of PBC in both Illinois and Kansas was accompanied by 
improvement in the number of adoptions, while Vargo, et al. (2006) identified a 
statistically significant increase in the proportion of children with finalized adoptions 
between 2001 and 2004 in Florida.   
While increases in the number of adoptions do not necessarily imply a negative 
“distortion” of permanency outcomes, a small number of studies suggest that caregivers or 
administrators in states that employ PBC may feel pressured to promote adoptions at the 
“expense” of reunification, both because of the financial incentives offered as well as the 
emphasis placed on timeliness.  In Illinois, for instance, the Governor’s Task Force Report 
indicated that “many stakeholders felt that the emphasis on financial incentives has pushed 
caregivers to “rush” to adoption, put children at risk, and lowered the numbers of children 
reunifying with their parents” (Department of Children and Family Services, State of 
Illinois 2003 p. 95).  Likewise, according to Karp (1999, cited in Berlin 2007 p. 9) “(i)n 
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Illinois, the new system created a very strong demand by the state for foster parents to 
adopt their foster children or risk losing contact with children they loved”.
54
 
 
3.5 Various factors, including secular trends, that might confound the 
interpretation of findings 
There are a number of normative and policy trends besides PBC which might have a 
bearing on the speed of permanency outcomes.  One such trend, already anticipated in 
section 1.4, is the support accorded by recent federal laws for the objective of promoting 
timely permanency outcomes.  While states differ in the degree to which they have 
embraced this policy goal (see also section 2.3), almost all states have modified their 
statutes to include at least some of the provisions aimed at reducing the amount of time 
children spend in care in accordance with federal guidelines.  Based on this trend alone, 
therefore, states might be expected to witness a reduction in the amount of time children 
spend in care, regardless of whether or not they implemented PBC.
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A second trend worth considering is the increasing emphasis on reducing racial 
disproportionality
56
 at entry or exit (Anyon 2011; Child Welfare Information Gateway 
2011c; Hill 2006).
 
  In recent years, a growing number of states and localities have sought 
to address racial disproportionality in various ways.  These interventions, by modifying the 
composition of children entering care, might also have affected the overall timeliness of 
exits,
57
 leading to a distorted interpretation of the relationship between PBC and timeliness 
in states that employ this type of programme management tool.   
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 Since the state was actively pursuing the goal of permanency, families that did not adopt the children 
placed with them could see their placement terminated. 
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 I used the PSBI/ND framework (see section 2.3) to address this concern.  Specifically, I chose to focus my 
analysis solely on states that embraced a BI approach to promoting timely exits from care.  However, as 
stated in that chapter, I am also aware that this approach is not, in-of-itself, sufficient to account for 
differences in state attitudes towards timeliness. 
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 Racial disproportionality is defined as the overrepresentation of a certain racial group among all children 
entering, or in, out-of-home care compared to the proportion of that group in the overall population. 
57
 For instance, the trend towards reducing racial disproportionality at entry could result in-of-itself in an 
improvement in the timeliness of permanency outcomes even in the absence of other policy interventions 
simply because African American children spend, on average, longer spells in care.   
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A third secular trend worth considering relates to changes in preference accorded to 
reunification as a permanency outcome.  According to Wulczyn (2004 p. 96) “the bedrock 
assumption underlying child welfare policy [in the U.S.] is that children are better off if 
raised by their natural parents.  This preference for the role of natural parents is codified in 
law and provides the rationale for retaining reunification as a core outcome for children 
placed in foster care”.  However, since the passage of the 1997 ASFA, priorities have 
shifted and the child’s safety has become the primary concern of child welfare policies.  As 
a result, policymakers have been rethinking the appropriateness of promoting reunification 
at all costs;
58
 a shift which is also evidenced by the increasing use of federal funding to 
promote adoptions and subsidise guardianship (Bartholet 1999; Parkinson 2003; Roberts 
2002).  While reunification continues to be viewed as the most desirable permanency 
option and over one half of all American children in out-of-home care are reunited with 
their biological parents (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2005), since the 
passage of the ASFA, the percentage of children who have been reunified has declined 
somewhat (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2003).  
A fourth potentially relevant trend relates to the emphasis given to placement with 
kin (Berrick 1997; Geen 2000; Schwartz 2002).  Since the passage of the Supreme Court 
Decision of Miller versus Youakin in 1979, states have been required to give the same 
financial support to kinship caregivers as non-related foster parents, provided that the child 
was eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the kinship home 
met licensing standards (Gleeson 1996; Ingram 1996).  The SSA reflects this position by 
calling on states to “consider giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related 
caregiver when determining a placement for a child” (42 U.S.C. §671, SEC. 471, B, para. 
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 Shear, in reference to incarcerated parents, observes that “[a] common perception is that the children are 
more likely to become successful, positive members of American society if they are adopted into new 
families instead of being reunited with their own parents after the parents are released from prison.  The “do 
good” zeal that underlies this “save the children” philosophy has its roots in the same sort of fear and 
prejudice that initially brought about the child welfare movement in America in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, when upright “child savers” wanted to “rescue” children of impoverished immigrants, 
whom they distrusted” (Shear 2007 p. 23).  Partially because of this, placement in care continues to be 
perceived as a form of punishment or social control, motivated by anti-immigrant, minority and religious 
biases. 
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19).
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  However, in recent years, placements with relative caretakers have come under 
increasing scrutiny.  Specifically, the ASFA, by emphasising child safety, made it more 
difficult for kinship caregivers to qualify for Title IV-E, the most important federally-
funded dedicated entitlement available for out-of-home care (Vericker, et al. 2007; US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2006).
60
  The fact that fewer kinship caregivers 
are eligible for federal funding as a result of the ASFA’s emphasis on safety may have 
contributed to decreasing reliance on such placements (see also chapter 8).  It may also 
have indirectly modified the timeliness of permanency outcomes since children placed in 
unrelated foster families or pre-adoptive homes are known to exit care more quickly than 
children placed with relatives (Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Needell, et al. 2005; Shaw 
2010). 
A number of studies appear to confirm the existence of such broad secular trends.  
Several states, for instance, have shown progress in reducing the amount of time children 
spend in care without having introduced PBC (Rockhill, et al. 2007; Wulczyn, et al. 
2006a).  Likewise, a number of studies point to significant reductions in racial 
disproportionality at entry or in out-of-home care (Shaw 2010; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b, 
2007).  These secular trends, in turn, may confound the interpretation of findings.  I return 
to discuss the implications of such trends on the interpretation of my results in chapters 4, 8 
and 10. 
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 The preference accorded by the SSA for placement with relatives, was also shaped by the passing of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978 and the adoption of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) in 
1994.  The ICWA identified a prioritised list of settings and required states to place Native American children 
in kinship homes whenever possible (Geen 2000; Mannes 1995).  The ICWA had the effect of favouring 
same-with-same placements, meaning that, whenever possible, preference was given to placing children of a 
given ethnic, racial and even religious background with a caregiver with similar characteristics.  This in turn 
led to an increasing reliance on placements with kin (Schwartz 2002).  In 1994, MEPA reversed the 
preference for same-with-same placements and described this practice as discriminatory (see also chapter 9). 
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 Children placed with unlicensed caregivers are ineligible for federal funds such as Title IV-E and instead 
have to rely on other forms of support such as child-only Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
or state or local funding which tend to be smaller and are not proportional to the number of children cared 
for. 
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3.6 Summary of main findings and gaps in the evidence base 
In this literature review I have sought to provide additional evidence justifying the aims of 
my study.  As stated earlier (see section 1.8), the main objectives of my research were to: 
(1) provide a more methodologically sound evaluation of differences in the timeliness of 
exits among entities employing and not employing PBC, and (2) contribute to the existing 
body of literature on the relationship between PBC and timeliness as well as on the 
possible negative distortionary effects of PBC, including on permanency outcomes.  While, 
as anticipated in chapter 1, my study is unable to explore the causal nexus between PBC, 
timeliness and permanency owing to limitations with the data and research design chosen, 
this review identifies a number of elements, which, in my view, support my initial claim 
regarding the need for additional research. 
First, the evidence on the relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of 
exits from care is fragmented and difficult to interpret.  While a small number of studies 
have shown that there may be a positive relationship between the two, it is difficult to 
generalise these finding given that such studies are often limited in terms of both the scope 
of the outcome measures employed, as well as their research design.  In relation to the 
former, relatively few of the studies reviewed in this chapter have used entry cohorts or the 
full spectrum of permanency outcomes to examine the relationship between PBC and the 
amount of time children spend in care.  In terms of the research design, the literature 
contains a relatively small array of studies that have employed a multi-year, multi-state 
approach to examine differences in the amount of time children spend in care and even 
fewer that have explicitly focused on the use of PBC.  
Second, in order to gain insight into the relationship between PBC and timeliness  
one must seek to control for various confounding or intervening variables including the 
demographic and social characteristics of children entering care, secular trends, as well as 
various policy and contextual variables at the state and county level (Courtney, et al. 
2011a, 2011b; Courtney and Hook 2012; Golden and Macomber 2009).  Of the studies 
reviewed in this chapter, most have found that selected child characteristics as well as 
geographical or administrative variables accounted for significant differences in the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes.  One of the shortcomings of these papers, however, is 
that the choice of treatment and controls appears to have been dictated by factors such as 
convenience or sample size.  Because of this, the findings from these studies are difficult to 
generalise (see also chapter 4). 
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Third, the evidence base on the mechanisms through which PBC states achieve 
timely permanency outcomes, including various types of gaming behaviours remains 
limited.  Information on the phenomenon of “cherry picking” or “parking” is fragmented 
and mainly anecdotal.  Further, only a small number of studies—mostly focused on Wayne 
County, Michigan—have identified a negative relationship between the use of PBC and 
reunification. 
As stated in chapter 1, my study has sought to address some of these concerns.  
Specifically, it examined differences in the timeliness of exits from care between PBC and 
non-PBC states, using multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts.  Further, my research has 
attempted to consider differences in the timeliness of permanency outcomes both before 
and after the enactment of PBC, examine a more complete spectrum of permanency 
outcomes, as well as control for differences among states in some of the factors known to 
be associated with the timeliness of exits from care, including the characteristics of 
children entering care and the placement setting.  I also drew attention to a number of 
policy and other factors, including secular trends, which might confound the interpretation 
of the results of my analysis.  While these efforts are clearly not sufficient to ascribe a 
causal relationship between the use of PBC and timeliness of exits from care, they 
represent a contribution towards being able to more critically assess the type of information 
needed to monitor the impact of a policy tool such as PBC as well as a step towards 
reviewing the theoretical and policy implications of this relationship in a more nuanced and 
informed manner.  
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4 Methods 
 
4.1 Addressing the research questions and hypotheses: structure and rationale of 
the chapter  
This chapter provides an overview of the methods used to address the research questions 
and hypotheses outlined in chapter 1.  First, I describe the AFCARS dataset, highlighting 
its main strengths and limitations.  I then briefly present an overview of the research design 
utilised and outline the criteria employed in selecting the treatment and control states as 
well as the timeframe for my analysis.  I also provide an overview of the criteria used to 
create the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts and the outcome measures employed.  
Lastly, the chapter provides an overview of the independent variables and covariates used, 
as well as a description of the main statistical methods employed in chapter 6 through 9. 
 
4.2 The data source  
The analysis in this research is based on the AFCARS dataset, the only data source 
containing information on all children in out-of-home care in the United States.  
Administered by the Children’s Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, this dataset was designed to “address policy development and program 
management issues at both the state and federal levels” as well as to provide useful 
information “for researchers interested in analysing aspects of the United States’ foster care 
and adoption programs” (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect 2002 p. iv).   
The AFCARS dataset on out-of-home care contains 66 data elements, including 
basic demographic and social characteristics of children in care, their primary caregiver 
and out-of-home caregivers.  The set also provides a unique encrypted identifier for every 
child in the out-of-home care system
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 as well as information on the characteristics of 
placement settings and permanency outcomes. 
One of the main disadvantages of the AFCARS dataset is that it includes only one 
record per child.  If a child re-enters care several times during the same fiscal year, only the 
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 As the AFCARS codebook notes “(f)or most states, but not all, this ID is consistent from year to year, 
allowing the tracking of a child from one data year to the next” (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 2012 p. 13).  As indicated in section 4.4, I utilise this variable as one of the elements to match the 
multi-year, multi-state cohorts. 
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most recent spell is entered in the annual database (National Data Archive on Child Abuse 
and Neglect, et al. 2002).  For this reason, the AFCARS is not well suited for studying 
children’s re-entry into care.   
A second issue relates to the reliability and validity of the data.  In the case of 
AFCARS, as with most administrative sources, the data are subject to various types of 
errors, including data entry errors and duplicate cases.  The Children’s Bureau regularly 
reviews the data and provides training to states on how to maintain their quality.  Despite 
these efforts, challenges remain.  Specifically, some states do not provide information on 
certain types of variables, particularly on the characteristics of the primary caregiver and 
out-of-home caregivers.   
A third drawback of the AFCARS dataset is that its scope is rather limited.  Unlike 
other sources such as the NSCAW, which contains a rich array of data gathered from 
interviews with children in care, their primary caregivers, teachers and caseworkers, the 
AFCARS is a relatively sparse in contextual information on the child and his or her 
surroundings.  Further, it does not provide information on a number of important aspects 
including: (1) the wellbeing, health or safety of children in care; (2) the types of services 
received by children in out-of-home care or their families; (3) the characteristics of 
individual caseworkers or administrators involved in each child’s case; or (4) other policy 
or contextual variables at the state or county level which might relate to performance 
outcomes. 
While the AFCARS has several limitations, it also has a number of notable 
advantages compared to other data sources.  First, it is the only dataset available in the 
United States with case-level information on all children under the care of state welfare 
agencies.  According to section 479 of the SSA, states are required to submit these data on 
a biannual basis.
62
  Because states are subject to financial penalties if they fail to comply, 
the AFCARS data tend to be comparable across time and locality, making the dataset 
particularly amenable to study changes over time with respect to various performance 
outcomes, including timeliness.  Second, data are available for a relatively long time series, 
even though the datasets prior to 2000 are not as complete or reliable as the more recent 
                                                 
62
 In the first years after the introduction of the AFCARS (between 1996 and 2000) not all states reported the 
required data in a systematic manner.  This is one of the reasons why my analysis focuses on a sub-set of 
states with complete data for the periods 1996-2011 (see section 4.3 below). 
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data.
63
  Lastly, the various annual datasets can be transformed into a longitudinal source 
through appropriate linking procedures (see section 4.4).  This is important given that one 
of the main criticisms advanced against research on out-of-home care in the United States 
is that it relies on small samples and lacks a longitudinal component (Courtney, et al. 2004; 
McDonald and Testa 2010).   
 
4.3 Aspects related to the research design 
As indicated in previous chapters, my research seeks to explore whether the use of PBC is 
associated with better outcomes in terms of the timeliness of exits.  Ideally, this type of 
research question would be addressed by comparing outcomes for children randomly 
assigned to agencies that employ and do not employ PBC.  This type of design, referred to 
as a randomised experiment (RE) or controlled trial (RCT), is often viewed as the gold 
standard for exploring causal relationships (Payne and Gainey 2002).  In the case of the 
child welfare policies, however, such designs are often not possible for ethical or other 
reasons.  To my knowledge only a handful of such examples exist in practice, one being 
the case of Wayne County, Michigan, where PBC was piloted in six agencies, with three 
agencies serving as control (Meezan and McBeath 2003a, 2003b). 
 
The multiple baseline design  
An alternative, though less robust design is the quasi-experimental design (QED).  An 
example of QED is the case of Cook County, Illinois, where PBC was implemented as part 
of a pilot project one year earlier than for the rest of the state (Taylor and Shaver 2010).  
Other examples include evaluations of Title IV-E
 64
 Flexible Funding Child Welfare 
Waiver Demonstrations in Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio and Oregon (James Bell 
Associates 2013; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for 
Children and Families 2011c). 
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 Only ten states report complete AFCARS datasets prior to the year 2000. 
64
 Title IV-E of the SSA is the federal programme which oversees funding for out-of-home care and adoption 
services in the United States. It comprises three specific sub-programmes: (a) the foster care maintenance 
payments programme, (b) the adoption and guardianship assistance programme, and (c) John H. Chafee 
foster care independence programme. 
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The main limitation of QED compared to RE is that, because the treatment and 
control groups are not randomly assigned, the interpretation of outcomes may be biased by 
prior differences between the selected groups.  This can lead to a misinterpretation of the 
effectiveness of a policy intervention, resulting in both false positives—namely, that the 
programme had an impact when in fact it didn’t—and false negatives—the programme 
didn’t have an impact when in reality it did.   
However, QED also has an important advantage.  In the context of my research, 
where children were not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, this type of 
research design makes it possible to explore the relationship between a policy intervention 
and its outcomes even though no explicit provisions were made to assess the impacts of the 
policy a priori. 
The research design I decided to employ in this study—referred to as multiple 
baseline design (MBD)—is a particular type of QED.  The key features of MBD are that 
individuals in different groups receive a treatment at different points in time and that the 
timing of the effect of this treatment is synchronized with the timing of the introduction of 
the intervention.  In my research, the groups are the states, while the individuals are the 
children within each state.  MBD requires a relatively long-time frame, with multiple 
measures prior to—referred to as baseline—and following the treatment—referred to as 
observations.  My analysis meets these conditions since I have data both preceding and 
following the enactment of PBC for multiple states.  Figure 4.1. offers a visual 
representation of the MBD for four states, two of which employed PBC—state 2 from year 
a+1 onward and state 4 from the period a+2 onward—and two which did not—state 1 and 
state 3. 
 
Figure 4.1. Simplified representation of a multiple baseline design  
 
While MBD provides a useful framework for assessing changes in outcomes over 
time, it is not a suitable design for drawing causal inferences.  In particular, as indicated in 
Group Year a Year a+1 Year a+2 Year a+n 
State 1         
State 2         
State 3         
State 4         
PBC 
PBC 
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chapters 2 and 3, it does not allow to distinguish between the effects of the treatment and 
other confounding effects including differences between states in terms of unobserved 
contextual and normative variables.  My research acknowledges this.  Specifically, rather 
than attempting to determine causal relationships as I had initially planned, I seek to 
explore the association between the use of PBC and outcomes in the timeliness of exits 
from out-of-home care at the state level, controlling for theoretically relevant mediating 
and confounding factors.  I also acknowledge that it is likely that there are significant 
differences between PBC and non-PBC states.  For instance, states with slower 
permanency outcomes to begin with are probably more likely to adopt a more 
interventionist policy compared to states that are more successful in expediting timely exits 
from care.  Likewise, the caseload volume and the composition of children entering and in 
care are likely to differ (see also chapter 5).  I seek to address these aspects by focusing 
only on BI states (see section 2.3) and controlling for differences in out-of-home care 
population served; well aware that the lack of random assignment in my research design is 
likely to bias the interpretation of results.  In spite of these limitations, I contend that MBD 
is an appropriate design in the context of my study where, owing to ethical and other 
practical considerations, it would have been difficult to randomly “exclude” a group of 
children from the treatment, namely from PBC. 
 
The selection of the control and treatment states 
In selecting the treatment and control states for my analysis I relied on three criteria (see 
Figure 4.2).  First, I only included states that had data covering the mid-1990s; that is prior 
to the introduction of PBC in most states.  States that did not have data from 1996 onwards 
were excluded.  In total, only ten states reported complete AFCARS data between 1996 
and 2011: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Vermont and Washington.   
Second, I limited my analysis to states with a high percentage of successful child-
case matches in the multi-year, multi-state longitudinal entry files (see section 4.4).  A 
number of states were excluded from the analysis because the scrambling algorithm used 
for the composite identifier—henceforth referred to as CID—did not permit to accurately 
match across annual data files.  California, Colorado and Maine, for example, each had 
annual AFCARS data files with fewer than 90 per cent successful matches.   
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Figure 4.2. Graphical representation of the selection of treatment and control states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, based on the analytical framework outlined in section 2.3, I restricted my 
analysis to states that followed the BI approach, meaning that they were largely in 
conformity with federal provisions related to promoting timely permanency outcomes.  I 
excluded three states from my analysis—Alaska, Florida and Vermont—because they did 
not fulfil this requirement.   
Based on these three criteria, I identify four states: two—Illinois and North 
Carolina—which adopted the BI/N approach, and two—New Jersey and Washington—that 
followed the BI/D approach.  It is important to note that the two groups of states are in 
many respects similar (see also chapter 5).  For instance, all four states comprise a 
relatively large urban and poor child population (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau 2002, 2012c, 
2012d).  The fact that there are a number of similarities across the two groups of states is 
helpful in the context of my analysis, given that it potentially reduces some of the 
unobserved variability and hence selection bias discussed above in relation to QED. 
 
Yes  
Alaska, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, 
Maine, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Vermont and 
Washington 
1st criterion 
(Complete data for the 
period 1996-2011) 
2nd criterion 
(Matching CIDs) 
Yes  
Alaska, Florida, Illinois, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, 
Vermont and Washington 
3rd criterion 
(BI approach) 
Illinois, New Jersey,  
North Carolina and 
Washington 
50 States  
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming 
No 
(dropped)  
California, Colorado 
and Maine 
No 
(dropped)  
Alaska, Florida and  
Vermont  
No 
(dropped)  
Yes  
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The selection of the time periods 
I decided to group the data in my analysis into three multi-year periods: the years 
immediately preceding the implementation of PBC, which refer to the period 1996 to 1998; 
the years immediately following the enactment of PBC, which roughly correspond to the 
period 1999 to 2004; and the five years thereafter, namely between 2005 and 2009.  This 
categorization, which was chosen mainly for analytical convenience,
65
 has the advantage of 
masking some of the random noise present in the data, while capturing overall trends.  It 
also has the advantage of minimizing serial correlation as well as autocorrelation across the 
multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts,
66
 while offering a more nuanced picture than the one 
obtained from only two points in time.  I used this time categorisation to compute the 
difference-in-difference estimators utilised in several of my analytical chapters (see also 
section 4.7), as well as to create time-varying covariates in chapters 6 and 7.  I, however, 
acknowledge that the decision to focus my analysis on three distinct time periods instead of 
fourteen individual years may confound the interpretation of my results. 
Because states and counties introduced PBC in different years, the pre-PBC period 
and the first period after the introduction of PBC—also referred to in various tables and 
figures in chapters 5 through 9 as “Post-PBC (first period)”—differ slightly depending on 
the county or state considered.  For both North Carolina and Cook County, Illinois, for 
instance, the pre-PBC period refers to the period 1 October 1995 to 30 September 1997, 
inclusive.  For the rest of Illinois, where PBC was introduced one year later, the pre-PBC 
period refers to the period 1 October 1995 to 30 September 1998.  Thus, the “Post-PBC 
(first period)” for both North Carolina and Cook County, Illinois denotes the period 
1 October 1997 to 30 September 2004, while for the remaining counties in Illinois it refers 
to the period 1 October 1998 to 30 September 2004.   
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 For instance, I was concerned that the post-PBC period was more than twice as long as the pre-PBC period.  
AFCARS data were only available from 1996 onwards.  
66 This can be a concern, for instance, for panel data, which in this study refers to the second-level units, i.e., 
counties or states (Bertrand, et al. 2003). 
76 
In order to ensure that the control states had a comparable time-frame,
67
 I created a 
simple random sample without replacement of children from the two control states 
proportional to the size of the child population entering care in those of the localities where 
PBC was implemented earlier—namely Cook County and North Carolina—over the 
overall population entering care in states that employed PBC—namely Illinois and North 
Carolina.  I then “removed” this sample from the pre-PBC period and added it to the “Post-
PBC (first period)”.  
 
4.4 The criteria for creating the entry cohorts  
Much of the evidence used to monitor the timeliness of exits from care across states has 
relied on cross-sectional data on children in care or exit cohorts, which, as seen in previous 
chapters, is not appropriate for monitoring changes in the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes (for a critique of these measures see also Courtney, et al. 2004; McDonald and 
Testa 2010; Wulczyn, et al. 2007).  Instead prospective cohorts, which follow each child 
from the time of entry intro care until the time of exit should be used to create measures of 
timeliness. 
In order to create the multi-year, multi-state files from the AFCARS dataset, I 
followed a number of steps.  First, using the cross-sectional AFCARS data for year a, I 
identified all children who had entered care between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 
September of year a.  For instance, for the cross-sectional dataset 1996, the entry cohort 
refers to children who entered care between 1 October 1995 and 30 September 1996.  I 
then created an identifier which I refer to as CID by concatenating a string of data, 
uniquely combining for each child the following AFCARS variables: state, record number 
(henceforth referred to as ID), date of birth, sex, race and latest date of entry.  I also 
generated a cross-sectional “in care file” for year a+1.  Next, I linked the entry file from 
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 My decision to ensure that the treatment and control states had comparable pre- and post-time periods was 
motivated by a desire to minimise the effect of some unobserved secular trends.  One such trend, documented 
in the United States after the implementation of the ASFA, is the changing attitude towards racial 
disproportionality.  Another is the increasing pressure faced by child protection services to reduce the amount 
of time children spend in care by promoting alternatives to family reunification (see also chapters 3 and 8). 
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year a with the “in care” file for year a+1 using the CID code.  In the majority of cases,
68
 
the CID code matched, meaning that the child was either still in care or had exited care 
between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 September of year a+1.  Where the CID did not 
match across the two files, I first examined whether the child had exited care during the 
period considered (see Figure 4.3).  If the entry cohort file did not indicate that the child 
had exited care during that period, I simplified the CID by removing one of the conditions, 
starting from the date of latest entry.  I than repeated the matching procedure, excluding 
from the files children who had either already been successfully matched, or had exited 
care between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 September of year a+1.   
I repeated the same procedure using the cross-sectional “in care” file for year a+2, 
but replacing the original entry cohort file with the linked a to a+1 file, described above.  
As in the first iteration, I did not restrict the matching procedure to children who had 
remained uninterruptedly in care.  Children who exited care between 1 October of year a-1 
and 30 September of year a+1 and re-entered care prior to 30 September of year a+1 were 
matched with the cross-sectional “in care” file for year a+2.  This means that in this study 
spells in care—what I also refer to duration in care or amount of time spent in care—are 
computed based on the latest, rather than first exit from care.  While, in many cases the two 
coincide, I chose this approach because it gives less “weight” to permanency outcomes 
which disrupted within the first years of exit.  However, it also means that my analysis may 
underestimate permanency disruptions for children who exit or re-exit care towards the end 
of year a+2 compared to children who exit care earlier on in the observed period.
69
   
On the basis of this matching procedure, I created fourteen multi-state prospective 
cohorts of children who entered care between the years 1996 and 2009, with each entry 
cohort covering a maximum duration of three years in out-of-home care per child.  On 
average, around 5 per cent of cases were matched with the more simplified CID.  Around 1 
per cent of cases did not match after using simplified CIDs and were dropped from my 
analysis.  
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 As indicated in section 4.3, I excluded from my analysis states with fewer than 90 per cent “matches”.  For 
the states included in my analysis, the percentage of successful matches ranges from 98 per cent to 100 per 
cent depending on the state and year.  
69
 See section 4.5 for a discussion of the implications of these decisions. 
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Figure 4.3. Graphical representation of the criteria used for creating the entry cohorts 
 
 
A small number of studies have employed a similar approach.  Testa, et al. (2008), 
for instance, used the AFCARS dataset to create a linked, multi-year longitudinal dataset to 
Child in care on 30 September of year a+1 
Entry cohort for year a  
(child entered care between 
1 October of year a-1 and 30 
September of year a) 
Child exited care between 1 October of year a-1 
and 30 September of year a+1 
Step 1: Match with in care file for year a+1 
based on CIDs 
 
No match found 
Step 2: Match with in care file for year a+1 
based on simplified CIDs 
No match found 
Child still in care on 30 September of year 
a+1 
Child exited care between 1 October of 
year a-1 and 30 September of year a+1 
Step 3: Match with in care file for year a+2 
based on CIDs 
Child exited care between 1 October 
of year a+1 and 30 September of year 
a+2 
Child still in care on 30 September of 
year a+2 
No match found 
Step 4: Match with in care file for year a+2 
based on simplified CIDs 
No match found 
Child exited care between 1 October of 
year a+1 and 30 September of year a+2 
Child still in care on 30 September of 
year a+2 
Final linked entry 
cohort for year a 
The linked entry cohort includes: 
 
 Children who exited care between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 
September of year a+2 and did not re-enter care by 30 September of 
year a+2 
 Children still in care by 30 September of year a+2 and who:  
o Never exited care between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 
September of year a+2; or 
o Exited care between 1 October of year a-1 and 30 September 
of year a+2 and re-entered care (one or more times) by 30 
September of year a+2 
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calculate prospective measures of child permanence for five states—Arizona, Illinois, 
Missouri, Ohio and Wisconsin.  The authors matched the identifiers and controlled for 
other characteristics such as the child’s date of birth and the date of latest placement.  A 
similar method was used by Koh and Testa (2008) to examine the impact of placement 
with kin on reunification, adoption and guardianship rates and by Koh and Testa (2011) to 
study re-entries.  All three of these studies relied on software developed by Hornby-Zeller 
Associates.   
While there are a number of similarities between the approach I utilised to create the 
entry cohorts and the one developed by Hornby-Zeller Associates, there are also a number 
of differences.  Unlike my approach, the Hornby-Zeller software imputed missing values 
for date of birth, sex and race, which may create some “false” positives in the linked files.  
A second difference relates to the fact that the Hornby-Zeller software uses six-month 
AFCARS cross-sectional submissions. Conversely, I was only able to obtain annual 
AFCARS datasets, signifying that the cohorts used by Testa, et al. (2008) and Koh and 
Testa (2008, 2011) are better suited for measuring re-entries.  It is important to note, 
however, that even though such data may “capture” more short-term permanency 
disruptions, they are nonetheless unable to measure re-entries which occurred within each 
six-month cross-sectional file.  Lastly, the method developed by Hornby-Zeller Associates 
focused on first entry into care, while my approach considers any entry that occurred in a 
given year, regardless of whether the child had already been in care.  As a result, the 
approach by Hornby-Zeller Associates is more suited for following a child’s path through 
care.  My approach, on the other hand, is more geared towards examining changes in the 
average number of timely exits for different entry cohorts.
70
  I briefly return to discuss 
some of these aspects, which also have a bearing on the statistical methods employed, in 
section 4.8 below as well as in chapters 6, 7 and 10.  
 
4.5 Outcome measures
71
 
On the basis of the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts described above, I created a 
variable which I refer to as the amount of time children spend in care.  I computed this 
                                                 
70
 This approach is also better suited to address my research questions and hypotheses (see sections 1.6 and 
1.7), which focus on state-level averages, rather than individual child outcomes. 
71
 Through this study, I use the terms outcome measure and dependent variable interchangeably. 
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variable by subtracting the date of entry into care from the date of latest exit from care.  
Data for children who had not exited within thirty-six months of entry were considered 
right censored.
72
  I employed this outcome variable in chapters 6 and 7. 
I also created a series of outcome measures to approximate the concept of 
timeliness.
73
  I defined timely exits as those occurring within twenty-four months of a 
child’s entry into care and untimely exit as those taking place thereafter.  I then subdivided 
timely exits into very timely, namely those occurring within twelve months of a child’s 
placement, and somewhat timely, namely those taking place after twelve months but within 
twenty-four months of entry (see Table 4.1).  These categorical measures are the main 
dependent variables analysed in chapters 6 through 8.
74
   
 
Table 4.1. Main outcome measures 
Measure Variable type and values 
 
As stated in chapter 1, the choice of these thresholds is primarily based on the 
composite measures used by the U.S. government to monitor the timeliness of 
reunifications and adoptions (see Table A.1.1).  My decision to include twenty-four months 
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 A number of studies on the timeliness of exits have employed various statistical methods including survival 
analysis to address the issue of right censoring.  I chose not to avail myself of this type of statistical method 
for a number of reasons, including the unsuitability of my multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts for capturing 
placement instability and re-entries.  However, I did specify that the amount of time children spent in care 
was right censored at thirty-six months.  I used the script gsem from the statistical software package Stata 13 
to generate a series of regression models for censored data (Wooldridge 2009).  I then computed state-level 
marginal averages, taking into account this censoring (see chapter 6 and 7). 
73
 These measures are also more suited to address my research questions, which focus on timely exits, rather 
than the average amount of time children spend in care. 
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 Initially, I had sought to employ only one detailed measure of timeliness in the statistical models presented 
in chapters 6 and 7.  This measure was to assume the values very timely, somewhat timely and untimely.  
However, because a number of assumptions were violated in the multinomial logistic regression and ordinal 
logistic regression models using this outcome measure (see also section 4.8), I created two additional 
dichotomous variables very timely and somewhat timely.   
Amount of time children spend in care Continous 
Timely exits Categorical (yes, no) 
Very timely Categorical (yes, no) 
Somewhat timely Categorical (yes, no) 
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was further dictated by the fact that adoptions are less likely to occur within the first twelve 
months of placement (Conell, et al. 2006; Courtney and Wong 1996; Wulczyn 2004).
75
  
Considering twelve months alone, therefore, might have masked changes in permanency 
outcomes, particularly with regards to adoption. 
I am aware that my choice of outcome measures has a number of possible negative 
implications.  One such drawback is that none of the measures employed are well suited for 
addressing the issue of permanency disruptions and re-entries.  The main reason for not 
considering these aspects is that, as indicated in section 4.2, the AFCARS dataset is not 
optimal for capturing placement instability and re-entries.  The AFCARS is particularly 
inadequate for measuring multiple permanency disruptions within the same fiscal year 
since the most recent spell “overwrites” any previous spells in the dataset (National Data 
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, et al. 2002).  As a result, measures of timeliness 
based on the AFCARS tend to underestimate placement and permanency instability; a 
problem which is further compounded for analyses that seeks to follow entry cohorts over 
multiple years.
 76
   
I acknowledge that this is a serious shortcoming, particularly since a disruption in 
permanency may be more damaging to a child’s wellbeing and safety than a longer stay in 
out-of-home care.  In practice, my linked multi-year entry cohorts do not distinguish 
between children who experienced permanency disruptions—i.e., who exited and re-
entered care within three years of entry—and children who remained continuously in care.  
Instead, my analysis focuses on whether the child exited in a timely manner during the 
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 According to Conell, et al. (2006 p. 794) this trend may be a result of the “amount of time necessary to 
pursue legal processes that free a child for adoption (e.g., termination of parental rights), as well as the 
tendency to pursue alternative permanency avenues (e.g., reunification or guardianship) before proceeding to 
adoption.” 
76
 Partially because of these limitations, many of the studies that have focused on spells in care have either 
limited their analysis to one year (McDonald, et al. 2000; Smith 2003; Wells and Guo 1999) or have relied on 
other types of state-specific administrative data (Courtney and Hook 2012; Marcenko, et al. 2011; Shaw 
2010).  These approaches, however, are also not optimal since the literature suggests that there is often an 
inverse relationship between the length of stay in care and re-entries, signifying that twelve months are an 
insufficient timeframe for studying the timeliness of permanency outcomes, particularly adoptions 
(McDonald, et al. 2006; Wells and Guo 1999).  Further, state-specific administrative sources do not allow for 
a multi-state perspective; a shortcoming identified in much of the relevant literature (see for instance 
Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Courtney and Hook 2012; Golden and Macomber 2009). 
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timeframe considered.  While this approach is reasonable given the objectives of my study, 
I recognise that future research should devote greater attention to exploring the relationship 
between PBC, timeliness and permanency disruptions (see also chapter 10). 
Another aspect that warrants further discussion is that, owing to limitations with my 
multi-year linked entry cohorts, my analysis is only able to follow timeliness outcomes 
within three years of entry.
 77
  This means that my analysis is more likely to view as 
“untimely” placements that disrupt earlier on in the observed period compared to those 
which occur towards the end of year a+2.
78
  This, in turn, may underestimate the 
disruption of adoptions compared to reunifications, since the latter are more likely to occur 
earlier on after placement, while the probability of a child being adopted tends to be low in 
the first year in care (see also note 75).  Unfortunately, I am unable with the current 
dataset
79
 to establish whether differences in the amount of time children spend in out-of-
home care prior to exiting have a bearing on the stability of their permanency outcomes.  
This relationship should be explored in future research (see chapter 10).   
In focusing my analysis on the timeliness of exits, I am aware that this goal should 
not be pursued in isolation.  The fact that reunification services tend to be more effective 
when they are provided over a longer period of time or that re-entry rates are higher for 
children who exit care more quickly are two examples of why an emphasis on timeliness 
alone may be detrimental to a child’s prospects of permanency, especially in cases where 
the permanency goal is reunification (Bagdasaryan 2005; Barth, et al. 2008; Courtney, et 
al. 1997; Littell and Schuerman 2002).   
The issue of whether timeliness is a “worthy” policy objective in-of-itself is further 
complicated by the fact that interpretations of what permanency entails vary greatly (see 
section 1.4).  The notion that discriminatory criteria are often applied in placement and 
permanency decisions, and that the child protection system is not always able to provide 
the necessary support and services to out-of-home care children and their families remains 
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 Based on PIT estimates, approximately one-sixth of children exit care after three years of placement (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau 
2012e).  
78
 The literature suggests that most permanency outcomes that disrupt do so shortly after a child’s exit from 
care.  
79 As stated in section 4.4., the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts do not allow me to examine spells in care.  
Children who exited care and re-entered within thirty-six months of entry were considered to be still in care.  
83 
central to the debate on whether federal and state resources should be devoted to promoting 
timely exits.
80
   
 
4.6 Independent variables 
In my analysis I employ three different types of independent variables: (1) variables related 
to the characteristics of children in care, (2) variables related to placement or permanency 
characteristics, and (3) county and state level variables.  The choice of these three groups 
of variables is consistent with the analytical framework by Wulczyn, et al. (2010) 
described in chapter 2, which recognizes the need to control for contexts and actors, as well 
as the “structures, functions and capacities” of the state and local child protection system.  
In my analysis, the actors and contexts are the children served as well as their permanency 
and placement characteristics.  The “structures, functions and capacities” refer to the two 
main dimensions highlighted in chapter 2 in relation to the PSBI/ND framework, namely 
whether the state: (1) uses PBC to expedite exits from care, and (2) follows the provisions 
related to promoting timely permanency outcomes in the ASFA.   
The three types of independent variables are described below (see Table 4.2), 
referring, where relevant, to the AFCARS codebook as well as to significant relationships 
identified in the literature, which provide the theoretical justification for their inclusion in 
the various models discussed in chapters 6 through 9.  While these variables are based on 
the data contained in the AFCARS dataset, in a number of cases I modified the original 
variable by combining various categories or performing other transformations.  Prior to 
doing this, I examined the frequency distributions of the relevant variables and assessed the 
effect of their inclusion, or of a relevant transformation thereof, on the goodness of fit of 
the models employed in chapters 6 through 9.  Decisions to modify the original variables 
were primarily based on considerations related to analytical relevance and sample size.  
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 Central to this debate is the issue of whether adoption by a “stranger” is preferable to remaining in the care 
of biological parents or relatives.  Authors such as Bartholet, for example, (1999 p. 196), citing the concept of 
psychological parent, have argued that “[i]t is essential not only that [children] be spared damaging disruption 
and get permanent homes, but that they get the kind of permanent homes likely to provide true parenting”.  
However, since adoptive parents are often white, while the biological parents of children in out-of-home care 
tend to belong to ethnic or racial minorities this can exacerbate issues of cultural sensitivity.  Roberts in 
particular has objected to what she perceives as the negative portrayal of biological families as risky and 
violent and of adoptive families as loving and safe (Roberts, 2002). 
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Table 4.2. Independent variables included in the analysis 
Measure Variable type and values 
 
Characteristics of the child 
In my analysis, I included six variables related to the characteristics of children (see Table 
4.2).  These are: (1) the age of children at entry, (2) whether or not the child is an infant, 
(3) the sex of the child, (4) the race of the child, (5) whether or not the child is African 
American, and (6) the child’s ethnicity.  I decided not to include a number of variables 
which have been identified as being related to the timeliness of exits in the literature.  
These included the health or disability status of the child as well as whether the child 
received various types of subsidies—which can be used as a proxy for the income of the 
child’s family of origin.  I made this decision because, for some of the states in my analysis 
such variables were either missing or incomplete.   
The age of the child is continuous variable, which refers to the age of the child at the 
time of placement, expressed in years.  I created this variable by subtracting the date of 
birth of the child from the date of placement in care.  Both dates were originally expressed 
in “day, month, year” format.  The literature confirms that controlling for a child’s age is 
Characteristics of the child 
Age Continuous 
Infant Categorical (yes, no) 
Sex Categorical (male, female) 
Race Categorical (white, African American, other race) 
African American Categorical (yes, no) 
Ethnicity Categorical (Hispanic: yes, no) 
Placement or permanency characteristics 
Placement setting Categorical (unrelated foster care home, kinship care, group 
home or institution, other setting) 
Placement with kin Categorical (yes, no) 
TPR Categorical (yes, no) 
Permanency outcome Categorical (reunification, adoption, legal guardianship or 
placement with relative, other permanency outcome) 
Permanency goal Categorical (reunification, adoption, legal guardianship or 
placement with relative, other permanency goal, not yet 
established) 
Reason for placement  Categorical (physical or sexual abuse or neglect, other) 
Number of previous placement settings Categorical (none, one to two, more than two) 
County and state level 
State ID Categorical 
County ID Categorical 
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important, since it can be associated with the settings children are placed in while in care, 
their permanency outcomes, as well as the timeliness of their exits from care.   
I also computed a transformation of this variable—the square of the child’s age 
expressed in years—to capture the fact that, while teenagers tend to exit care more slowly, 
once they reach the age of majority
81
 they automatically exit the out-of-home care 
system.
82
  I chose to employ the variable age (squared) after verifying that its inclusion 
increased the predictive power and goodness of fit of my multivariate statistical models 
compared to the models containing the variable age; thus confirming the non-linear nature 
of the relationship between age and timeliness. 
I also created an additional categorical age variable, referred to as infant, which 
measures whether the child is aged one year or less, or is older than one year of age.  I 
choose to create this variable because children under the age of one account for the largest 
single group of children entering care (see also section 5.3) and infants often differ from 
other age groups in terms of permanency outcomes.  Specifically, a number of studies have 
shown that infants are more likely to be adopted than older children (Becker, et al. 2007; 
Koh and Testa 2008; McDonald, et al. 2007; Snowden, et al. 2008; Yampolskaya, et al. 
2007). 
Sex is a categorical variable which refers to the child’s biological sex.  In my 
analysis, this variable can assume two values: male or female.  Sex in the AFCARS dataset 
does not refer to a child’s gender, which is a more complex social construct, not captured 
by these administrative data.  While sex is an important variable, the literature suggests that 
the timeliness of exits is rarely significantly related to the sex of the child.   
Race
83
 is a categorical variable which I recoded to assume three values: (1) white, (2) 
black, and (3) other race.
84
  The choice of focusing on these three categories was motivated 
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 For some states this threshold is the age of twenty-one, rather than eighteen. 
82
 I chose to include the variables age squared because of the non-linear relationship between timeliness and 
age of the child. This, as well as my decision to focus on the analytically relevant category infant, explains 
why I decided not to use a series of dummy variables for age. 
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 According to the AFCARS codebook, while race is usually a self-determined characteristic, “(i)n the case 
of young children, parents determine the race of the child” (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 2002 p. 24).   
84 The category “other race” includes children who are American Indian/Alaskan Natives and Asian/Pacific 
Islanders, as well as children of unknown race. 
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primarily by the need to ensure a relatively similar size for the racial groups in my 
analysis
85
 as well as to ensure greater comparability of the racial composition of the out-of-
home care population across the treatment and control states.   
As with other data sources in the United States, including the U.S. Population Census 
and the American Community Survey, the AFCARS dataset modified the way it measures 
race over the time period considered in my analysis.  While in the files prior to 2000, the 
data on the child’s race were presented for five categorical values—(1) white, (2) black, 
(3) American Indian/Alaskan Native, (4) Asian/Pacific Islander, and (5) unable to 
determine—after 2000, the coding of race was modified so that each child could record 
more than one race.  As a result, in the post-2000 definition of the variable race, a child can 
be classified as “belonging” to up to a maximum of four different races at a time.   
In order to ensure consistency with the earlier time series and because I was 
primarily interested in the timeliness of exits for African American children compared to 
other racial groups, I coded all children who included black as one of their racial attributes 
in the annual datasets after 2000 as being African American.  I also created the 
dichotomous variable
86
 African American, which assumes the value one if the child is 
black and zero if the child is of another racial background.
87
  This variable was included in 
the multivariate statistical models in chapters 6 through 9. 
As discussed in chapter 3, controlling for the race of children entering care as well as 
how the racial composition of children entering care may have changed over time is very 
important, since race is one of the most significant predictors of timeliness of permanency 
outcomes identified in the literature.  A large number of studies, for instance, have shown 
that African American children exit care more slowly compared to children of other races 
(Becker, et al. 2007; Connell, et al. 2006; Potter and Klein-Rothschild 2002; Romney, et al. 
2006; Shaw 2010; Smith 2003; Yampolskaya, et al. 2006, 2007; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b).  
African American children also tend to experience different permanency outcomes 
(Connell, et al. 2006; Koh and Testa 2011; Snowden, et al. 2008).   
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 This is important from a statistical perspective since uneven distribution across categories can contribute to 
unstable multivariate models. 
86
 Dichotomous variables are a type of binary variable, which assume the values 0 or 1. 
87 In my analysis, I refer to children of other racial backgrounds interchangeably as children of other races, 
not-African American, or not-black.  
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Ethnicity is a categorical variable, which refers, in my analysis, to whether a child is 
Hispanic or not.  Unlike in many other data sources in the United States, where it is 
considered one of the possible categories in the racial distribution, in the AFCARS dataset 
it is a distinct attribute.  I decided to include this variable in my models because the 
literature suggests that Hispanic children may be less likely to be placed in care compared 
to other African or Native Americans and may also experience different permanency 
outcomes (Cheng 2010; Needell, et al. 2003). 
 
Placement or permanency characteristics 
In relation to placement or permanency characteristics, I identified seven variables which I 
included in my analysis.  These are: (1) the setting a child is placed in while in care, 
(2) whether or not the child was placed with kin, (3) whether the parental rights of the child 
had been terminated, (4) the permanency outcome through which the child exits care, 
(5) the child’s case plan goal, (6) the reasons for placement in care, and (7) the number of 
previous settings the child was placed in. 
The variable placement setting refers to the type of setting the child lived in since the 
latest removal.  I recoded the original values of placement setting reported in the AFCARS 
data into four categories: (1) unrelated foster family homes,
88
 (2) kinship care or related 
foster family,
89
 (3) group homes or institutions,
 90
 and (4) other settings which include 
supervised independent living homes, trial home visit homes, and pre-adoptive homes.  
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 The AFCARS codebook defines an unrelated foster family home as a “licensed foster family home 
regarded by the state as a foster care living arrangement” (National Data Archive on Child Abuse and 
Neglect 2012 p. 23). 
89
 The AFCARS codebook defines kinship care or related foster family as “a licensed or unlicensed home of 
the child’s relatives regarded by the state as a foster care living arrangement for the child” (National Data 
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect 2012 p. 23).  
90
 The AFCARS codebook defines group home as a “licensed or approved home providing 24-hour care for 
children in a small group setting that generally has from seven to twelve children”.  Institutions are defined as 
a “child care facility operated by a public or private agency and providing 24-hour care and/or treatment for 
children who require separation from their own homes and group living experience. These facilities may 
include: child care institutions; residential treatment facilities; maternity homes; etc.” (National Data Archive 
on Child Abuse and Neglect 2012 p. 23).  According to the AFCARS, the main difference between a group 
home and an institution is the number of children that they are licenced to care for.  Group homes usually 
host a maximum of twelve children. 
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Again my motivation for combining the original values of the variable into a more limited 
set of categories was influenced by the number of cases for each of the original values as 
well as their analytical relevance in the context of my research. 
On the basis of this variable, I created a dichotomous variable placement with kin, 
where one indicates that children are in kinship care, and zero that they are in another type 
of placement setting.  I included this variable in the analysis in chapters 6 through 9.  As 
indicated in previous chapters, the setting children are placed in while care has been found 
to be significantly associated with the timeliness of exits in a number of studies (Caplick 
Weigensberg 2009; Courtney, et al. 2011a, 2011b; Needell, et al. 2005; Noonan and Burke 
2005; Scannapieco, et al. 1997; Shaw 2010; Smith 2003; Wulczyn, et al. 2007).  Several 
authors have also found that children may experience different permanency outcomes 
depending on their placement setting in care (Berrick, et al. 1997; Weil 1999; Chipman, et 
al. 2002). 
TPR is a categorical variable which refers to whether the parental rights of the child 
were terminated.
91
  The AFCARS dataset includes two separate variables related to TPR: 
one for the mother and one for the father.  I decided to combine these variables, and coded 
the resulting variable as one if: (1) both parents had experienced TPR, or (2) only one 
parent had lost TPR and the child had only one parent.  In all other cases, I coded this 
variable as zero (or no TPR).  A number of studies have identified an association between 
TPR, the timeliness of exits, and various permanency outcomes (Connell, et al. 2006; 
Noonan and Burke 2005; Potter and Klein-Rothschild 2002), suggesting that this variable 
should be included in the analysis. 
Permanency outcome is a categorical variable which refers to the reason why a child 
was discharged from out-of-home care.  Before including this variable in my analysis, I 
recoded the values reported in the AFCARS into four categories: (1) reunification with 
parent or a primary caretaker, (2) adoption, (3) placement with a relative or guardians, and 
(4) other permanency outcomes, including emancipation from care due to the age of the 
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 TPR, in addition to being related to timeliness, can also be influenced by policy tools such as PBC, raising 
concerns of endogeneity.  I tested whether the inclusion of this variable had a significant impact on the 
models discussed in chapters 6 through 9 and concluded that it did not alter the interpretation of the DID 
estimator (the alternative models are also presented in the relevant annex tables).  I decided to retain the 
variable in the models since it has been included in a number of previous studies (see above) and contributed 
to improving my models’ predictive power. 
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child.  As with some of the variables described above, the decision to combine some of the 
categories was based on considerations of analytical relevance and sample size. 
The literature indicates that children who achieve permanency through adoption 
experience different timeliness patterns compared to children who exit care through 
reunification or guardianship (Akin 2011; Caplick Weigensberg 2009; Wulczyn, et al. 
2000; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b).  Further, the likelihood of adoption or reunification is related 
to a number of factors, including the setting the child is placed in while in care as well as 
the age and race of the child (Connell, et al. 2006; Courtney and Wong 1996; Koh and 
Testa 2011).  Permanency outcome is one of two explanatory variables analysed in chapter 
9; the other being the permanency goal.
92
  In my analysis, permanency goal is a categorical 
variable which can assume five values: (1) reunification, (2) adoption, (3) placement with 
relatives or guardianship, (4) other permanency goal, which includes emancipation, and 
(5) case goal not yet established.   
Reason for placement is a categorical variable which in my analysis can assume two 
values: (1) placement for physical or sexual abuse, or neglect, and (2) other reasons for 
placement.  The AFCARS dataset includes sixteen different dichotomous variables to 
classify the reasons for placement, which range from inadequate housing to the disability 
of the child, and from a parent having been incarcerated to the death of the child’s primary 
caregiver.  While for many of these variables the number of cases is very small, I am able 
to address this concern by “collapsing” the three variables related to maltreatment—
namely, placement for physical abuse, sexual abuse or neglect—into one variable.  Further, 
from a substantive perspective, this choice appears to be reasonable since a number of 
studies have identified a relationship between a similar, simplified set of measures of 
maltreatment and permanency outcomes (Connell, et al. 2006; McDonald, et al. 2007).  
This variable is employed in chapter 9. 
Number of previous placement settings is a categorical variable which refers to the 
number of placement setting a child has lived in, including the most recent setting.  I 
recoded the values included in the AFCARS dataset as follows: zero if the most recent was 
the only placement the child had experienced, one for children who had been in one or two 
settings, including the most recent one, and two for all other cases.  A number of studies 
have found an association between placement instability and the type of setting children 
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 The same considerations related to TPR apply to the variable permanency goal (see also note 91). 
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are placed in (Berrick, et al. 1997; Koh and Testa 2008; Webster, et al. 2000; Wulczyn, et 
al. 2003).  
 
County and state level variables 
In my analysis, I included two variables which identify the state or the county: state ID and 
county ID.  On the basis of the first variable, I created two additional state categorisations: 
a first to distinguish between the treatment and control states (used in chapter 6), and a 
second to classify states into three groups—Illinois, North Carolina and the states which 
did not employ PBC—used in chapters 7 through 9.  In combination with the year of entry 
described above, these two state classifications also serve to compute various DID 
estimators, as well as the time-varying covariates used in chapters 6 and 7. 
County ID is a categorical variable used to identify the second level in the multilevel 
models presented in chapter 6 and 7.  In particular, I employ it to control for time-invariant 
fixed effect at the county level (see also section 4.7). 
 
4.7 Estimators and other measures 
In addition to the independent variables described above, in my analysis in chapters 6 
through 9, I avail myself of a series of estimators and other measures.  Below I briefly 
discuss three of them. 
 
Difference-in-difference estimator 
One of the central measures in my analysis is the so-called difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimator.  The DID estimator is one of the most widely used tools to evaluate the 
relationship between a policy intervention and selected outcomes (Abadie 2005; 
Wooldridge 2009).  In its simplest form, the DID estimator can be expressed as follows: 
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where 	
 represent the average outcome at two points in time—pre- and post-intervention—
for two groups—the treatment and the control (see also Figure 4.4).   
One of the main assumptions of the DID estimator is that the average outcome for 
the treatment and control groups follows parallel trends over time.  Based on this 
assumption, the difference between the treatment group and its counterfactual, the so-
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called average treatment effect (ATE), reflects the effect of the intervention, whereas the 
trend for the control and the counterfactual are attributed to other factors, including secular 
trends.  In the case of my analysis, this assumption can be loosely interpreted as follows: 
had PBC had not been introduced, the treatment states would have experienced the same 
trend in terms of the timeliness of exits as the control states, albeit starting from different 
initial levels. 
 
Figure 4.4. Visual representation of the DID estimator 
 
 
I included the DID estimator in a number of statistical models in my analysis, (see 
chapters 6 through 9) to examine differences between PBC and non-PBC states in the 
timeliness of exits.
93
  Doing so has several advantages, including the relative simplicity of 
calculating standard errors and the possibility to control for the effect of other independent 
variables which could reduce the residual variance.  However, for the interpretation of DID 
to be valid, the parallel trend assumption must hold.  This assumption is violated when 
something besides the treatment changes in one group but not the other.  In practice this 
“requires verifying that PBC actually improves permanence and stability while the children 
are in foster care and the changes were not the result of other extraneous factors (e.g., 
changes in the kinds of children entering care, general improvements in the economic 
climate, or sweeping policy changes that affect all programs regardless of the 
intervention)” (Taylor and Shaver 2010 p. 303). 
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 In these cases, the DID estimator refers to modeled averages.   
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As indicated in section 4.3, one of the limitations of my study is that I was unable to 
randomly assign observations to the treatment and control groups owing to both practical 
and ethical considerations.  I sought to minimise the potential bias introduced by this less 
robust type of research design by controlling for differences in child characteristics and 
other contextual factors.  In reality, ensuring the comparability of the composition of out-
of-home care caseloads as well as other normative and policy practices over time is 
challenging (see also chapters 3 and 5).  This means that some of the assumptions 
underlying DID may have been violated, which in turn could partially compromise the 
interpretation of my results.  A number of factors such as the speed at which the state 
implemented the ASFA, budgetary constraints, the culture on the ground among the child 
protection services, attitudes towards permanency options, availability of different 
placement settings as well as various secular trends are examples of factors that are likely 
to have changed in different ways over time, across the states and counties considered 
(Berliner and Fine 2001; Whittaker and Maluccio 2002).  Bertrand, et al. (2003) have 
suggested two possible solutions to address this problem: the first is to block bootstrap 
standard errors by sampling states with replacement, the second is to cluster standard errors 
at the state level.  I chose to use the latter approach in my analysis.  I am aware, however, 
that the interpretation of ATE is often problematic and that assessments based on ATE 
have to be made with great caution.  One aspect that requires particular attention is the 
plausibility of generalising trends based on the controls.  For instance, given the pressure 
that states face to reduce the amount of time children spend in care (see also chapter 1), 
non-PBC states are likely to have implemented other strategies to promote timeliness.  As a 
result, the counterfactual will reflect those policies and interventions as well, rather than 
simply the “absence” of PBC.  A second concern stems from the fact that the slope of the 
counterfactual does not take into account the level of the outcome measures considered.  
This is equivalent to saying that a policy intervention would have the “same” impact on the 
treatment and control groups, regardless of their initial level of timeliness.  In reality, states 
that already record large proportions of timely exits may find it more difficult to improve 
their performance further.  In contrast, in states where children spend, on average, long 
amounts of time in care it may be easier to achieve an improvement.  I return to discuss 
these limitations in chapters 6, 7 and 10. 
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Other measures: DTE and DAE 
In chapter 8, I seek to explore the mechanisms through which PBC states achieve timely 
permanency outcomes, including various types of gaming behaviours.  In order to better 
explore the research hypotheses related to this question, namely my third, fourth and fifth 
hypotheses, I created two measures: (1) disproportionality in timely exits or DTE and 
(2) disparity at entry or DAE. 
I defined DTE as the difference in period t of the proportion p of timely exits from 
care for selected sets of bivariate characteristics.  For instance, DTE by race is defined as 
the difference between the proportion of black children ( !) exiting care in a timely 
manner and the proportion of children of other racial backgrounds ( !") exiting care 
within twenty-four months of entry at time t.   
 
DTE&!",..( = | ! −	|	 !" 4.2 
 
For DTE, t assumes three values: 0, which refers to the period 1996-1998, 1 which 
refers to the period 1999-2004, and 2, which refers to the period 2005-2009.  Values of 
DTE close to zero signify that there is convergence in timely exits for the set of bivariate 
child attributes considered.  In contrast, values which diverge from zero indicate that DTE 
widened.   
I defined DAE as the differences in the proportion of children entering care with 
certain bivariate sets of characteristics (see equation 4.3).  For example, DAE by race can 
be defined as the difference between the proportion of black children (* !) and the 
proportion of children of other racial backgrounds (* !") entering care at time t.   
 
DAE&!",..( = q&|	-! −	q&|	-!" 4.3 
 
A value above zero points to a greater proportion of black children entering care 
compared to children of other races, whereas a value of less than zero indicates that fewer 
African American children entered care compared to children of other racial backgrounds.  
A value close to zero signifies that the same proportion of children entered care for both 
groups.  DAE is not the same as disproportionality at entry, which instead refers to the 
proportion of children with a certain characteristic over the proportion of children with the 
same characteristic in the overall child population (see also chapter 8). 
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4.8 Statistical methods 
For each of the variables described in section 4.6, I examined their frequency distribution, 
measures of central tendency, as well as their dispersion around such measures.  On the 
basis of this, I deleted a small number of records that were either outliers or had missing 
values.  I then focused on identifying relationships between two variables at a time 
(bivariate analysis).  Where relevant, I conducted cross-tabulations and computed various 
measures to assess the significance of bivariate associations (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient and Cramer’s V).  In addition, I tested the significance of differences between 
proportions through a series of the two-proportions z-tests.  Because the number of 
observations in my analysis is very large (over 300,000 records), many of these bivariate 
tests are highly significant.  
To examine the relationship between more than two variables as a time (multivariate 
analysis), I used a number of statistical models including logistic regression and regression 
for censored data, as well as multilevel models for binary and continuous censored data.  
For the binary outcome variables, I chose to use a logistic regression model because of: 
(1) its appropriateness given my choice of dependent variables, (2) its relative 
computational simplicity, and (3) its prior use in a number of quantitative studies focused 
on the timeliness of exits from care (Green, et al. 2007; Shaw 2010).  The logistic 
regressions models included in my analytical chapters were generated using the statistical 
software package Stata 13, using the script logit.  For the continuous outcome variables, I 
employed the script gsem for censored regression models.  Before running the models, I 
carried out standard diagnostic tests, examined outliers and residuals through various 
graphical tools.  I also checked for goodness of fit of the models, and quantified the 
predictive ability of the various models through receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves.   
I decided to use multilevel models because the framework developed by Wulczyn, et 
al. (2010) recognizes that system are not isolated but are nested within broader context 
comprising families, communities, and states (see also chapter 2).  Multilevel models are 
well suited to reflect the nested structure of my data, where children are clustered within 
counties and states.  Failing to consider the population structure, could result in biased 
estimate of the standard error, which in turn could produce a biased interpretation of the 
significance of any relevant coefficients.  The fact that, at least in some states, counties 
have considerable autonomy in administering programmes and allocating resources and 
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that the AFCARS dataset is very sparse in terms of contextual information is an additional 
reason for employing multilevel models in my analysis, since this approach allows to 
“cluster” group level variability at the state and county levels.  To compute the multilevel 
models, I used the Stata 13 script melogit for the binary outcomes, and the script gsem for 
the continuous censored outcomes.   
In selecting these models, I made the decision not to use a number of other statistical 
models which have been employed to study the amount of time children spend in care, 
such as survival analysis (Courtney 1995; Lewandowski and Pierce 2004), as well as to 
control for differences in out-of-home care populations, such as propensity score matching 
(PSM) (Koh and Testa 2011; Testa 2010c).  For survival analysis, the main reasons for not 
selecting these models were that: (1) I was interested in state-level averages, rather than in 
a more detailed, time-to-event type of analysis focused on the individual child, (2) I was 
not seeking to explore permanency disruptions or re-entries, and (3) my models did not 
require controlling for individual-specific time-varying covariates.  For PSM as well 
synthetic control methods (SCM) for comparative case studies, I made this choice because: 
(1) the treatment and control groups differed considerably for a number of important 
covariates, including the race of the child or the type of placement setting used, (2) owing 
to the limited scope of the AFCARS dataset, I was unable to match the treatment and 
control groups for all relevant covariates associated with my dependent variables, and 
(3) the number of aggregate units—counties or states—was too small for SCM. 
There were also a number of statistical models which I tested and then discarded 
after some important assumption had been violated.  These included multinomial logistic 
regression as well as ordinal logistic regression, which in my analysis violated, 
respectively, the Suest-based test of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption, derived from the Hausman specification test, and the Brant test of the parallel 
regression assumption.  I also chose not to use nested logit regression because the Stata 
script nlogit was unable to handle factor type variables, which are included in my 
multivariate statistical models.   
 
Logistic regression 
Based on the notation used in Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012 pp. 502-203), the logistic 
regression can be expressed as follows: 
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where 56 is a dichotomous dependent variable, 86E  is a vector of covariates and β is the 
regression coefficient.  The logit function can also be expressed as an exponential function 
of Odds(56 = 1|86		) = JKLM	∑ KN
O
NPQ @?N .		 Given that probability can be expressed as a 
function of odds—specifically as 4 = RSSTMRSST—the probability of a dependent variable 
being equal to 1 in the logit model can be specified as: 
 
4(56 = 1|86		) =
JKLM	∑ KN
O
NPQ @?N
1 +	JKLM	∑ KN
O
NPQ @?N
 
 
Regression for censored data 
Based on the notation used in Wooldridge (2009 p. 601), a regression for censored data can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
56 = " +	86 + U6 	, U6|	86 	, V6 4.5 
W6 = min	(56	, V6) 4.6 
 
where 56 is a dependent variable right censored at V6 and U6 is an error term.  Based on the 
assumptions in 4.5 and 4.6,  can be estimated by maximum likelihood, given a random 
sample on (86, W6).  For uncensored observations, W6 = 56, and the density of W6 is the 
same as that for 56.  For censored observations, the probability that W6 equals the censoring 
value, V6, given 86(see also Wooldridge 2009 p. 602). 
 
Multilevel logistic regression 
In chapters 6 and 7, I use a two-level logistic mixed-effects regression model.  Conditional 
on a set of random effects U6, and a series of Z = 1,… ,\ independent clusters, the 
probability of a dependent variable being equal to 1 for observation 1 = 1,…]E can be 
expressed as: 
Odds(56 = 1	|	86) 
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4^56E = 1_86E		, U6` = a^86E +	b6EUE` 4.7 
where 56E is the binary dependent variable, 86E is a vector of covariates for the fixed effects 
as in the standard logistic regression model and β is the fixed effects regression coefficient, 
b6Eis a vector of the covariates corresponding to the random effects and H is the logistic 
cumulative function.  This formula is based on the Stata documentation for multilevel 
logistic mixed-effects regressions. 
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5 PBC and non-PBC states: an overview of out-of-home care trends 
and the child protection system 
 
5.1 Rationale and outline of the chapter 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the basic contextual information for the four 
states considered in my analysis.  The reasons for including this discussion are twofold.  
First, given the lack of random assignment in my research design, it is important to 
establish whether the treatment and control groups are comparable for a number of 
observed characteristics.  Barring this, it would be difficult to address the first research 
hypothesis outlined in chapter 1, which focuses on comparing the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes in two distinct groups, namely PBC and non-PBC states.  Second, 
given the centrality of the assumption of parallel trends for the validity of the interpretation 
of the DID estimator (see section 4.7), it is critical to ascertain whether anything besides 
the treatment—i.e., the implementation of PBC—changed over time in the four states 
considered. 
In this chapter I present some basic descriptive statistics on out-of-home care 
population in the two treatment—Illinois and North Carolina—and two control states—
New Jersey and Washington.  In particular, the chapter outlines trends in the number of 
children entering and exiting care between 1996 and 2009.  It also provides a comparison 
of the child population in the four states focusing in particular of their race and age as well 
as their placement and permanency characteristics (see also section 4.6).  Lastly, the 
chapter presents a brief overview of some contextual variables in the four states and 
outlines some key features of their child protection and welfare systems that might have a 
bearing of the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  
 
5.2 The number of children entering and exiting care 
There are a number of similarities between the PBC and non-PBC states in terms of the 
number of children entering out-of-home care.  For instance, during the period 1996 to 
2009, the number of entries in each of the four states considered was, on average, between 
five and seven thousand children per year.  Washington had the largest average annual 
number of children entering care (around 6,500), while New Jersey had the smallest 
(around 5,000). 
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In terms of trends, both Illinois and Washington experienced a progressive decline in 
the average annual number of children entering out-of-home care, with the two states 
recording, respectively, a 40 per cent and a nearly 20 per cent decline between the pre-PBC 
and the second post-PBC period.  In contrast, in both North Carolina and New Jersey the 
average annual number of children entering care increased between 1996 and 2004.  Even 
though both states experienced a decline in the second post-PBC period, the average annual 
number of children entering care was significantly higher in 2009 compared to 1996.95   
 
Figure 5.1. Trend in the average annual number of children entering and 
exiting care in Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina and Washington  
Illinois New Jersey 
  
North Carolina Washington 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Sources: The data on exits are based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau (2006a, 2008b, 2012c). 
Note: Data refer to the average annual number of children entering and exiting care.  The pre-PBC 
period refers to 1996-1998, the post-PBC (1st period) to 1999-2004 and the post-PBC (2nd period) to 2005-
2009 (see also section 4.3). 
                                                 
95 In the remainder of this chapter, as well as in chapters 6 through 9, I use t tests, chi-squared tests, as well as 
two-proportion z-tests.  Unless otherwise specified, all tests reported as statistically significant are so at a 
value of p<0.001. 
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For exits, there are also some striking similarities between the PBC and non-PBC 
states.
96
  Both Illinois and Washington, for example, recorded a decline in the average 
annual number of children exiting care between 1996 and 2009, while both New Jersey and 
North Carolina experienced an increase during the same period.  It is worth noting that 
Illinois differs from the other three states in terms of the level of exits in the period 1996-
1998.  During this period, the average annual number of exits in Illinois was nearly twice 
that of Washington and nearly three times that of New Jersey and North Carolina.  I return 
briefly to discuss the implications of this difference for the timeliness of exits in chapter 
10. 
 
5.3 Selected characteristics of children entering care: age and race 
As anticipated in chapter 3, one of the main limitations of the existing literature on the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes is that it fails to control for various “compositional” 
effects, namely differences across states in the type of out-of-home care populations 
served.  In this study, I seek to address this limitation by controlling for a sub-set of child 
characteristics, known in the literature to be associated with a child’s timely exit from out-
of-home care, notably the age and race of children. 
 
Age 
Evidence from the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts constructed using the AFCARS 
dataset, indicates that in all four states, infants, i.e., children under the age of one, make-up 
the largest group of children entering care.  Illinois had the largest share97 of children 
entering care as infants—around one-fourth of entries—followed by New Jersey, North 
Carolina and Washington—between one-fifth and one-sixth of entries.  While the age 
distribution is unimodal, all four states recorded relatively high proportions of 
adolescents—defined here as children between 12 and 16 years of age—entering care. 
As with entries, there are some striking similarities between PBC and non-PBC 
states in terms of trends in the age distribution (see Figure 5.2).  Focusing on the proportion 
                                                 
96 Exits here refer to all children exiting care during a certain fiscal year regardless of their entry cohort and 
are based on data compiled by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for 
Children and Families, Children's Bureau.  
97 Throughout this study, I use the terms proportion, share and percentage interchangeably. 
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of children entering care as infants, I found that Illinois and New Jersey recorded almost no 
change between 1996 and 2009.  In contrast, in North Carolina and Washington the share 
of infants entering care increased significantly.  Another notable difference relates to the 
proportion of children aged 12 to 16 years.  New Jersey, North Carolina and Washington 
all witnessed a decline in the share of children entering at these ages during the period 
1996 to 2009, while Illinois recorded a slight increase.  Using a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test, a non-parametric method for comparing cumulative probability 
distributions, I found that the probability that random chance alone might produce the 
observed difference was very small (KS test, p<0.000). 
 
Figure 5.2. Proportion of children entering care by age  
Illinois New Jersey  
  
North Carolina Washington 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
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Race 
There are considerable similarities in the racial composition of children entering care in the 
four states considered.  In both Illinois and New Jersey, for instance, the majority of 
children entering care between 1996 and 2009 were African American, while in North 
Carolina and Washington more than 50 per cent of all children entering care were white. 
Strikingly, both the PBC and the non-PBC states witnessed a significant decline in 
the proportion of African American children entering care between 1996 and 2009.  The 
decline was particularly noteworthy for Illinois, New Jersey and North Carolina, where the 
share on African American children entering care fell by more than 10 percentage points 
during this period.  Washington also witnessed a decline, though less pronounced (around 
4 percentage points) in the proportion of black children placed in care.  
 
Figure 5.3. Proportion of children entering care by race 
Illinois New Jersey  
  
North Carolina Washington 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
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increase in the proportion of white children entering care.  In New Jersey and North 
Carolina, both the share of white children and children classified as “other race” increased, 
while in Washington the share of white children did not change significantly, while the 
state recorded an upturn in the proportion of children classified as “other race”, which 
includes children of American Indian/Alaskan Natives and Asian/Pacific Islanders, as well 
as children of more than one race.98 
 
5.4 Permanency and placement characteristics 
In addition to the characteristic of children entering care, it is also important to control for 
other factors known in the literature to be associated with the timeliness of exits.  These 
factors, which fall under what Wulczyn, et al. (2010) refer to as the states’ “structures, 
functions and capacities” (see also chapter 2), include the placement setting and the child’s 
permanency outcome. 
 
Placement settings 
There are a number of differences between the PBC and non-PBC states in terms of their 
placement setting.  For instance, during the period 1996 to 2009, more than half of all 
children who entered care in New Jersey and Washington were place in an unrelated foster 
family, while in Illinois and North Carolina the average share placed in this setting was less 
than 40 per cent.  Illinois, North Carolina and Washington also recorded relatively large 
shares of children placed with relatives—between one-third and one-fourth of all children 
entering care.  In contrast, in New Jersey the proportion of children placed with kin was 
relatively small—around one-tenth.  In addition, New Jersey, North Carolina and 
Washington had a sizable proportion of children placed in group homes or institutions—
between one-fifth and one-fourth of all children entering care—while in Illinois and North 
Carolina approximately one-sixth of children entering care were placed in other settings, 
which include supervised independent living homes, trial home visit homes and pre-
adoptive homes. 
PBC and non-PBC states also experienced somewhat different trends in the share of 
children placed in various settings.  In all four states, the share of children placed with a 
relative increased between the period 1996-1998 and the period 2005-2009.  The increase, 
                                                 
98 Children of more than one race, for whom at least one of the reported values was “African American” were 
considered African American (see also section 4.6). 
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however, was much more pronounced for New Jersey and Washington than for Illinois and 
North Carolina.  Further, in Illinois the share of children placed with kin declined slightly 
during the period immediately following the implementation of PBC. 
For placements in unrelated foster homes, the share of children placed in this setting 
increased during the first post-PBC period in Illinois and New Jersey, only to return to the 
levels comparable to those of 1996-1998 by the second post-PBC period.  In contrast, in 
Washington, the proportion of children placed with unrelated foster families declined, 
offsetting the increase in the proportion of children placed with relatives, while in North 
Carolina the share of children placed in unrelated family settings increased significantly. 
 
Figure 5.4. Proportion of children entering care by placement setting 
Illinois New Jersey  
  
North Carolina Washington 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
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Washington where the share of children placed in other settings increased significantly 
between the periods 1996-1998 and 2005-2009.  
 
Permanency outcomes within thirty-six months of entry 
Based on the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts created using the AFACRS dataset, I 
find that reunification is by far the most common means of achieving permanency in all 
four states considered.  After three years of entry, two-thirds of the children in Illinois, 
New Jersey and Washington and over half of the children in North Carolina had exited care 
through this permanency outcome.  Adoption was the second most common permanency 
outcome, followed by guardianship—the exception being North Carolina where exits to 
guardianship overtook adoptions following the implementation of PBC. 
 
Figure 5.5. Proportion of children exiting care within thirty-six months of 
entry by type of permanency outcome 
Illinois New Jersey  
  
North Carolina Washington 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: Other permanency outcomes include emancipation from care due to the age of the child.   
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In all four states, the proportion of children who exited care to reunification declined 
significantly during the period considered.  In Illinois and Washington, for instance, the 
proportion of children who were reunited with their parent or another caregiver fell by 
around 5 per cent between the period 1996-1998 and the period 1999-2004, while North 
Carolina and New Jersey recorded an even more pronounced decline—over 15 per cent—
during the same time span.  While North Carolina and, to a lesser degree, Illinois witnessed 
an upturn in the proportion of children who were reunified during the period 2005-2009 
compared to the period 1999-2004, levels of reunification remained below those recorded 
prior to the introduction of PBC. 
There are also many similarities between PBC and non-PBC states in terms of trends 
for adoptions.  In Illinois and New Jersey, the proportion of children who exited to 
adoption rose between the period 1996-1998 and the first period following the 
implementation of PBC.  However, during the period 2005-2009, the proportion of 
adoptions among children exiting care within thirty-six months of entry declined in both 
states, with levels falling below those recorded during the period 1996-1998 in Illinois.  
North Carolina and Washington experienced an almost opposite trend, with the proportion 
of adoptions changing little during the period 1999-2004 compared to the period prior to 
the implementation of PBC, and then increasing during the period 2005-2009. 
Permanency outcomes besides reunification and adoption also changed.  All four 
states, for instance, experienced an increase in the proportion of children who exited care to 
guardianship.  In North Carolina, the share of such exits rose to 29 per cent in the first 
period after the implementation of PBC; more than double the proportion recorded during 
the period 1996-1998.  By the period 2005-2009, however, the share of children exiting to 
guardianship declined, falling to around 21 per cent of all exits from care.  In contrast, in 
Illinois and Washington the proportion of children who exited care to live with a guardian 
or a relative changed relatively little between the periods 1996-1998 and 1999-2004.  By 
the period 2005-2009, however, this proportion had nearly doubled compared to the period 
preceding the implementation of PBC. 
 
5.5 Selected contextual variables and key features of the child protection and 
welfare system 
In addition to the characteristics of the population entering care, placement setting and 
permanency outcomes, it is useful to consider selected contextual variables in the four 
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states considered as well as outline some of the key features of the states’ child protection 
and welfare systems that might be related to the timeliness of exits from care. 
 
Contextual variables 
In terms of the contextual variables, I briefly present four which have been identified in the 
literature as being predictive or associated with relevant characteristics and outcomes in the 
out-of-home care population.  These include the size of the state’s child population, the 
racial composition of the child population, the proportion of children living in urban areas 
and the proportion of children living in poverty.99  In order to ascertain whether these 
variables changed over time, I report them for two points in time: 1998 and 2009 (see 
Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Selected demographic and social characteristics of the child 
population in the four states 
 Illinois New Jersey North 
Carolina 
Washington 
 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 
Population under18 (thousands) 3,187 3,177 1,990 2,046 1,920 2,278 1,472 1,569 
Racial distribution (percentage)         
    Black 18.5 16.9 15.9 14.6 26.6 23.4 3.8 4.3 
    Hispanic 14.4 22.2 15.5 21.6 3.3 13.0 9.7 17.6 
    White 63.6 54.3 62.4 53.2 66.8 57.6 77.9 64.0 
    Other race .. 2.2 .. 2.2 3.3 6.0 8.6 14.1 
Children living in urban areas 
(percentage) 
80.1 .. 100.0 .. 72.8 .. 76.5 .. 
Children living in poverty 
(percentage) 
17.5 18.9 15.0 13.5 16.9  22.5 15.0 16.2 
Sources: Based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families, Children's Bureau (2006a, 2012d). 
Note: Data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The classification of race differs somewhat from that 
reported in the AFCARS dataset where “Hispanic” is recorded as the separate variable “ethnicity” rather than 
as a racial category. 
 
Based on these variables, it emerges that the four states are, in many respects, similar.  
All four states, for instance, comprise relatively large urban and poor child populations.  
Further, in all four states more than half of the child population is white.  There are, 
                                                 
99 These variables are also reported as contextual variables in the annual CWORs.   
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however, some differences with regard to the other racial groups.  North Carolina has the 
highest share of African Americans in its child population (around one in four), followed 
by Illinois and New Jersey (around one in six).  Washington, on the other hand, where the 
share of black children is much lower (less than 5 per cent), has a much larger proportion 
of children classified as “other race”, the majority of whom are Native American. 
 
Selected features of the child protection and welfare system 
In this section, I focus on five key features of the child protection and welfare system in the 
four states considered, namely: (1) the type of administrative framework employed; (2) the 
state’s normative stands towards timeliness; (3) the state’s preference for various types of 
placement settings; (4) the existence of policies that allow relatives to become permanent 
guardians of children in out-of-home care; and (5) the amount of federal funding received 
by the state for children in out-of-home care as well as for adoptions. 
In terms of the type of administrative framework for child welfare services and 
programmes, there are some differences between the states considered.  Specifically, 
Illinois, New Jersey and Washington have a centralised administrative system, while North 
Carolina has a county administered system.   
With regard to the normative stands towards timeliness, the four states have a 
somewhat similar approach.  As indicated in chapter 2, all four states have implemented 
the five measures outlined in the ASFA to promote timeliness.  These measures are: 
(1) concurrent planning, (2) the 15 of 22 month standard, (3) case reviews within six 
months, (4) permanency hearings within twelve months of the initial placement; and 
(5) permanency hearings every twelve months thereafter. 
For placement settings, all four states give preference to placements with kin in their 
statutes.  Illinois, New Jersey and Washington require relatives to undergo a criminal 
background check before the child can be placed in their care.  In North Carolina and 
Washington the court can “transfer legal custody of the child to the relative as an 
alternative to a foster care placement” while in Illinois and New Jersey, the custody of the 
child remains with the state social services (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2013c 
p. 3).  While all four states favour placements with kin, none of them explicitly provide 
relatives with additional services. 
In terms of policies to promote permanency through guardianship, the four states 
have followed somewhat different approaches.  Specifically, Illinois, New Jersey and 
 109 
 
North Carolina explicitly promote guardianship with kin as a permanency option when 
“efforts to reunite the child with his or her family have been unsuccessful and permanency 
through adoption is either not possible or not appropriate” (Child Welfare Information 
Gateway. 2015 p. 2), while Washington does not.  In New Jersey, kinship guardians are 
eligible for state-funded guardianship assistance payments, while in Illinois and 
Washington they can be granted federally funded title IV-E relative guardianship 
assistance.  In addition, Illinois and North Carolina have implemented a subsidised 
guardianship waiver demonstrations programme.100  States that have implemented such 
programmes to subsidise guardianship can utilise title IV-E funds to “pay subsidies to 
caregivers who assume physical and legal custody of children in their care” (Based on U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, 
Children's Bureau 2011c p. i).   
With regard to federal funding, the four states received between 12,000 U.S. dollars 
and 16,000 U.S. dollars in federal funds under title IV-E for each eligible child, with North 
Carolina recording the highest amount per caseload and New Jersey the lowest (U.S. 
Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means 2004).  With 
regard to adoption assistance, the average amount per child ranged from 3,000 U.S. dollars 
to 6,000 U.S. dollars, with New Jersey receiving the highest amount per caseload and 
Illinois the lowest. 
Illinois spent the lowest amount of federal funding for assistance payments to 
families, administration and child placement services, while Washington spent the largest 
amount (see Figure 5.6).  In Illinois, nearly half of the federal out-of-home care funding 
was employed for waiver demonstration programmes such as the guardianship subsidising 
programme described above.  North Carolina, which also availed itself of demonstration 
waivers, dedicated considerably fewer federal resources to such programmes—around one-
fourth of its title IV-E funds.  With regards to adoption assistance, North Carolina 
dedicated the largest amount per caseload to assistance payments, while New Jersey spent 
the most on state and local administration of the programme. 
 
                                                 
100 Federal child welfare waivers were devised to accord states greater flexibility in the use of federal funds 
such as title IV-E funds.   
110 
 
5.6 Summary of the main findings and discussion 
With regards to the dynamics of the out-of-home care populations, Illinois (PBC state) and 
Washington (non-PBC state) followed relatively similar trends, with both states 
experiencing a marked decline over the time period considered in the number of children 
entering and exiting care.  In contrast, both New Jersey (non-PBC state) and North 
Carolina (PBC state) recorded an increase in the number of entries and exits during the 
same period.   
 
Figure 5.6. Estimated federal funding under title IV-E per caseload for out-
of-home care and adoption assistance in U.S. dollars 
Out-of-home care 
 
Adoption assistance 
 
Illinois            New Jersey         North Carolina        Washington 
Source: Based on U.S. Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means 
(2004).  
Notes: The figures refer to the average amount per caseload in 2002. 
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In terms of the age of children, all four states witnessed an increase in the proportion 
of children entering care as infants.  However, for North Carolina and Washington this 
increase was more pronounced.  The proportion of infants entering care rose by over 6 
percentage points in North Carolina and by over 8 percentage points in Washington 
between the periods 1996-1998 and 2005-2009.  In Illinois, the proportion of children 
entering care as infants rose by a comparatively more modest 2 percentage points.   
For race, all four states witnessed a significant decline in the proportion of African 
American children entering care during the time period considered.  The decline was 
particularly striking for New Jersey and Illinois.  North Carolina, which had a lower 
percentage of African American children entering care to start with compared to those two 
states, also witnessed a marked decline in the proportion of black children placed in care 
between the periods 1996-1998 to 2005-2009. 
Focusing on the placement setting of children, the four states experienced somewhat 
different trends.  In Illinois, the proportion of children placed with relatives declined in the 
period immediately following the introduction of PBC, and then increased, returning to 
levels comparable to those prior to the enactment of PBC.  North Carolina also experienced 
a significant increase in the proportion of children placed with kin following the 
implementation of PBC.  However, in the two control states, where the share of children 
placed in kinship care at entry was significantly lower than in the treatment sates, this 
proportion increased much more rapidly. 
In terms of permanency outcomes, all four states experienced a reduction in the share 
of reunifications, with North Carolina and Washington recording the largest declines.  All 
states, with the exception of Illinois, experienced an increase in the share of adoptions 
between the period 1996-and the period 2005-2009.  All four states also witnessed an 
increase in the share of children exiting through guardianship.  
In terms of the contextual variables, the four states have somewhat similar 
populations, with relatively large proportions of urban and poor children.  All states, with 
the exception of Washington, also have a relatively large proportion of African American 
children.  In addition, all four states actively promote the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes and favor placement with kin. 
As anticipated in the introduction to this chapter, these similarities are important 
given my decision to compare PBC and non-PBC states as distinct groups (see also chapter 
6).  They are also central for the validity of the interpretation of the ATE in the DID 
estimator.  There are, however, some notable differences that warrant further discussion, 
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including trends for placement with related caregivers as well as for adoptions within 
thirty-six months of entering care.  Other aspects that require additional attention are the 
differences in policies towards guardianship and the use of waiver demonstration 
programmes in the two PBC states.  The fact that North Carolina has a different 
administrative framework compared to the other states could also have implications for the 
interpretation of results, since different types of administration can impact “child welfare 
funding, policymaking, licensing, training for workers, and more” (Child Welfare 
Information Gateway 2012c p.1).  I return to discuss these aspects in chapters 8 through 10. 
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6 Differences in the timeliness of exits from out-of-home care among 
states that employ and do not employ PBC 
 
6.1 The use of PBC and its relationship with timely permanency outcomes: 
introduction and outline of the chapter 
This chapter addresses the first research question outlined in chapter 1, focusing on 
differences in the timeliness of exits in states that employ PBC compared to states that do 
not.  According to the theory of social exchange (see chapter 2), PBC states should record 
more timely exits from care compared to the control states.  Specifically, since states that 
employ this type of programme management tool tie the compensation of child welfare 
agencies, in whole or in part, to their performance with respect to specific outcomes, they 
should have a greater financial incentive to meet those quantitative targets.  I would expect 
states that employ PBC, therefore, to record more timely exits from care compared to a set 
of control states. 
The chapter consists of three parts.  In the first part, I examine various measures of 
timeliness based on the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts created with the AFCARS 
dataset, and focus on how these measures have changed over time for the two groups of 
states.  In the second part, I conduct a multivariate statistical analysis, controlling for 
differences among the states considered in their out-of-home care populations as well as 
for trends in how such populations might have changed over time.  Lastly, I discuss the 
main findings of my analysis and provide a synthesis of the main results. 
 
6.2 The timeliness of exits from care: differences between PBC states and the 
control states 
In this chapter, I examine different measures of timeliness (see also section 4.5).  First, I 
focus on the average amount of time children spend in care.101  I then consider the 
proportion of children who exit care in a timely manner, with timeliness defined in terms of 
a series of thresholds.
102
   
                                                 
101 As stated in chapter 4, this measure is right censored.   
102 These thresholds are: (1) timely exits, defined as those taking place within twenty-four months of a child’s 
entry intro care, and (2) untimely exits, which are those occurring after twenty-four months of entry.  I also 
use a more detailed classification of timely exits, with very timely exits defined as those taking place within 
twelve months of a child’s entry intro care, and somewhat timely exits as those occurring between twelve and 
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The average amount of time children spend in care 
To explore whether PBC states record more timely permanency outcomes, I started by 
examining the average amount of time children spend in care in PBC and non-PBC states.  
I employed the script gsem from the statistical software package Stata 13 to account for the 
fact that my data are right censored (see chapter 4).  The comparison reveals that between 
1996 and 2009, children in the two PBC states spent a significantly longer amount of time 
in care, on average, compared to the non-PBC states: 3.5 years versus 1.7 years.  However, 
it also indicates that the mean amount of time spent in care decreased in the PBC states 
from around 3.5 years in the period 1996-1998 to around 2.8 years in the period 2005-
2009, equivalent to a nearly 20 per cent decline (see Figure 6.1).  In contrast, in the control 
states, the mean amount of time in care increased: from 1.6 years in the period prior to the 
implementation of PBC to 1.9 years by the second post-PBC period. 
 
Figure 6.1. The average amount of time spent in care in PBC states and non-
PBC states  
PBC states Non-PBC states 
  
Note: See note to Table 5.1.  The reported values refer to modelled averages and were computed based 
on all children entering care.  See also Table A.6.1.   
 
The proportion of timely exits 
While the above comparison indicates that PBC states may have experienced a reduction in 
the average amount of time children spent in care, it does not shed light on whether exits in 
PBC states became more timely after the implementation of this programme management 
tool.  To explore this, I computed the proportion of children who exited care in a timely 
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manner in the two groups of states.  Based on this measure, I find that over the fourteen 
year period considered, approximately half of all children in the PBC states exited care in a 
timely manner compared to around 70 per cent of children in the non-PBC states.   
 
Figure 6.2. The percentage of timely and untimely exits in PBC states and 
non-PBC states  
PBC states Non-PBC states 
  
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: The reported values refer to modelled proportions and were computed based on all children 
entering care.  See also Table A.6.1.   
 
While PBC states recorded relatively fewer timely exits from care, the gap in the 
percentage of timely exits between the two groups of states narrowed over time (Figure 
6.2).  Treatment states witnessed a statistically significant increase in the percentage of 
timely exits from care following the introduction of this programme management tool, 
while non-PBC states saw the timeliness of their permanency outcomes decline 
significantly during the same period.  As of the period 2005-2009, the gap in the proportion 
of timely exits between the two groups of states was reduced by half compared to the 
period prior to the implementation of PBC.  
Using the more detailed categorization of timeliness, I find that PBC states witnessed 
a statistically significant increase in the percentage of very timely exits: from 30 per cent in 
the period prior to the implementation of PBC to 33 per cent by the second post-PBC 
period.  The percentage of children exiting care in a somewhat timely manner rose even 
faster during this period—by nearly 9 percentage points.  Conversely, non-PBC states 
witnessed a significant decline in the percentage of children exiting care within twelve 
months of entry: from around 59 per cent in the period 1996-1998 to 50 per cent during the 
period 2005-2009.  The percentage of children exiting care in a somewhat timely manner 
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increased in the period 1999-2004 and then remained unchanged during the period 2005-
2009 in the two control states. 
 
Figure 6.3. The percentage of very timely, somewhat timely and untimely 
exits in PBC states and non-PBC states 
PBC states Non-PBC states 
 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: See note to Figure 6.1. 
 
Difference-in-difference estimator 
Based on the above comparison, it is difficult to assess whether the treatment states 
recorded more timely permanency outcomes compared to the control states, given the 
difference in timeliness between the two groups of states prior to the implementation of 
PBC.  To adjust for this difference, I computed the so-called DID estimator (see also 
section 4.7).  Based on this comparison, I find that states that employed PBC fared 
significantly better than the counterfactual based on the two control states both in terms of 
the average amount of time spent in care and in terms of the proportion of children 
achieving permanency in a timely manner (Figure 6.4).   
By the period 1999-2004, the percentage of timely exits in the treatment states was 
approximately 8 percentage points higher than would have been expected based on the 
counterfactual.  By the period 2005-2009, the difference had grown even larger: to 15 
percentage points, equal to nearly 29 per cent more than if the treatment states had 
followed the trend of the states that did not employ PBC.  The average amount of time 
children spent in care in PBC states also declined during the period considered.  Further, by 
the period 2005-2009, this average was significantly lower—nearly one year less—than the 
counterfactual based on the two control states.  
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Figure 6.4. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for PBC states and non-PBC 
states: DID-only model 
  
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
  
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a very timely manner 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a somewhat timely manner 
  
PBC states 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
Non-PBC states 
Note: The reported values refer to modelled averages and proportions and were computed 
based on all children entering care.  See also Table A.6.1 and Table A.6.2. 
 
In terms of the more detailed classification of timeliness, I find that even the 
relatively modest increase in the proportion of very timely exits recorded by states that 
employed PBC between 1996 and 2009 is highly significant compared to the 
counterfactual: nearly 13 percentage points, or 38 per cent more than expected.  In contrast, 
because both groups of states recorded an increase in the proportion of somewhat timely 
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counterfactual was smaller, though still statistically significant.  The more detailed 
classification of timeliness, therefore, confirms that the use of PBC is positively associated 
with both very timely exits as well as somewhat timely exits from out-of-home care.   
In order to more formally quantify these differences, I created three models which 
contain the DID estimator (see Table 6.1), expressed here as the interaction between the 
two groups of states and the three time periods considered.  The outcome measures in the 
various models refer either to the continuous variable, amount of time spent by children in 
care (model 1), or to the dichotomous variables, indicating whether or not a child 
experienced a timely (model 2), a very timely (model 3) or a somewhat timely exit from 
care (model 4).103  
 
Table 6.1. Schematic representation of the multivariate models 
Covariates Dependent variable Statistical method 
DID-only Amount of time spent in care (model 1) 
Timely exits (model 2) 
Very timely exits (model 3) 
Somewhat timely exits (model 4) 
Regression for censored data 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
DID and time-invariant Amount of time spent in care (model 5) 
Timely exits (model 6) 
Very timely exits (model 7) 
Somewhat timely exits (model 8) 
Regression for censored data 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
DID, time-invariant and 
time-varying 
Amount of time spent in care (model 9) 
Timely exits (model 10) 
Very timely exits (model 11) 
Somewhat timely exits (model 12) 
Regression for censored data 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
DID-only Amount of time spent in care (model 13) 
 
Timely exits (model 14) 
Multilevel regression for 
censored data 
Multilevel logistic regression 
DID, time-invariant and 
time-varying (fixed effects) 
Amount of time spent in care (model 15) 
 
Timely exits (model 16) 
Multilevel regression for 
censored data 
Multilevel logistic regression 
Note: See also Table A.6.1-Table A.6.7 in annex. 
 
To ensure that the DID estimators were more easily comparable across models, I 
calculated respectively the average marginal effects and the predicted probabilities of the 
                                                 
103 Initially, I had used multinomial logistic regression and ordinal logistic regression.  Ultimately, I had to 
discard them because they violated critical assumptions (see section 4.8).  While I do not include these 
models in this chapter, the predicted probabilities for the DID estimator were consistent with those obtained 
with the three logistic regressions. 
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DID estimator.  The models confirm what already emerged visually from Figure 6.4, 
namely that regardless of the measure selected, the PBC states recorded a statistically 
significant improvement in the timeliness of exits from care compared to the control states. 
 
6.3 The timeliness of exits controlling for various covariates 
While the findings in the above section suggest that the introduction of PBC may have 
been positively associated with timely outcomes in the two treatment states compared to 
the two non-PBC states, it is important to control for differences between states in terms of 
the child populations served, as well as how those factors might have changed over time.104  
As stated in chapters 3 and 4, controlling for these factors is needed to ensure that 
improvements in the timeliness of permanency outcomes are not the result of other factors 
such as compositional changes in the child population served (Taylor and Shaver 2010). 
To do so, I added a number of covariates, identified as being relevant in the literature 
(see also section 4.6), to the two statistical models described above.  The covariates are as 
follows: (1) age of the child (squared),105 (2) child is an infant, (3) sex, (4) child is African 
American, (5) child is placed with kin, (6) the child is assigned the permanency goal 
reunification, (7) the child is assigned the permanency goal adoption, (8) number of 
previous placement settings, and (9) TPR.
106
  In a first iteration, I included only time-
invariant covariates that contributed to the statistical significance of the models.  I refer to 
these models as time-invariant, since they do not include time interactions (see Table 
A.6.3).   
                                                 
104 In this part of the analysis, I am chiefly interested in the DID estimator and the impact that including 
various covariates has on its interpretation.  Because of this, I do not discuss the relationship between the 
covariates and the dependent variables in this chapter.  I return to discuss some of them, namely the age, race 
and placement setting in chapter 8. 
105 I computed an alternate version of models 5 through 12 with the continuous variable age instead of the 
continuous variable age squared and the dichotomous variable infant (the results are reported in annex in 
Table A.6.3b and Table A.6.5b).  As indicated in chapter 4, I chose to include the variables age squared and 
infant because of the non-linear relationship between timeliness and age of the child as well as the analytical 
relevance of the category infant.  
106 I also computed models 5 through 12 without the variables TPR and the child placement goal of adoption 
and reunification (the results are reported in annex in Table A.6.3c and Table A.6.5c).  As discussed in 
section 6.4, their inclusion in the various models does not alter the interpretation of the DID estimator.  My 
motivation for computing these additional models was that these covariates, besides being related to 
timeliness, can also be influenced by PBC; raising concerns of endogeneity (see also section 4.6).  
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Then, following the approach of Wulczyn, et al. (2009), I created a more complex 
model which includes time-varying interactions for three of the dichotomous covariates—
black, infant and placement with kin (see Table 6.1).
107
  I retained these time interactions 
since their inclusion improved the significance of the multivariate statistical models.  
Lastly, acknowledging both the hierarchical nature of my data—namely, that for each state, 
children are placed in care in agencies, within counties—as well as the need to control for 
unobserved variables, I repeated my analysis using a multilevel model (see Table A.6.7).  
 
Model with time-invariant covariates 
The results indicate that adding theoretically relevant time-invariant covariates, such as the 
age and race of children entering care as well as their placement setting108 modifies the 
relationship between PBC and timeliness (Figure 6.5).  Specifically, the gap in the 
percentage of timely exits between the target states and the counterfactual, while still 
positive, is less than half in the time-invariant covariate model compared to initial DID-
only model (see Figure 6.4).  Focusing on the average amount of time spent in care yields 
similar findings, with the difference between the PBC states and the counterfactual 
shrinking to half the size of the difference in the model without covariates.   
Using the more detailed classification of timeliness, I find that for very timely exits 
the difference between the treatment states and the counterfactual remains positive, 
meaning that PBC states performed better than might have been expected based on the 
assumption of parallel trends.  However, compared to the model which only included the 
DID estimator, the gap between the two was significantly smaller: around 2 percentage 
points (or 6 per cent) compared to 13 percentage points (or 38 per cent).  For somewhat 
timely exits, the difference between the PBC states and the counterfactual actually 
increased, with the treatment states recording significantly more exits after twelve, but 
                                                 
107 The time-varying covariates were computed by multiplying the factor variable year of entry by the factor 
variable consisting of the interaction between the relevant covariate and the variable state ID classified here 
as states that employ and do not employ PBC. 
108 As with TPR and permanency goals, placement settings could also be endogenously related to the 
treatment and outcome considered since, as anticipated in section 1.7, changing the composition of children 
in various placement settings could be one of the ways for PBC states to achieve improved timeliness.  I 
return to explore this relationship in greater detail in chapter 8. 
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within twenty-four months of entry compared to non-PBC states: 4 percentage points (or 
21 per cent) versus 3 percentage points (or 13 per cent) in the DID-only model. 
 
Figure 6.5. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for PBC states and non-PBC 
states: model with time-invariant covariates 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a very timely manner 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a somewhat timely manner 
 
PBC states 
Counterfactual (Based on non-PBC states)  
Non-PBC states 
Note: See Figure 6.4.  See also Table A.6.3 and Table A.6.4. 
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Figure 6.6. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for PBC states and non-PBC 
states: model with time-varying covariates 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a very timely manner 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a somewhat timely manner 
 
PBC states 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
Non-PBC states 
Note: See Figure 6.4.  See also Table A.6.5 and Table A.6.6. 
 
Model with time-varying covariates 
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covariates the percentage of children who exited care within twenty-four months of entry 
was slightly below the value of the counterfactual.  The trend for the average amount of 
time spent in care closely mirrors this finding.  This suggests that, after controlling for 
various theoretically relevant time-varying covariates, the states that employed PBC 
“performed” no better than the counterfactual based on the control states, meaning that the 
improvements in timeliness observed in the previous models are, at least in part, 
attributable to changes in the covariates and interactions included in the model. 
For the more detailed classification of timeliness, I find that PBC states recorded 
significantly lower shares of very timely exits than would have been expected based on the 
counterfactual (see Figure 6.6).  This stands in contrast to the DID-only and time-invariant 
models, where the two treatment states experienced an improvement in very timely exits 
from out-of-home care following the implementation of PBC compared to the two control 
states.  Instead in the model with time-varying covariates, the percentage of very timely 
exit significantly declined in the PBC states, falling below the values recorded prior to the 
introduction of PBC.  As of the period 2005-2009, the difference in the percentage of very 
timely exits for the treatment states compared to the counterfactual was negative rather 
than positive. 
In contrast, even after controlling for time-varying covariates, the two PBC states 
recorded a slight increase in the proportion of somewhat timely exits, even compared to the 
counterfactual.  During the first period following the introduction of PBC, the treatment 
states experienced a slightly lower share of exits of intermediate timeliness compared to 
the counterfactual.  However, by the period 2005-2009, the percentage of somewhat timely 
exits in the treatment states was higher than what would have been expected based on the 
trend for the two control states.  
 
Multilevel model 
Having examined the relationship between the use of PBC and timeliness of exits for the 
treatment and control states, I conducted a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to quantify how 
much of the variability between the two groups of states could be attributed to the observed 
covariates.  On the basis of this decomposition, I find that the time-invariant covariates 
included in the model “explained” about one-fourth of the difference in the timeliness of 
exits for states that employed PBC compared to the control states over the period 1996-
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2009, while three-fourths of the difference remain “unexplained” by the covariates 
included in the model.   
Given that much of the difference in the timeliness of permanency outcomes between 
the two groups of states remains unexplained, as well as the nested structure of the data, I 
decided to control for the unobserved time-invariant fixed-effects at the county level by 
using a multilevel model.  Controlling for fixed-effects can reduce some of the bias on the 
DID estimator resulting from the omission of time-invariant variables which are correlated 
with both the treatment and the outcome—what is referred to as omitted variables bias 
(OVB).  As indicated in chapters 3 and 4, multilevel models are useful to account for 
policy differences at the state and county level as well as secular trends that might affect 
the outcome. 
I created two versions of the multilevel models: the first containing only the DID 
estimator (models 13 and 14) and the second the DID estimator as well as both the time-
varying and invariant covariates (models 15 and 16).109  The likelihood-ratio tests 
comparing the two fixed-effects models to original models were highly signiﬁcant, 
suggesting that the use of a multilevel model is appropriate. 
The results confirm that, after controlling for unobserved time-invariant covariates at 
the group level, the results are generally consistent with the ones obtained in the original 
models.  For the DID-only fixed effects model, the average amount of time spent in care in 
PBC states declined significantly both in absolute terms and compared to the 
counterfactual.  Likewise, the proportion of children exiting care in a timely manner was 
significantly higher than expected based on the assumption of parallel trends.  However, 
compared to the original DID-only model (model 2), the gap in the proportion of timely 
exits between the treatment and control states was smaller, suggesting that unobserved 
omitted variables may have had a negative effect on the DID estimator.  These findings are 
consistent with those for the mean amount of time spent in care.  Specifically, I find that in 
the two PBC states the average duration in care declined significantly after the 
implementation of this programme management tool. 
 
                                                 
109 As above, my focus is the relationship between the outcome variable and the DID estimator, rather than 
the relationship of the dependent variable to the other covariates.   
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Figure 6.7. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely exits for PBC states and non-PBC states: fixed effect for the initial 
DID-only model and the model with time-varying covariates 
DID-only 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
  
Time-varying 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
 
PBC states  
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
Non-PBC states  
Note: See Figure 6.4.  See also Table A.6.7. 
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four months of entry declined and was smaller than in the counterfactual.  Compared to the 
original time-varying model, in the time-varying model which controlled for fixed effects 
the difference was significantly larger.   
 
6.4 Summary of the main findings and discussion 
In this chapter I examined whether states that employed PBC experienced more timely 
exits compared to the control states.  In order to do so, I followed two different approaches: 
one which simply compared trends for different groups of states and a second, which 
sought to control for basic differences in the child population as well as unobserved, time-
invariant fixed effect at the county level. 
The initial comparison reveals that states that employ PBC performed worse than the 
control states in terms of the proportion of timely exits from care and the average amount 
of time spent in care.  However this approach has clear shortcomings since it does not 
control for differences in the initial levels of timeliness of exits. 
Using a DID estimator provides greater insight into this relationship.  I find that 
states that employed PBC experienced both an increase in very timely and somewhat 
timely exits compared to the counterfactual as well as a reduction in the average amount of 
time spent in care.  In contrast, the control states witnessed a statistically significant decline 
in very timely exits from care and a small increase in the average amount of time in care.  
For somewhat timely exits, the non-PBC states also experienced a pronounced 
improvement in such exits, although to a lesser degree than the treatment states.  This 
finding is consistent with a number of previous studies that have identified a positive 
relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes (Alpert, et al. 2011; 
Garstka, et al. 2012; Haslag, et al. 2012; Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability 2006; Shaver 2006; Vargo, et al. 2006). 
However, once various covariates identified in the literature as being associated with 
timeliness of exits are included in the models, the relationship between PBC and timeliness 
of exits changes.  Specifically, I find that states that employed PBC recorded lower shares 
of timely or very timely exits compared to the counterfactual, although the use of PBC 
remains associated with a positive and statistically significant change for somewhat timely 
exits in the second period following the implementation of PBC.  Likewise after the 
inclusion of various covariates and relevant interactions, there is no significant difference 
between the average amount of time spent in care in the PBC states and the counterfactual 
based on the controls. 
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I also find that the relationship between the DID estimator and the outcome variable 
does not change as much when only time-invariant covariates are included in the model.  
The effect of including such variables is to reduce the “magnitude” of the relationship, but 
not change its overall interpretation.  However, once time-varying covariates are included, 
the relationship between PBC and timeliness shifts from being positive to being negative.  
Why are these findings important? And what do they mean?  In my research, the 
“why” follows from what Taylor and Shaver (2010) have referred to as the need to 
establish “(w)hat are the observable, valid results of doing the work well”.  The authors, 
who openly recognize the difficulty of answering this question, nonetheless provide some 
“clues” as to how this might be done.  Specifically, discussing the use of PBC, they 
observe that: “[v]alid here refers to demonstrating how the outcomes for children served 
through [PBC] contracts would be better than under the (counterfactual) pre-existing 
contracts”, by among others, controlling for changes in various “extraneous factors” 
(Taylor and Shaver 2010 p. 303).  In this chapter, I have sought to do this by employing a 
control group, including relevant time-varying and invariant covariates in the models and 
considering fixed effects.  I acknowledge, however, that my analysis has a number of 
limitations.  I briefly review seven of them below.   
First, my research is constrained by a lack of detailed information on a number of 
factors known in the literature to be relevant for permanency outcomes, including 
organizational, managerial and clinical factors (Akin 2011; Garstka, et al. 2012; McBeath 
and Meezan 2009).  As discussed in this chapter, I have sought to address this limitation by 
employing latent county-level variables in the multilevel models.  Future research on the 
relationship between PBC and timeliness, however, might benefit from the inclusion of 
more detailed information on factors known to be associated with the amount of time 
children spend in care at the state, country or local level.   
Second, as indicated in chapter 4, the counterfactual in my analysis is based on a 
series of states that did not employ PBC, and not a random sub-sample of children in the 
treatment states, “set aside” to test the effectiveness of PBC.  As seen in section 5.5, 
however, there are a number of differences among the states considered besides PBC that 
may have contributed to the observed outcomes.  These include differences in the type of 
administrative framework employed as well as in the use of subsidised guardianship waiver 
programmes.  Further, the control states are likely to have adopted their own strategies to 
improve the timeliness of permanency outcomes, further confounding the interpretation of 
results. 
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Third, the DID assumption of parallel trends, which is central to this analysis, is 
violated when the treatment or control group change in different ways over time.  I have 
sought to address this by clustering the standard errors at the state level (Bertrand, et. al 
2003).  However, as seen in chapter 5, other changes that are not accounted for with this 
approach might bias the interpretation of the ATE.   
Fourth, as mentioned in previous chapters, the potentially endogenous nature of the 
relationship between the treatment and the outcome—namely that states that employ PBC 
are more likely to have lower levels of timeliness to start with compared to the non-PBC 
states—is not addressed in this analysis.  This is something which could be considered in 
future research using more complex methods such as instrumental variable and time-lags 
for panels of states or counties.   
Fifth, it is unlikely that the pre-PBC level of timeliness has no bearing on trends.  
Specifically, as mentioned in section 4.7, states which already record high levels of 
timeliness are likely to find it more difficult to further “improve” their performance 
compared to states where children spend prolonged amounts of time in care.  I return to 
discuss some of these aspects briefly in chapter 10.   
Sixth, even though the inclusion of variables such as TPR and various permanency 
goals does not alter the interpretation of the DID estimators in my analysis, their inclusion 
may, nonetheless, be problematic owing to their potentially endogenous relationship with 
PBC.  Future research could address this issue by creating more complex models that treat 
various theoretically relevant variables as endogenous.   
Seventh, interpreting the meaning of my findings is complicated by the fact that I am 
“bundling” together states which are characterized not only by very different out-of-home 
care populations and levels of timeliness of exits, but also have employed different models 
of PBC and with different policy objectives.  For this reason, it makes sense to consider the 
two states that employed PBC separately.  In chapter 7, I repeat this analysis, but 
differentiating between the two treatment states, namely Illinois and North Carolina.   
In light of these limitations, my second question, “what do the findings mean?” is 
perhaps even more difficult to answer.  However, while limited in scope, I believe that this 
chapter identifies a number of relevant findings.  First, it highlights the difficulty of 
measuring the impact of a policy intervention such as PBC in the absence of an explicit 
monitoring framework.  My efforts to control for observed differences across treatment and 
control groups are clearly necessary but not sufficient for exploring the relationships 
between PBC and timeliness.  States that wish to introduce such programme management 
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tools, therefore, should establish a priori a monitoring system with well specified outcome 
measures, timelines and benchmarks, randomly assigning, where feasible, cases to the 
treatment and control groups as was done in the case of Wayne County, Michigan (see also 
chapter 10).  
Second, my analysis confirm the importance of taking “each provider’s population 
mix into account” (Lawler and Foster 2013).  Specifically, Lawler and Foster argue that: 
“(w)hile there should be standard benchmarks, these targets must be adjusted to reflect the 
fact that not all providers serve the same mix of clients.  Providers with the most 
challenging clients should not be penalized for doing the hardest job” (2013 p. 143).  The 
findings in this chapter support this assertion.  Specifically, they point to the need to take 
differences in the “client mix”, i.e., the child population served, into account in assessing 
differences across states in their performance in expediting exits from care.  Failing to do 
so may give an inaccurate sense of the differences across states in terms of the timeliness 
of permanency outcomes and may also confound the interpretation of trends over time.  
Controlling for such differences is particularly important in the context of the outcome 
measures CWOR and the CFSR; the two main tools used for monitoring state performance 
in relation to permanency, safety and child wellbeing (see also chapter 10).   
Third, while the findings in this chapter need to be interpreted with caution, they may 
shed light on some of the “mechanisms” through which changes in the timeliness in 
permanency outcomes occur.  Specifically, the fact that the positive relationship between 
PBC and timely exits from care—a relationship which had been identified in a number of 
previous studies (Garstka et al. 2012; Haslag, et al. 2012; Shaver 2006; Vargo, et al. 
2006)—“disappears” once various theoretically relevant covariates and interactions are 
included, is, in my opinion, worthy of further exploration.  In particular, it raises the 
possibility, as anticipated in chapter 3, that the use of PBC may be associated with changes 
in caseload profiles and placement settings, and that these, in turn, may be related to 
changes the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  I address this aspect in more detail in 
chapter 8.  
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7 Differences in the timeliness of exits from care among states that 
employ different models of PBC 
 
7.1 Differences between states that employ PBC: introduction and outline of the 
chapter 
The analysis in chapter 6 indicated that, for some states, there may be a positive 
relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of exits.  However, once time-
varying covariates and interactions were included, this relationship shifted and was no 
longer positive.  In this chapter I seek to better explore this relationship by focusing on 
differences in the timeliness of permanency outcomes between states that employed 
different models of PBC.  This is important from a practice perspective since, as 
highlighted previously, states have adopted very different approaches in implementing 
PBC.  Illinois uses a so-called caseload model, requiring child welfare agencies to move at 
least one-quarter of cases to permanency within twelve months.  Agencies that are 
successful receive more funding per child, while agencies that fail to do so are penalised by 
receiving proportionally less funding per child served (Blackstone, et al. 2004; Taylor and 
Shaver 2010).  States which have followed a similar approach include Missouri and 
Tennessee (Alpert and Meezan 2012; Planning and Learning Technologies, Inc. and The 
University of Kentucky 2009).  Other states such as North Carolina or North Dakota, on 
the other hand, have employed pure pay-for-performance contracts, compensating child 
welfare agencies only if they achieve certain quantitative targets (Myslewicz 2008; 
Planning and Learning Technologies, Inc. and The University of Kentucky 2009). 
Given these differences in policy approaches and objectives, I would expect the two 
states to follow different patterns in terms of the timeliness of exits (see also the second 
hypothesis in chapter 1).  Specifically, I would expect North Carolina to experience a more 
pronounced increase in timely permanency outcomes following the introduction of PBC 
compared to Illinois, since child welfare agencies have more to “lose”— they are not paid 
at all—if they fail to achieve their stated objectives.  However, because PBC in North 
Carolina is primarily used to promote adoptions (Myslewicz 2008), I expect most of the 
increase to be for somewhat timely exits, since relatively few adoptions occur within the 
first twelve months of a child’s entry into out-of-home care (Akin 2011; Connell, et al. 
2006; Wulczyn 2004). 
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The structure of this chapter mirrors that of the previous one, but focuses on 
differences between Illinois, North Carolina and the control states, instead of the difference 
between PBC and non-PBC states.  First, I consider the difference between Illinois and 
North Carolina in terms of the average amount of time children spend in care as well as the 
proportion of timely exits from out-of-home care using the DID estimator.  I then use the 
same multivariate statistical models outlined in chapter 6, but distinguishing between 
Illinois and North Carolina (see also Table 6.1).  Lastly, I discuss and summarise the main 
conclusions of the chapter. 
 
7.2 Differences among states that employ different models of PBC in the timeliness 
of exits from care 
The average amount of time children spend in care 
Based on the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts created with the AFCARS dataset, I find 
that children in Illinois spent, on average, more time in out-of-home care than children in 
North Carolina.  During the period 1996-2009, the mean stay in care was 3.6 years in 
Illinois compared to 2.2 years in North Carolina. 
 
Figure 7.1. The average amount of time spent in care in Illinois and 
North Carolina  
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Note: See note to Table 5.1.  The reported values refer to modelled averages.  See also Table A.7.1.   
 
While the gap in average amount of time spent in care between Illinois and North 
Carolina persisted after the implementation of PBC, the two states followed somewhat 
different trends during the timeframe considered.  In Illinois, the average amount of time 
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children spent in care declined by half a year in the period immediately following the 
introduction of PBC, and then increased somewhat in the subsequent period.  In contrast, 
North Carolina, which experienced almost no change in the mean amount of time children 
spent in care between the periods 1996-1998 and 1999-2004, witnessed a decline in the 
average duration in care during the period 2005-2009.  
 
The proportion of timely exits 
The comparison based on the proportion of timely exits confirms that Illinois and North 
Carolina are characterised by very different levels of timeliness.  In Illinois, the percentage 
of children exiting care within twenty-four months of entry during the period 1996-2009 
was significantly lower than in North Carolina—37 per cent versus 64 per cent.  After the 
introduction of PBC, both states experienced an increase in the proportion of timely exits, 
although for Illinois this increase was nearly twice as fast as for North Carolina (see Figure 
7.2).  
 
Figure 7.2. The proportion of timely and untimely exits in Illinois and 
North Carolina 
Illinois North Carolina 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: The reported values refer to modelled proportions.  See also Table A.7.1.   
 
Focusing on the more detailed classification of timeliness, North Carolina recorded 
twice as many children exiting in a very timely manner compared to Illinois during the 
period 1996-2009.  However, following the introduction of PBC, Illinois saw the 
percentage of children who exited care within twelve months of entry rise by around 4 
percentage points, equal to a 17 per cent increase.  Conversely, in North Carolina the 
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percentage of children exiting care in a very timely manner declined by 10 percentage 
points, or by 20 per cent, between the period 1996-1998 and 2005-2009 (Figure 7.3). 
 
Figure 7.3. The proportion of very timely, somewhat timely and 
untimely exits in Illinois and North Carolina 
Illinois North Carolina 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: See Figure 7.2.   
 
While North Carolina experienced a decline in the proportion of exits within twelve 
months of entry, this decline was offset by a significant increase in the proportion of 
somewhat timely exits.  Between the period 1996-1998 and the period 2005-2009, the 
proportion of children exiting after twelve months but within twenty-four months of entry 
rose by nearly 15 percentage points or 56 per cent.  During the same period, Illinois 
registered much more modest gains in the proportion of somewhat timely exits: less than 2 
percentage points equal to a 12 per cent increase compared to the period prior to the 
implementation of PBC. 
 
Difference-in-difference estimator 
As in the previous chapter, I am interested in comparing trends in the timeliness of exits in 
Illinois and North Carolina to those of the counterfactual based on the two control states.  I 
used the same models
110
 as those outlined in chapter 6, containing a DID estimator, 
expressed here as the interaction between the three groups of states—Illinois, North 
                                                 
110 These models have as dependent variables the amount of time children spend in care and timely, very 
timely, and somewhat timely exits from care, respectively. 
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Carolina and the control states—and the three time periods considered.  Before running 
these models, I carried out a number of diagnostic tests (see also section 4.8). 
 
Figure 7.4. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for Illinois and North 
Carolina: DID-only model 
  
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a very timely manner 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a somewhat timely manner 
 
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolinas 
Note: The reported values refer to modelled averages and proportions and were 
computed based on all children entering care.  See also Table A.7.1 and Table A.7.2. 
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period 2005-2009, the average amount of time children spent in care in both Illinois and 
North Carolina was, respectively, 16 per cent and 19 per cent less than expected based on 
counterfactual. 
These findings are mirrored by those for the proportion of timely exits.  The gap in 
the proportion of timely exits between Illinois and the counterfactual rose from 5 
percentage points in the period 1999-2004 to over 8 percentage points in the period 2005-
2009.  North Carolina, also recorded a significantly larger share of exits within twenty-four 
months of entry than would have been expected based on the trend for non-PBC states: 
over 7 percentage points more by the period 2005-2009. 
In terms of the more detailed classification of timeliness, I find that Illinois recorded 
a statistically significant increase in the proportion of very timely exits compared to the 
control states.  In contrast, North Carolina witnessed a significant decline in the proportion 
of exits within twelve months of entry compared to the counterfactual between 1996-1998 
and 1999-2004.  By the period 2005-2009, however, the proportion of very timely exits in 
North Carolina had converged to the value of the counterfactual. 
For somewhat timely exits, I find that the two states experienced opposite trends.  
North Carolina witnessed a significant increase in the proportion of exits occurring after 
twelve but within twenty-four months of entry compared to the counterfactual scenario.  
The percentage of somewhat timely exits in North Carolina doubled between the period 
1996-1998 and the period 1999-2004, and increased by nearly another 20 per cent during 
the subsequent period.  In contrast, Illinois recorded a significantly lower proportion of 
somewhat timely exits from care compared to the counterfactual.  Even though the 
percentage of somewhat timely exits increased in Illinois following the introduction of 
PBC, this increase was significantly less than would have been expected based on the trend 
for the two control states. 
 
7.3 The timeliness of exits controlling for various confounding factors 
As in chapter 6, I created a number of models which included, in addition to the DID 
estimator, selected time-invariant covariates identified in the literature as being associated 
with the timeliness of exits (see Table 6.1).  To these models, I then added time-varying 
interactions for three dichotomous variables—black, infant and placement with kin.  
Lastly, I computed two multilevel models using the more detailed classification of the state 
groups, the first focusing only on the DID estimator and the second including both time-
varying and invariant covariates.  
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Figure 7.5. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for Illinois and North 
Carolina: model with time-invariant covariates 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a very timely manner 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a somewhat timely manner 
 
Illinois  
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: See Figure 7.4.  See also Table A.7.3 and Table A.7.4. 
 
Model with time-invariant covariates 
As in the previous chapter, my analysis confirms the importance of controlling for various 
covariates (see Figure 7.5).  This is particularly true for North Carolina, where the 
relationship with the counterfactual is “reversed” once time-invariant covariates are 
included in the model.  Specifically, the average amount of time spent by children in care 
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in the state increased, becoming significantly higher than expected based on the 
assumption of parallel trends.  Likewise, the proportion of children exiting care in a timely 
manner declined, falling significantly below the counterfactual based on the controls.  In 
contrast, in Illinois the average amount of time in care remained significantly lower than 
the counterfactual, while the proportion of exits within twenty-four months of entry 
remained significantly higher, albeit, in both cases, less than in the initial DID-only model. 
In terms of the more detailed classification of timeliness, I find that in the model with 
time-invariant covariates, Illinois continued to record a significantly higher percentage of 
very timely exits compared to the counterfactual—nearly 8 percentage points or 31 per 
cent more—though significantly less than in the initial DID-only model.  For North 
Carolina, on the other hand, the proportion of very timely exits compared to the 
counterfactual was significantly lower in the model with time-invariant covariates, 
suggesting a negative association between the use of PBC and timeliness of permanency 
outcomes once relevant variables were included.   
For somewhat timely exits, Illinois continued to perform “worse” than expected 
based on the counterfactual, albeit slightly better than in the DID-only model.  Conversely, 
for North Carolina the inclusion of time-invariant covariates resulted in an even higher 
percentage of children exiting care after twelve months but within twenty-four months of 
entry.  Specifically, whereas in the initial DID-only model North Carolina recorded 32 per 
cent more somewhat timely exits than the counterfactual, in the model with time-invariant 
covariates this difference rose to 48 per cent more. 
 
Model with time-varying covariates 
Focusing on the models with time-varying covariates, I find that including such 
interactions significantly alters the relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness 
of exits, particularly for Illinois.  Specifically, the average amount of time children spent in 
care, instead of declining, slightly increased and was no longer significantly better than the 
counterfactual.  Likewise, the percentage of children who exited care in a timely manner in 
Illinois shifted to being more than 4 percentage points below the counterfactual, compared 
to 5 percentage points above the counterfactual in the model with time-invariant covariates.  
In North Carolina, the inclusion of relevant interactions also has an impact on the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes.  Specifically, children continued to spend, on average, 
a longer amount of time in care after the implementation of PBC compared to the period 
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1996-1998, and significantly more than the counterfactual.  Likewise, the percentage of 
children exiting care within twenty-four months of entry remained significantly lower than 
expected as in the model with time-invariant covariates (see Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6).   
 
Figure 7.6. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely, very timely and somewhat timely exits for Illinois and North 
Carolina: model with time-varying covariates 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
 
Proportion of children exiting care 
in a very timely manner 
Proportion of children exiting care 
in a somewhat timely manner 
 
Illinois  
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: See Figure 7.4.  See also Table A.7.5 and Table A.7.6. 
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proportion of exits within twelve months of entry remained slightly higher than the 
counterfactual, the difference was much smaller than with either the DID-only or time-
invariant model (Figure 7.6).  For North Carolina, on the other hand, there was relatively 
little difference between the time-varying and invariant models, with the proportion of very 
timely exits from care remaining significantly lower than expected in both models. 
Focusing on somewhat timely exits, I find that Illinois experienced a modest decline 
in the proportion of exits after twelve but within twenty-four months of entry in the model 
which includes time-varying covariates.  Further, Illinois recorded nearly half as many 
somewhat timely exits as expected based on the trend for two states that did not employ 
PBC.  In contrast, after controlling for various time-varying covariates, the proportion of 
somewhat timely exits in North Carolina quadrupled between the periods 1996-1998 and 
2005-2009.  Compared to the counterfactual, the percentage of somewhat timely exits in 
North Carolina was nearly 6 percentage points higher than expected.   
 
Multilevel model 
Using multilevel models,111 I find that the results of the two models—one consisting only 
the DID estimator and the other containing time-varying and invariant covariates, in 
addition to the DID estimator—are consistent with those obtained in the original models.  
For the DID-only fixed effects model, both Illinois and North Carolina witnessed a modest 
reduction in the average amount of time children spent in care (see Figure 7.7).  In both 
states, the average duration in care was significantly less than the trend based on the 
counterfactual.  Likewise, both states experienced a significantly higher proportion of 
children exiting care within twenty-four months of entry compared to the trend based on 
the control states.  However, once various time-varying and invariant covariates were 
included in the fixed-effects model, the relationship between the use of PBC and the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes changed.  Again, this is consistent with the original 
models.  Further, the levels of timeliness in the fixed effects models are somewhat lower 
than those in the original model, suggesting that unobserved, time-invariant variables at the 
county level may be negatively associated with the timeliness of exits in the two treatment 
states considered. 
 
                                                 
111 The likelihood-ratio tests comparing the fixed-effects models to original models were highly signiﬁcant, 
suggesting, as in the previous chapter, that the use of multilevel models is appropriate.   
140 
 
Figure 7.7. The average amount of time spent in care and the proportion of 
timely exits for Illinois and North Carolina: fixed effect for the initial DID-
only model and the model with time-varying covariates 
DID-only 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
  
Time-varying 
Average amount of time spent  
in care 
Proportion of children exiting care  
in a timely manner 
  
Illinois  
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: See Figure 7.4.  See also Table A.7.7.   
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the period 1996-2009, after controlling for caseload profiles and placement settings, North 
Carolina experienced an improvement in the proportion of somewhat timely exits.  What 
factors might have contributed to this increase?  Reports prepared by the North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services (2001, 2007) point to a number of possible 
explanations, including the increased emphasis given to promoting adoptions and 
guardianship for children who were unable to exit care in a very timely manner through 
reunification.  To explore this relationship, I examined whether there had been changes in 
North Carolina’s permanency outcomes for children exiting care in a very timely and 
somewhat timely manner during the period 1996-2009.   
What emerges is that while, overall, the average annual number of adoptions and 
reunifications occurring within twenty-four months of entry remained relatively constant 
over the period considered, both adoptions and reunifications became more delayed.  
Specifically, between the period 1996-1998 and the period 2005-2009, the average annual 
number of children exiting care in a somewhat timely manner to adoption or reunification 
increased by nearly fourfold and by over twofold, respectively (Figure 7.8).  At the same 
time, the average annual number of reunifications and adoptions occurring within twelve 
months of entry declined significantly.   
 
Figure 7.8. Average annual number of children exiting care in North Carolina in a 
very timely and somewhat timely manner by type of permanency outcome 
 
 
Pre-PBC                Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: See table A.7.8. 
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exiting care in a somewhat timely manner to adoption or reunification increased 
significantly less than for children of other racial backgrounds.  At the same time, the 
average annual number of African American children exiting to adoption or reunification 
in a very timely manner declined much more rapidly than for children of other races.  As a 
result, while the use of PBC may have been associated with improved permanency 
outcomes for somewhat timely exits in North Carolina, not all groups of children appear to 
have benefitted from this change (see also chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of the 
relationship between race and timeliness of exits). 
 
7.5 Summary of the main finding and discussion 
In this chapter I sought to explore whether states that employed different models of PBC 
experienced different outcomes in terms of the timeliness of exits.  As in the previous 
chapter, I started by comparing various measures of timeliness across the two states.  This 
comparison revealed that, while North Carolina recorded a larger proportion of timely exits 
compared to Illinois, the gap between the two states narrowed over time; a finding which is 
somewhat at odds with my second hypothesis according to which states that employed 
more stringent models of PBC would be expected to record more timely exits from care 
compared to states that use PBC merely as an incentive to promote better performance. 
The comparison using the DID estimator suggests that both Illinois and North 
Carolina experienced a significant increase in the proportion of timely exits as well as a 
reduction in the average amount of time children spent in care compared to the 
counterfactual based on the control states.  For Illinois, most of this change was due to an 
increase in the proportion of very timely exits, while for North Carolina it was primarily 
the result of higher shares of children exiting care in a somewhat timely manner.  This 
finding is consistent with previous research that identified a positive relationship between 
the use of PBC and timeliness of exits (see also chapter 6).  However, as anticipated in 
section 4.7, this result needs to be interpreted with caution.  Specifically, there are a 
number of policy and contextual factors besides PBC that may confound the interpretation 
of these results.  An example of such factors might be the subsidised guardianship waiver 
programme (see also section 5.5). 
The chapter also confirms what had already emerged in chapter 6, namely that after 
controlling for various time-varying and invariant covariates, the relationship between PBC 
and timeliness is no longer positive, suggesting that the variables and interactions included 
in the models may be related to improvements in timeliness recorded by the two PBC 
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states.  Both Illinois and North Carolina recorded significantly lower proportions of timely 
exits compared to the counterfactual by the period 2005-2009.  However, North Carolina 
witnessed a larger share of somewhat timely exits than expected based on the trend for 
states that did not employ PBC.  Part of this increase occurred as a result of a shift from 
very timely to somewhat timely exits during the period considered.  However, while these 
findings suggest a positive relationship, owing to limitations in the research design and 
data source employed in the study (see also chapter 4), I am unable to make inferences 
about the causal nexus between the use of PBC and improvements in somewhat timely 
exits for North Carolina.  A preliminary analysis suggests that part of this gain may be 
associated with changes in the timeliness of various permanency outcomes (see also 
chapter 9).  
It is notable that the findings in this chapter are at odds with those reported in the two 
rounds of CFSR.  Specifically, in both rounds of the CFSR, Illinois scored below the 
national median in terms of both the percentage of children who were reunified with their 
families within twelve months as well as those who were adopted within twenty-four 
months of entry.112  North Carolina, on the other hand, exceeded the federal standards for 
both adoption and reunification in the second round of CFSR, though not in the first (North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services 2007).  In 
contrast, my analysis suggests that both Illinois and North Carolina witnessed a decline in 
the proportion of children exiting care both within twelve months, as well as within twenty 
four months of entry, once relevant variables and interactions were accounted for.  How do 
my findings reconcile with those of the CFSR? 
First, the two approaches measure different things.  Besides focusing on a sub-set of 
permanency outcomes, CFSR composite measures mainly emphasise differences in 
levels—i.e., differences among states in the proportions of timely reunifications or 
adoptions—rather than trends over time, which could be obtained by indexing such levels 
to a common baseline or by using counterfactuals to control for ATE.  While information 
on differences in levels can be interesting in-of-itself—for example, if one believes that 
children should stay in care as little as possible—I contend that decisions related to the 
introduction of new contract management tools, such as PBC,  need to be informed by 
                                                 
112 New Jersey and Washington also performed below the national median for these two outcome measures in 
both rounds of the CFSRs. 
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additional measures that adjust for difference in levels, rather than merely state-level “raw” 
averages. 
Second, the CFSR measures do not control for differences in the out-of-home care 
population served and how this population might have changed over time.  As anticipated 
in earlier chapters, failing to do so is particularly problematic since it potentially confounds 
the interpretation of the impact of different programmes or practices.  In this analysis, I 
have sought to address this issue by using more robust methods, which seek to control for 
some of these aspects (see also chapters 3 and 4).  However, while controlling for 
differences in populations is essential, I acknowledge that “(i)t is not possible in social 
work research to control for all the variables that might have an impact on treatment 
outcomes” (Else, et al. 1992 p. 523).   
In both Illinois and North Carolina, a number of factors besides the use of PBC may 
have had a positive impact on timeliness of exits from care.  For example, Illinois provides 
a number of services and key practices that help children and their families achieve 
permanency in a timely manner, including engaging families in case planning and 
providing substance abuse services to family members (Department of Children and 
Family Services, State of Illinois 2009).  Likewise, North Carolina has sought to improve 
the size and level of qualification of staff in its child welfare system, and has introduced a 
number of statutory and policy changes, such as more stringent timeframes for TPR (North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services 2001 p. 
78).  My analysis does not discuss how these or other types of services and practices, 
including domestic violence counseling, temporary childcare, or support with housing or 
transportation might have had a positive impact on the timeliness of permanency outcomes; 
an omission which might contribute to a more positive assessment of PBC than such 
programmes warrant.   
At the same time, my analysis fails to control for a number of factors which have 
been identified as possibly hampering timely permanency outcomes, including the lack of 
communication and trust between stakeholders, as well as structural aspects such as 
shortages of qualified staff or large caseloads (Collins-Camargo, et al. 2013; McBeath and 
Meezan 2009; Raghavan 2010).  My inability to control for such factors may be 
confounding the interpretation of the relationship between the use of PBC and the 
timeliness of exits.  Evidence suggests that there may be a number of such factors in 
practice.  Illinois, for instance, in spite of being awarded the 2000 Harvard Innovations in 
American Government Award for implementing PBC in its child welfare system, continues 
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to face a number of obstacles which contribute to delaying the timely achievement of 
permanency for children in care.  These include: 
“court delays, staff turnover, placement instability related to behavior of 
children/lack of services/unwillingness of foster parents to commit to children, lack 
of efforts to achieve reunifications, inappropriate use of Subsidized Guardianship or 
Independence as long term foster care goals versus efforts to facilitate permanency 
and exiting children from the system, limited efforts to locate relative placement 
resources-particularly paternal relatives, staff unaware of what has happened on their 
cases (not reading files)” (Department of Children and Family Services, State of 
Illinois 2003 p. 21). 
 
North Carolina also confronts a number of barriers to achieving permanency in a 
timely manner including challenges related to recruiting and retaining qualified social 
workers, lack of compliance with timelines for submission of custody orders, and 
inadequate coordination in the child welfare cases between the state and county level 
(North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services 
2001).   
Given the scarcity of information on the types of services provided, system-level 
factors, as well as other important aspects associated with the child’s familial and social 
ecology, all results presented in this chapter must be interpreted with caution.  Indeed, as in 
the previous chapter, this analysis underscores the challenges of monitoring the impact of a 
policy tool in the absence of an explicit monitoring framework.  However, while 
“attributing total effect, either positive or negative, to treatment is problematic” (Else, et al. 
1992 p. 523), the approach presented in this and the previous chapter—which relies on 
prospective cohorts, controls for some basic social and demographic characteristics of 
children in care, and uses a simple procedure to estimate the ATE—represents, in spite of 
its limitations (see also section 6.4), a contribution to identifying the necessary elements to 
better examine the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of exits from care.  
Furthermore, this approach could be adapted to monitor the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes in other contexts, including in national monitoring frameworks such as the 
CFSRs.  I return to discuss some of these aspects in chapter 10.  
This analysis also raises three distinct areas for future research.  First, there is a need 
for more research on the relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes.  This research, ideally, should be conducted by using randomly 
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assigned treatments and controls.  In addition, it should follow entry cohorts for a long 
enough period after the implementation of this programme management tool.  A first step 
could be to use the method proposed in this chapter as well as in chapter 6, for other states 
that have employed PBC.  The analysis could also be repeated using more or different 
controls.  Second, given that in states that employ PBC some groups of children—
particularly African American children—may not have recorded the same improvement in 
timeliness as their peers; this might be an area for additional research, possibly widening 
the focus to other groups of children and in different contexts.  Third, while my analysis 
suggests that North Carolina may have performed better than Illinois or the control states in 
promoting somewhat timely exits from care, more research is needed on the relationship 
between the more stringent types of PBC and various measures of timeliness.  It might be 
helpful, for instance, to repeat the analysis focusing on larger sample of PBC states, so that 
differences in PBC approaches can be better accounted for.  In addition, it might be useful 
to develop a more detailed classification of the different PBC models, building on the 
analytical framework proposed by Testa (2001, 2008).  
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8 Factors associated with the timeliness of exits from out-of-home 
care in states that employ PBC 
 
8.1 The timeliness of children exiting care versus the composition of those entering 
care: an outline of the chapter 
In the previous chapters, I have shown that states that implemented PBC recorded 
significantly more timely exits from care compared to the counterfactual based on the two 
control states.  However, once differences across states in various time-varying and 
invariant covariates were accounted for, the relationship between the timeliness of 
permanency outcomes and the DID estimator changed, meaning that much of the 
“improvement” in timeliness experienced by states that employed PBC during the period 
1999-2009 is associated with changes in those factors.   
In this chapter, I seek to better investigate some of these relationships by focusing on 
three of the main “mechanisms” through which changes in the timeliness in permanency 
outcomes are achieved.  As seen in section 1.7, the first two relate to the amount of time 
various groups of children spend in care.  The third relates to whether compositional 
changes in the out-of-home care population, including in the distribution of children in 
various placement settings, might be associated with changes in the overall timeliness of 
exits. 
In this chapter I seek to explore some of these aspects by focusing on Illinois and 
North Carolina compared to the two control states.  First, I examine whether there have 
been changes in the timeliness of exits for various groups of children entering out-of-home 
care as well as whether some groups of children have experienced more rapid 
improvements in the timeliness of exits compared to others.  The reason for focusing on 
this, as anticipated in chapter 2, is that agencies whose compensation is tied to the 
achievement of specific permanency targets—such as those operating under PBC—would 
have an interest to reduce the amount of time various groups of children spend in care by 
either: (1) improving the timeliness of groups of children known in the literature to exit 
care more slowly such as infants, African American children or children placed with kin, or 
(2) shorting the stay in care of the so-called “marginal” cases, i.e., children that are more 
likely to meet performance targets (see also the third and fourth research hypothesis in 
chapter 1).  I then consider whether compositional changes might be associated with 
improvements in the overall timeliness of exits.  Again, the rationale for this stems from 
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the fact that child welfare agencies in states that employ PBC would have an interest to 
increase their chances of meeting performance targets by, for instance, moving children 
into placement settings that are known to be positively associated with timely permanency 
outcomes (see also chapter 3).  Lastly, I examine whether there is evidence of various types 
of gaming, including “cherry picking” and discuss and summarise the main findings of the 
chapter.  For reasons of analytical convenience, this chapter focuses only on the simplified 
classification of timeliness—timely versus untimely exits—rather than on the average 
amount of time children spend in care or the more detailed classification of timeliness, 
consisting of very timely, somewhat timely and untimely exits.  Further, I decided to 
restrict my analysis to the three time-varying covariates included in the statistical models in 
chapters 6 and 7, namely the child’s age, race and placement setting. 
 
8.2 Changes in the timeliness of exits for different groups of children 
The timeliness of exits for various groups of children 
The three groups of states—Illinois, North Carolina and the two control states—have 
experienced different trends in the timeliness of exits for various groups.  To better 
compare these trends, I computed the DID estimator for timely exits focusing on the three 
sets of child attributes indicated above.  This comparison reveals a number of findings. 
Focusing on the race of the child—defined here as the dichotomous variable 
“African American” and “other race” (see also section 4.6)—I find that the proportion of 
black children exiting care in a timely manner increased significantly in Illinois following 
the introduction of PBC, but changed little in North Carolina (Figure 8.1).  However, while 
Illinois recorded a pronounced increase, this was not significantly different from the trend 
of the control states.  In contrast, North Carolina experienced a marked increase in the 
percentage of children of other races exiting care within twenty-four months of entry, both 
in absolute terms and compared to the counterfactual.  
For the age of children—defined as the dichotomous variable “infant” and “child 
over the age of one”—I find that the proportion of infants exiting care in a timely manner 
rose in both Illinois and North Carolina during the period 1996-2009, although this change 
was not significantly different from the counterfactual.  Conversely, the proportion of 
children over one year of age exiting in a timely manner was significantly higher in both 
Illinois and North Carolina than expected based on the trend from the non-PBC states.  
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Figure 8.1. Proportion of timely exits in Illinois, North Carolina by race, age 
and placement setting 
African American children Children of other racial backgrounds  
 
Infant Over one year of age  
  
Kinship care Other placement settings  
  
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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permanency in a timely manner rose significantly following the introduction of PBC.  In 
contrast, for the two control states the timeliness of exits among children placed with kin 
did not change over the time period considered.  For children placed in other settings, both 
Illinois and North Carolina witnessed a relatively small change during the period 1996-
2009, with values that were not significantly different from those expected based on the 
trend for the control states. 
 
Disparity in timely exits 
As the section above indicates, different groups of children have experienced different 
trends in terms of the timeliness of exits during the period considered.  In particular, some 
groups which have been identified in the literature as being less likely to exit care in a 
timely manner, such as children placed with kin, recorded an improvement in the 
timeliness of exit during the period 1996-2009.  In order to better understand the 
implications of these trends for the overall timeliness in the two PBC states, I created a 
measure which I refer to as “disproportionality in timely exits” or DTE (see also section 
4.7).113.   
Based on this measure, I find that, for a number of child characteristics, there has 
been a convergence in DTE, meaning that the gap in timeliness between different groups of 
children has narrowed over time.  For instance, DTE by race declined significantly in both 
Illinois and the states that did not employ PBC.  In Illinois, where the difference between 
the proportion of black children and children of other racial backgrounds exiting care 
within twenty-four months of entry was nearly 18 percentage points during the pre-PBC 
period, this gap fell to less than 9 percentage points during the period 2005-2009 (Figure 
8.2).  Non-PBC states recorded an even more pronounced decline: from a “deficit” of 10 
percentage points during the period 1996-1998 to a “surplus” of nearly 4 percentage points 
during the period 2005-2009, signifying that a larger share of African American children 
exited care in a timely manner than children of other racial backgrounds in the control 
states during the period 2005-2009.  In North Carolina, however, DTE by race increased 
during the period considered, reaching levels nearly 80 per cent higher than those recorded 
prior to the implementation of PBC.   
 
                                                 
113 I define DTE as the difference in the proportion p of timely exits for selected sets of bivariate 
characteristics. 
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Figure 8.2. DTE in Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBC states by race, age 
and placement setting 
 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: “By race” refers to the difference in the proportion of African American children and children of 
other racial backgrounds.  “By age” refers to the difference in the proportion of infants and children over one 
year of age.  “By placement setting” refers to the difference in the proportion of children placed in kinship 
care and those in other placement settings.   
 
For the age of children entering care, Illinois recorded a modest reduction in the DTE 
for infants compared to older children, while North Carolina experienced almost no change 
during the period considered.  On the other hand, the non-PBC states witnessed a 
significant decline in DTE by age owing both to improvements in the timeliness of exits 
for infants and the simultaneous decline in the timeliness of exits for older children.  
Because neither Illinois nor North Carolina experienced significant changes in DTE by 
age, I do not include this characteristic in the counterfactual scenarios discussed below. 
Focusing on placement setting, I find that Illinois recorded a progressive reduction in 
the DTE for children placed with kin compared to children in other settings.  By the period 
2005-2009, DTE by placement setting in Illinois had narrowed by 9 percentage points, 
equal to a 40 per cent decline compared to the period prior to the implementation of PBC.  
In North Carolina, on the other hand, the DTE by placement setting switched from being 
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in other settings—to being positive—meaning that a larger share of children placed with 
kin exited care within twenty-four months of entry compared to children in other settings.  
 
Two counterfactual scenarios based on DTE 
In order to quantify the impact of such changes on the overall timeliness of permanency 
outcomes, I created a first counterfactual scenario holding DTE for various groups constant 
to the level of the period 1996-1998 (the base value).  I then created a second 
counterfactual scenario, where DTE for various groups was allowed to change over the 
time period considered, but following the trend of the non-PBC states. 
What emerges is that changes in the timeliness of exits among African American 
children had a positive impact on the overall timeliness of exits in Illinois (Figure 8.3).  
Specifically, if levels of DTE by race had remained the same as those prior to the 
introduction of PBC, the share of timely exits in Illinois would have been 3 percentage 
points lower by the period 2005-2009.  However, because the control states experienced an 
even greater convergence in DTE by race114 compared to Illinois, the proportion of timely 
exits in Illinois would have been 5 percentage points higher by the period 2005-2009 had it 
followed the trend of the control states (second scenario).  Conversely, for North Carolina 
changes in DTE by race had a negative impact on the overall timeliness of children exiting 
care.  In North Carolina, the proportion of children exiting care within twenty-four months 
of entry would have been significantly higher if levels of DTE by race had followed the 
trends of the two alternative scenarios.   
Focusing on DTE by placement setting, I find that both Illinois and North Carolina 
recorded significantly more timely exits from care than would have been expected based 
on either the first or the second scenario.  In particular, owing to the convergence of DTE 
by placement settings, the proportion of children exiting care in a timely manner for 
Illinois was, respectively 4 and 2 percentage points higher than would have been expected 
had Illinois followed the trend based on the first or second scenario.  For North Carolina, 
the corresponding difference was 4 and 10 percentage points, respectively.  Consequently, 
convergence in DTE by placement setting contributed significantly to increasing the 
overall proportion of timely exits in both Illinois and North Carolina, both overall as well 
as compared to the counterfactual based on the two control states. 
                                                 
114 Part of this reduction was also due to the decline in the proportion of timely exits for children of other 
racial groups in the non-PBC states. 
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Figure 8.3. Two scenarios for DTE by race and placement setting 
 
First scenario 
(DTE constant at pre-PBC levels) 
 
Second scenario 
(DTE followed trend of non-PBC states) 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: Values above zero indicate that the state performed “worse” than might have been expected on 
the basis of one of the alternative scenarios, while values below zero signify that the state performed better 
than the scenario.   
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overall timeliness of permanency outcomes might have been affected, namely by 
modifying the composition of those entering care, particularly their placement setting.  In 
the sections below I focus on three distinct aspects: (1) whether the share of so-called 
“underperforming”
115
 children entering care followed the trend of non-PBC states, 
(2) whether the proportion of so-called “underperforming” children converged with the 
share of “marginal” cases, and (3) the impact of such changes on the overall timeliness of 
exits. 
 
The share of children entering care known to be slower in achieving permanency  
As seen in chapter 5, both Illinois and North Carolina experienced significant changes in 
the proportion of various groups of children entering care known in the literature to exit 
care more slowly than their peers, including African American children, infants and 
children placed with kin.  It is important, however, to assess whether these changes are 
significantly different from those of the counterfactual based on the control states. 
Focusing on race, I find, as anticipated in chapter 5, that both Illinois and North 
Carolina experienced a significant decline in the share of black children entering care 
during the period 1996-2009.  Further in both states, the decline was significantly more 
pronounced than expected based on the counterfactual: 14 per cent less for Illinois and 13 
per cent less for North Carolina (Figure 8.4).  This finding appears to support my fifth 
hypothesis, according to which PBC states would be expected to record a greater decline in 
the proportion of so-called “underperforming” children entering care compared to non-
PBC states. 
For the age of children entering care, I find that there was relatively little change in 
the share of infants entering care following the implementation of PBC in Illinois.  In 
contrast, in North Carolina, the proportion of children entering care before the age of one 
increased, though not significantly more than the counterfactual.   
In terms of placement settings, the share of children placed in kinship care rose 
significantly in both Illinois and North Carolina over the time period considered.  
However, compared to the counterfactual the increase was significantly smaller than 
expected.  Again this appears to partially confirm my fifth hypothesis, according to which 
                                                 
115 I also refer to these groups as children who are less likely to meet performance targets or 
“underperforming” children.  The use of the term “underperforming” is not intended as a negative judgement 
on these children, their families or their circumstances.  
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PBC states would be expected to record a smaller proportion of children placed in kinship 
settings compared to non-PBC states. 
 
Figure 8.4. Proportion of so-called “underperforming” children entering care 
in Illinois and North Carolina 
African American children 
 
Infant 
 
Kinship care 
 
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions. 
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Disparity at entry 
In order to better quantify these changes, I created a measure which I refer to as “disparity 
at entry” or DAE (see section 4.7).
116
  The measure seeks to capture whether the gap 
between the proportion of children known in the literature to exit care more slowly and the 
so-called “marginal” cases narrowed or widened over time. 
Based on this measure, I find that DAE by race converged in Illinois following the 
introduction of PBC, meaning that the gap in the proportion of African American children 
entering care compared to children of other races narrowed over the period considered (see 
Figure 8.5).  North Carolina also experienced a rapid decline in the proportion of black 
children entering care.  However, unlike Illinois, North Carolina experienced a divergence 
in racial DAE, meaning that the gap in the proportion of children of other races entering 
care compared to African American children widened during the period 1996-2009; a 
result attributable to the fact that there were proportionally fewer black children entering 
care in the state to start (see also section 5.3).   
 
Figure 8.5. DAE in Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBCstates by race, age 
and placement setting 
 
 
Pre-PBC                 Post-PBC (1st period)             Post-PBC (2nd period) 
Note: See note for Figure 8.2.   
                                                 
116 DAE refers to the differences in the proportion of children entering care with certain bivariate sets of 
characteristics (see also section 4.7). 
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In terms of the age of children, both North Carolina and the control states recorded 
an increase in the proportion of infants entering care compared to children over one year of 
age.  In North Carolina, DAE by age narrowed by around 13 percentage points between the 
periods 1996-1998 and 2005-2009, compared to around 11 percentage points in the control 
states.  For Illinois there was almost no change in DAE by age during this period.   
Focusing on DAE by placement setting, I find that for both Illinois and North 
Carolina the gap in the proportion of children placed with relatives compared to other 
settings declined (Figure 8.5).  However, while DAE by placement setting narrowed in 
both Illinois and North Carolina, the change was significantly smaller than the one 
recorded by the control states.   
 
Two counterfactual scenarios based on DAE 
To assess the impact of these trends on the overall timeliness of exits, I created two 
additional counterfactual scenarios, which “mirror” those already presented in section 8.2.  
In the third scenario, I assumed that DAE for various characteristics did not change over 
the time period considered, using the values recorded during the period 1996-1998 as the 
baseline.  I then created a fourth counterfactual scenario, where the DAE for different 
groups changed following the trend of the control states.   
Focusing on race, the results indicate that, for both Illinois and North Carolina, the 
proportion of timely exits from care was significantly higher than if there had been no 
change in the DAE (the third scenario).  In Illinois, the overall timeliness of exits would 
have been nearly 2 percentage points lower by the period 2004-2009 if DAE by race had 
remained the same as prior to the implementation of PBC.  In other words, the reduction in 
the proportion of African American children entering care contributed to improving the 
timeliness of exits from care in Illinois during the period 1996-2009.  A similar, though 
less pronounced, trend was also experienced by North Carolina.  Compared to the fourth 
scenario, both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a larger proportion of timely exits than 
if they had followed the trend for racial DAE of the two control states. 
The trends for DAE by placement setting are less straightforward to interpret.  For 
the third scenario, Illinois and North Carolina experienced somewhat different trends.  
Illinois witnessed an improvement between the periods 1996-1998 and 1999-2004 in the 
overall timeliness of exits from care due to the decline in the proportion of children placed 
with relatives, while in North Carolina the change in DAE by setting had almost no impact 
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on the overall proportion of timely exits from care.  By the period 2005-2009, however, the 
share of children exiting care within twenty-four months of entry in North Carolina was 
significantly higher than if there had been no change in the DAE by setting, while the 
opposite was true for Illinois.   
 
Figure 8.6. Two scenarios for DAE by race and placement setting 
Note: Values above zero indicate that the state performed “worse” than might have been expected on 
the basis of one of the alternative scenarios, while values below zero signify that the state performed better 
than the scenario. 
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while North Carolina fared worse.  For North Carolina, this result may also be due to the 
fact that, during the period 1999-2009, exits from kinship care became, on average, more 
timely compared to those from other placement settings (see also section 8.2). 
 
8.4 Additional factors that could have contributed to improvements in timeliness, 
including “cherry picking” 
The sections above indicate that there were marked changes in the timeliness of children 
exiting care as well as the composition of children entering care in the states that employed 
PBC during the period 1996-2009.  Changes in DTE and DAE by race and placement 
setting appear to be particularly noteworthy.  Given that states that employ PBC have an 
incentive to reduce the amount of time children spend in care, is there evidence of “cherry 
picking”?  What other factors, including secular trends, might have contributed to 
improvements in timeliness? 
Because of limitations with the AFCARS dataset—for instance, the dataset does not 
contain information on the amount or type of services provided to out-of-home care 
children or their families; information that could be used to assess if “cherry picking” is 
taking place—I sought to explore these questions indirectly by focusing on: (1) the 
distribution by race and placement setting of children still in care twenty-four months after 
entry, (2) trends at the state level in racial disproportionality at entry, (3) trends at the state 
level in racial disproportionality for children who were substantiated or indicated for 
maltreatment, and (4) the geographical distribution of children entering care by race and 
placement setting at the county level.   
 
The race and placement setting of children in care twenty-four months after entry 
The composition of children still in care after twenty-four months provides an indirect 
measure of “cherry picking”.  Specifically, if “cherry picking” occurred, one might 
expect—after controlling for changes in the composition of children entering care with 
those characteristics—the share of “underperforming” cases still in care at twenty-four 
months to be significantly larger than the counterfactual based on the share of the so-called 
“marginal” cases (Figure 8.7). 
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Figure 8.7. Share of children still in care at twenty-four months in Illinois 
and North Carolina by race and placement setting compared to the 
counterfactual based on the so-called “marginal” cases 
African American children 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
In kinship care 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Children still in care after twenty-four months of entry compared to children with that 
characteristic at entry 
Counterfactual (based on the marginal cases)   
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
 
Focusing on race, I find that in Illinois the share of African American children still in 
care twenty-four months after entry was significantly lower than in the pre-PBC period.  
Further, the share was significantly less than the counterfactuals based on the marginal 
cases, which in this case refers to children of other race.  For North Carolina, the 
proportion of African American children still in care after twenty-four months of entry did 
not change significantly following the implementation of PBC.  However, the share was 
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significantly higher than the counterfactual based on children of other race.  While this 
finding should be taken with caution given the limitations of the data employed, it suggests 
that “cherry picking” may have taken place for non-black children in the state. 
In terms of placement setting, both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a reduction 
in the share of children placed with kin still in care after twenty-four months (see also 
section 8.2 above).  In both states, this share declined faster than the counterfactual based 
on children in other settings, confirming that for placement settings the timeliness of the 
“underperforming” group improved; the opposite of what might have been expected if 
“cherry picking” had occurred. 
 
Racial disproportionality at entry 
To better explore whether changes in the composition of children entering care by race 
might be due to secular trends, I computed an index of racial disproportionality at entry, or 
RDE, defined here as the proportion of African American children among all children 
entering care over the proportion of African American children in total child population 
(see also Shaw, et al. 2008; Summers 2015).   
Using data from the U.S. Bureau of Census, compiled by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau 
(2002, 2012c, 2012d), I find that the racial composition of children in the three groups of 
states did not change significantly in the periods following the implementation of PBC.  In 
both Illinois and North Carolina, the proportion of African Americans in the total child 
population declined slightly between the periods 1996-1998 and 2005-2009 (see also 
section 5.5), while in the two control states it remained constant.  In contrast, as indicated 
in chapter 5, the share of African Americans children entering out-of-home care during the 
same time period declined by 13 percentage points in Illinois, by 10 percentage points in 
North Carolina, and by nearly 5 percentage points in the states that did not employ PBC. 
Comparing the two trends, I find that Illinois witnessed a somewhat more 
pronounced decline in RDE than would have been expected based on the trend for the 
control states (see Figure 8.8).  Specifically, I find that in Illinois RDE declined from 3.3 
times the level of the overall child population in the period 1996-1998 to 2.8 times the 
level in the period 2005-2009; nearly 5 per cent less compared to the counterfactual.  
Conversely, in North Carolina where the overrepresentation of black children entering care 
fell from 1.8 times to 1.5 times that of the overall child population, RDE remained 
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approximately 8 per cent higher than expected based on the trend for the two non-PBC 
states. 
 
Figure 8.8. RDE in Illinois and North Carolina compared to the 
counterfactual based on the control states 
 
 
Illinois  
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
 
While this comparison draws attention to the over-representation of African 
American children among those entering care, something already well-established in the 
literature, it does not suggest that “parking” took place.117  Instead, the findings indicate 
that other trends, including secular ones (see also section 3.3), may have shaped the decline 
in the proportion of African American children entering out-of-home care in both Illinois 
and North Carolina. 
 
RDE for children substantiated or indicated for maltreatment 
Considering the RDE for children substantiated or indicated for maltreatment,118 another 
comparison used to assess racial overrepresentation at placement, provides some additional 
                                                 
117 “Parking” occurs when contracting agencies deliberately attempt to reduce the number of children 
entering care with characteristics negatively associated with the desired outcomes.  Given that states 
generally retain the authority to investigate maltreatment and, where necessary, place children in care, it is 
likely that individual contractors are unable to influence such decisions. 
118 According to the NCANDS (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children 
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insight into whether gaming occurred in the two PBC states.  According to the data 
compiled by the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data Systems (NCANDS), the 
proportion of black children among all children with one or more substantiated or indicated 
report of maltreatment declined in both states between the periods 1996-1998 and 2005-
2009.  In both Illinois and North Carolina, the share of African American children among 
all children with substantiated or indicated reports of maltreatment fell by nearly 7 
percentage points between the two periods, compared to around 4 percentage points for the 
non-PBC states.   
Focusing on the proportion African American among all children entering care 
because of maltreatment, I find that this share also declined significantly in all three groups 
of states.  Illinois experienced the largest decline during this period (over 14 percentage 
points), followed by North Carolina (12 percentage points) and the control states (nearly 11 
percentage points).  In both Illinois and North Carolina, this decline was greater than 
expected based on the trend for the counterfactual (Figure 8.9).  
 
Figure 8.9. RDE for children substantiated or indicated for maltreated in 
Illinois and North Carolina 
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Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
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Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
                                                 
and Families 2012f p. 15) a substantiated maltreatment is “(a)n investigation disposition that concludes that 
the allegation of maltreatment or risk of maltreatment was supported or founded by State law or policy”. An 
indicated maltreatment is an “investigation disposition that concludes that maltreatment could not be 
substantiated under State law or policy, but there was reason to suspect that at least one child may have been 
maltreated or was at-risk of maltreatment.  This is applicable only to States that distinguish between 
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I then computed the RDE for children substantiated or indicated for maltreated; 
defined here as the proportion of African American children among all children entering 
care because of maltreatment over the corresponding proportion in the total population.  On 
the basis of this rate, I find that, while both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a decline 
in RDE for children substantiated or indicated maltreatment, this was less than expected 
based on the trend for the two states that did not employ PBC.  Further, because in both 
Illinois and North Carolina, the RDE for maltreatment was significantly higher than for the 
control states, it is likely that in both states African American children remained over-
represented among those placed in care because of maltreatment.  Again, this finding is at 
odds with the “parking” hypothesis put forward in section 1.7. 
 
The geographical distribution of children entering care 
Focusing on changes in the geographical distribution of children entering care represents 
another way to explore whether gaming took place, since the literature shows that changes 
in DTE and DAE can also be brought about by shifts in the composition of out-of-home 
care population within districts or counties within a state (Wulczyn, et al. 2006b, 2007).  
The AFCARS dataset, for confidentiality reasons, does not provide detailed information at 
lower levels of geographical disaggregation.  However, it is possible to look at changes in 
the composition of children entering care for larger administrative agglomerations such as 
counties or clusters of counties.  Focusing on lower levels of geographical disaggregation 
is also interesting for states that employ PBC since it provides some insight into whether 
strategies to share risk were effective.  Specifically, since risk reducing strategies work by 
randomly assigning children, regardless of their characteristics, to agencies across 
administrative boundaries, one would expect DAE by race to converge over time and 
across counties in states that have implemented such policy tools. 
Instead my analysis suggests that DAE by race did not converge across the three 
groups of counties considered in Illinois—Cook County, Peoria County and other 
counties—or the two counties in North Carolina—Mecklenburg County and other counties.  
After the implementation of PBC, the proportion of black children entering care in Peoria 
County—which had a much lower proportion of African American entering care compared 
to Cook County to start with—declined much more significantly than in Cook County.  
However, because the number of children entering care in Cook County, regardless of race, 
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declined more rapidly than in the other counties considered, the overall RDE in the state 
converged as a result of this compositional effect.  Likewise, in North Carolina, the 
proportion of African American children entering care diverged in Mecklenburg County 
following the implementation of PBC, while it narrowed significantly in the rest of the 
state.  Mecklenburg County hosted a significantly higher proportion of black children 
among children placed in care to start with compared to the aggregate for other counties in 
North Carolina. 
 
8.5 Summary of main findings and discussion 
In chapters 6 and 7, I found that controlling for various time-varying and invariant 
covariates significantly modifies the interpretation of the relationship between the use of 
PBC and the overall timeliness of exits.  Yet my analysis did not elaborate on how changes 
in some of those factors, particularly time-varying covariates, might relate to trends in the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes in states that had implemented PBC.   
In this chapter, I sought to provide greater insight into some of these relationships by 
focusing on two main aspects.  The first aspect I considered was the timeliness of exits 
from care for different groups of children.  Reducing the amount of time various groups of 
children spend in care is probably the most straightforward way for states to improve their 
overall timeliness.  Strategies to shorten the length of stay in out-of-home care for groups 
that are slower in exiting care as well as for marginal groups (“cherry picking”) can be an 
effective means to achieve this goal.  The second aspect I focused on was changes in the 
composition of those entering care.  If fewer children with characteristics negatively 
associated with timely permanency outcomes entered care, one might expect the overall 
timeliness of exits to improve.  I also sought to explore whether there was evidence that 
changes in either DTE or DAE might be a result of gaming or whether they might be 
associated with other factors, including secular trends.  In the sections below, I briefly 
summarise and discuss the main findings in relation to each of these aspects. 119  
 
Changes in the timeliness of exits 
My analysis indicates that the timeliness of exits for various groups of children changed in 
different ways.  The proportion of African American children exiting care in a timely 
                                                 
119 In the sections below, I do not present the findings related to the age of the child since the analysis 
suggests that differences are small compared to the control states.   
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manner, for instance, increased significantly in Illinois but not in North Carolina.  At the 
same time, both Illinois and North Carolina experienced a significant improvement in the 
timeliness of exits among children placed in kinship care both overall and compared to the 
counterfactual.   
As a result of these changes, Illinois recorded a significant convergence in DTE both 
by race and placement setting, meaning that the gap in timeliness between groups of 
children known to be slower in achieving permanency narrowed following the 
implementation of PBC.  This finding is consistent with a number of previous studies, 
which identified an improvement in the timeliness of permanency outcomes for groups of 
children perceived to be less likely to exit care in a timely manner—namely African 
American children and children placed in kinship care (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau 2013; 
Wulczyn, et al. 2007).  It is also consistent with my third hypothesis (see section 1.7), 
according to which one of the mechanisms through which PBC states might reduce the 
average amount of time children spend in care is by improving the timeliness of exits for 
groups known to be slower in achieving permanency. 
In contrast, in North Carolina, where DTE by race and placement setting was 
relatively small prior to the introduction of PBC, the gap in the timeliness of exits by race 
and placement setting widened in the periods following the implementation of this 
programme management tool, owing to a more pronounced improvement in the timeliness 
of exits for the so-called “marginal cases”.  Though not conclusive, the latter may be seen 
as a sign of “cherry picking” (see also my fourth hypothesis in section 1.7). 
To assess the impact of these changes on the overall timeliness of permanency 
outcomes, I created two counterfactual scenarios.  In the first, I held DTE constant at the 
level of the pre-PBC period, while in the second I allowed DTE to vary following the trend 
of the control states.  Based on these scenarios, I found that reductions in DTE by 
placement setting contributed to a higher proportion of timely exits in both Illinois and 
North Carolina, both in absolute terms (first scenario) and compared to the counterfactual 
(second scenario).  These findings are consistent with my third research hypothesis 
outlined in chapter 1; namely that PBC states would witness a convergence in DTE for 
various groups of children, and that this would contribute positively to the overall 
timeliness of exits in those states. 
While these findings suggest that a convergence in DTE by placement setting in 
states that employed PBC resulted in more timely exits, they should not be interpreted 
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naïvely as a “consequence” of this type of performance management tool since many other 
factors and policies may have intervened to shape this outcome.  An alternative 
explanation, for instance, could be that, as a result of the subsidised guardianship waiver 
demonstrations programme implemented in the two states during this period, a series of 
new permanency options became available for children who would have otherwise 
remained in long-term care.  As indicated in chapter 5, Illinois and North Carolina are two 
of eleven states in the United States to have implemented such programmes, meaning that 
they can use title IV-E federal funds “to subsidize placements with relative and/or non-
relative caregivers who served as the legal guardians of children who had previously been 
in foster care” (James Bell Associates 2013 p. 2).  Children who were living in kinship care 
in both states, therefore, may have been able to more quickly exit care to guardianship (see 
also chapter 9).  This point also appears to be supported by the study by Koh and Testa 
(2011). 
The findings for race are even more complex to interpret.  Illinois, where DTE by 
race narrowed as a result of the more pronounced improvement in the timeliness of exits 
for African American children compared to children of other races, experienced more 
timely exits overall than if DTE had remained constant at the level prior to the 
implementation of PBC (first scenario).  In contrast, North Carolina experienced an 
opposite trend, owing to the fact that DTE by race became more skewed as a result of 
reductions in the amount of time children of other races spent in care that were unmatched 
by similar improvements in the timeliness of exits for African American children.  Both 
Illinois and North Carolina fared worse than if they had followed the trend for DTE by race 
of the control states (second scenario).  In the case of North Carolina, however, this 
difference is primarily due to the fact that the non-PBC states also experienced a reduction 
in the proportion of children of other races exiting care in a timely manner, while North 
Carolina did not. 
The finding that Illinois witnessed a significant improvement in the timeliness of 
exits for African American children is noteworthy since addressing the “overrepresentation 
of African American children in substitute care who also spend on average a longer period 
of time in care than other child populations served” was identified as an important policy 
priority in Illinois (Department of Children and Family Services, State of Illinois 2003 
p. 216).  However, North Carolina also expressed commitment to reducing the DTE 
between African American children and other groups of children (North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services 2001).  Yet, 
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because the timeliness of permanency outcomes changed little for black children entering 
care in the state between 1996 and 2009, while it improved significantly for children of 
other racial backgrounds, DTE by race widened in North Carolina.   
Given that both states have implemented PBC and that both states have an interest in 
improving the timeliness of exits, why did DTE by race narrow in Illinois but not in North 
Carolina?  One explanation could be that efforts to close the gap in permanency outcomes 
for some of Illinois’ worst performing counties had a disproportionate effect on African 
Americans, who were significantly overrepresented in those counties.120  The state—
partially in response to its negative assessment in the 2003 CFSR and the subsequent 
development of a program improvement plan (PIP)—introduced a number of services 
targeted explicitly at Cook County.121  These initiatives included the Foster Family Support 
Project, the Intensive Relative Search Project as well as the Female Addicts and their 
Children in Treatment Program.  Other reforms included more timely approvals of 
permanency goals by the Cook County court system, greater efforts to expedite the 
movement of cases, as well as an outreach campaign to better inform foster families about 
the array of services available to them.  While it is not possible to draw a causal nexus 
between the two, the fact that the state responded to “underperforming” counties by 
“selecting appropriate services and delivering them effectively” may have also been a 
consequence of PBC and its emphasis on “ﬁnancial incentives and penalties” (McBeath 
and Meezan 2010 pp. 117-119).   
An additional explanation could be the “cherry picking” hypothesis proposed by 
McBeath (2006 p. 359) according to which caseworkers respond to performance 
environments “by devoting greater attention to those cases that lead to positive 
performance”, signifying that that they “provide more services to cases that are less 
difficult to serve”.  While I am unable to find direct evidence to support this hypothesis, it 
might explain why North Carolina witnessed an improvement in the timeliness of exits for 
children of other races, but not for black children.  Further, it might provide the rationale 
                                                 
120 While these programmes help explain the change in DTE by race in Illinois, they also raise a “red flag” for 
the interpretation of my findings.  Specifically, they signal that the assumption of parallel trends may have 
been violated (see also section 4.7), potentially confounding the interpretation of results.  I return to discuss 
the implications of this in chapter 10.  
121 Cook County not only had the lowest rates of timely permanency outcomes in the state but also was home 
to the overwhelming majority of African American children entering care in Illinois.   
 169 
 
for the more pronounced increase in somewhat timely exits to adoption and guardianship 
recorded in North Carolina by children who were of other racial backgrounds compared to 
African American children (see sections 7.4 and 9.3).  
 
Changes in the composition of children entering care 
My analysis confirms that both Illinois and North Carolina experienced a significant 
decline in the proportion of African American children entering care and that this reduction 
was more pronounced than would have been expected based on the trend for the two 
control states.  As a result of the marked decline in the proportion of African American 
children entering care, both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a significantly higher 
proportion of timely exits compared to the two counterfactual scenarios—in the first of 
these scenarios racial DAE was held constant at the level of the pre-PBC period, while in 
the second, DAE by race was allowed to vary following the trend of the two control states.   
The decline in DAE by race is also consistent with the broader trend towards 
reducing racial disproportionality of African American children in the child welfare and 
protection system.  For example, both Illinois and North Carolina implemented 
programmes aimed at reducing the over-representation of African American children 
entering care.  Further, Illinois launched an initiative to reduce caseloads by discouraging 
the so-called “side-door placement” of children perceived to be at low risk,
122
 many of 
whom were black, while North Carolina initiated a programme focused on preventive 
measures to keep low-risk children from entering the out-of-home care system 
(Department of Children and Family Services, State of Illinois 2003; North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Social Services 2007). 
For the placement settings the findings are less consistent.  There appears to have 
been a shift towards placing more children with relatives.  This trend is consistent with the 
preference accorded in the statutes of Illinois and North Carolina for placement with kin 
(see also chapter 5).  Strikingly, while both Illinois and North Carolina witnessed an 
increase in the proportion of children placed in kinship care, this increase was less than 
might have been expected based on the trend for the two states that did not employ PBC.  
The smaller increase contributed positively to the overall timeliness of exits in Illinois, but 
had a negative impact on the timeliness of exits in North Carolina, where, following the 
                                                 
122 Side-door placements refer to requests for service by parent or other caregiver who has not been 
investigated for abuse or neglect. 
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introduction of PBC, children placed with relatives spent on average less time in care than 
children placed in other settings.  The fact that the share of children placed with kin 
increased more rapidly in non-PBC states compared to the treatment states, while not 
conclusive in-of-itself, is also consistent with my fifth research hypothesis, according to 
which PBC states would be expected to experience a more rapid decline in the proportion 
of children placed in kinship care compared to the controls. 
While these findings suggest that the use of PBC may have been associated with a 
number of important changes in the composition of children entering care in both Illinois 
and North Carolina, a number of other policy and practice considerations besides PBC may 
have contributed to shaping this outcome.   Both states, for example, in spite of a growing 
emphasis on reducing the number of children in non-family settings in favour of less 
restrictive ones, including placements with relatives, have continued to face a number of 
barriers (see also section 5.5).  One such barrier is the requirement that relatives pass a 
mandatory criminal background check in order to become licensed caregivers.  Another 
barrier is in recruiting and retaining relatives interested “in becoming licensed to care for 
kin, as it is seen as burdensome and not necessary” (North Carolina Department of Health 
and Human Services, Division of Social Services 2007 p. 45).   
 
Evidence of gaming behaviours, including “cherry picking” 
As seen in chapter 1, “cherry picking” occurs when the so-called “marginal” cases exit care 
more rapidly as a result of additional services provided to children and their families, while 
“parking” takes place when groups known to be less likely to achieve certain performance 
benchmarks are deliberately diverted out of the out-of-home care system.  Unfortunately, 
owing to data limitations, I was unable to test these hypotheses directly.  For instance, it is 
difficult to determine whether “cherry picking” took place without direct evidence about 
the provision of additional services to different groups of children (McBeath 2006; 
McBeath and Meezan 2008, 2010).   
I decided, therefore, to consider a number of indirect measures.  I started by 
examining whether the composition of children still in care after twenty-four months of 
entry by race and placement setting had changed since the implementation of PBC.  I then 
compared this rate with the corresponding one for the so-called “marginal” cases.  My 
findings suggest that in Illinois (for race and placement setting) and in North Carolina (for 
placement setting), the share of so-called “underperforming” children still in care twenty-
four months after entry was significantly less than the counterfactual based on “marginal” 
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cases; the opposite of what might have been expected if gaming had been taking place.  An 
exception was for race in North Carolina where the proportion of African American 
children still in care after twenty-four months of entry was significantly higher than the 
counterfactual based on children of other race, suggesting that “cherry picking” may have 
occurred. 
Next, I focused on the RDE, concluding that disproportionality by race decreased 
rapidly in both Illinois and North Carolina.  However, since the non-PBC states also 
witnessed a marked decline in RDE, it is likely that the reduction in the two treatment 
states may have been associated with a broader trend to reduce the over-representation of 
African American children entering care, rather than a deliberate attempt to game the 
system.  This point, which is consistent with earlier studies (Shaw 2010; Vericker, et al. 
2007; Wulczyn, et al. 2006b, 2007), is further supported by the fact that the difference in 
RDE between states that employed PBC and the counterfactual based on the control states 
is quite small. 
I then examined the relationship between the race of children indicated or 
substantiated for maltreatment in the overall child population compared to the race of 
children placed in care for maltreatment and concluded that it also did not support the 
hypothesis of “parking”.  Based on this comparison I found that, while in both PBC states 
racial disproportionality at entry for children indicated or substantiated for maltreatment 
declined, it remained significantly above the levels expected based on the trend for the 
control states.  This suggests, in my opinion, that in both Illinois and North Carolina 
African American children continued to be over-represented among children placed in care 
because of maltreatment; the opposite of what might have been expected if states were 
trying deliberately to game the system by “deterring” certain groups of children from 
entering care. 
Lastly, I examined changes in the number of children entering care in various 
counties in Illinois and North Carolina.  This comparison suggests that disparity among 
counties changed less than expected, with the proportion of African American children 
entering care increasing in counties with larger shares of black children, and declining in 
counties with smaller overall shares of such children.  While this finding indicates that 
some type of gaming may have occurred in the counties with lower proportions of African 
American children, it is not in-of-itself conclusive.  Further, it points to the fact that 
strategies to share risks among child welfare agencies in states that employ PBC—i.e., to 
assign children randomly to ensure that agencies have comparable caseloads—appear not 
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to have been very effective, even though these results may be confounded by the lack of 
detailed information for lower levels of administrative disaggregation. 
While I cannot exclude the existence of “parking” based on the evidence presented 
above, this type of practice does not appear to fit into the broader “narrative” of what 
occurred, especially in Illinois.  Specifically rapid declines in caseloads in Illinois may 
have increased competition among child welfare agencies to accept all available cases 
(Avrushin 2013).  Berlin (2007 p. 8) in discussing changes in permanency outcomes in 
Illinois noted that: 
“(f)rom the state’s point of view, it is desirable to create a system that pits providers 
against one another. It is a primary tenet of capitalism that competition lowers cost and 
improves quality.  But beyond that, the reduced number of children in the foster care 
system meant that the state could no longer promise each provider the same number of 
children for whom services were originally contracted.  Some agencies felt they were 
treated unfairly when they found that even though they met all the required 
permanency goals in their contracts, they still lost funding or lost contracts in 
subsequent years”. 
 
While reducing unnecessary placements can be, in-of-itself, a worthy policy 
objective,
123
 there is some circumstantial evidence that pressure not to accept new 
caseloads, may have contributed to making the out-of-home care population more difficult 
to serve.  According to the report by the Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services (2003 pp. 151-152), for instance: 
“stakeholders interviewed during the statewide assessment indicated that in recent 
years it has been significantly more difficult getting a case of suspected 
abuse/neglect accepted by the SCR,124 even those reported by mandated reporters. As 
fewer cases are accepted by the SCR for investigation, the results are that the types 
of cases served are very high risk, the families have more complicated problems, and 
permanencies for children brought into care are more difficult to achieve in a timely 
manner”. 
                                                 
123 In addition, states may have a vested interest to reduce intakes since, according to Taylor and Shaver 
(2010 p. 312) “performance contractors would cost the public sector more (as would be the case under the 
per diem case)” if the number of children entering care increased.   
124
 The State Central Register (SCR) is a database containing a record for all substantiated cases of 
maltreatment in Illinois.  
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This assessment may also explain the reason why, in spite of declining caseloads, the 
timeliness of exits has not improved as much in Illinois as might have been expected based 
on the trend for the control states (see chapter 7).  Theoretically, ensuring smaller caseloads 
is one of the ways for agencies to provide more high-quality services to children and 
families.  However, if the overall “pool” of children who enter care becomes more difficult 
to serve, agencies may no longer have the adequate resources or expertise to address the 
higher needs of such clients (Berlin 2007 p. 4) (see also section 3.4)  
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9 The use of PBC and its relationship to permanency outcome for 
children exiting out-of-home care 
 
9.1 PBC and its potential unintended consequences on permanency outcomes: 
overview of the chapter  
One of the strongest critiques put forward against the use of PBC in child welfare is that it 
may have a distortionary effect on permanency outcomes.  In particular, a small body of 
literature has raised concern that the use of such programme management tools may be 
associated with a lower likelihood of reunification with parents or other primary caregivers 
for children in-out-of-home care (McBeath and Meezan 2006, 2008, 2010).  As indicated 
in chapter 2, one of the limitations of this literature is that it has primarily focused on one 
state—Michigan—and therefore the findings are difficult to generalise to other contexts.   
In this chapter, I seek to garner additional evidence on the possible distortionary 
relationship between PBC and permanency outcomes.  To do so, I first focus on differences 
in permanency outcomes between Illinois, North Carolina and the two non-PBC states.  
Then, I consider how such outcomes relate to changes in various theoretically relevant 
covariates, namely the age, race and placement setting of children in care.  I also briefly 
describe how permanency goals have changed in states that employ PBC compared to the 
two control states and consider how permanency outcomes relate to these permanency 
goals.  Lastly, I use multivariate analysis to explore whether the proportion of children 
exiting through various permanency outcomes changed following the introduction of PBC 
and whether, based on this analysis, the two treatment states experienced different trends in 
permanency outcomes compared to the set of control states.   
It is important to underscore that this analysis focuses only on permanency outcomes 
within thirty-six months of entry.  This choice stems from the fact that my multi-annual 
entry cohorts only follow children up to three years since their entry into care.  For children 
who exited after this time, I do not have information of how they exited, meaning that they 
are right censored.  Because of this I chose to “drop” all children who were still in care 
after thirty-six month of entry from this analysis, meaning that the number of cases is 
smaller in this chapter than in chapters 5 through 8.  Further, because I decided to focus 
only on children whose permanency outcome was known, the characteristics of such 
children are likely to be different from those of the broader population of children entering 
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care examined in the previous chapters.  I return to discuss the implications of some of 
these decisions in the conclusions of this chapter as well as in chapter 10. 
 
9.2 Did reunifications decline as a proportion of all permanency outcomes 
compared to the non-PBC states? 
In chapter 5, I ascertained that the composition of children exiting care through various 
outcomes had changed over time.  Specifically, both Illinois and North Carolina 
experienced a decline in the proportion of children exiting to reunification within thirty-six 
months of entry.  In addition, both states recorded an increase in the share of children 
exiting through guardianship, while North Carolina, but not Illinois, witnessed an increase 
in the proportion of adoptions.  How do these trends compare to those of the non-PBC 
states? 
 
Figure 9.1. Exits from care by type of permanency outcome for Illinois and North 
Carolina: DID-only model 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Reunification                                     Guardianship 
Adoption                                             Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states) 
Note: See note to Table 5.1.  The reported values refer to modelled proportions.  See also Table A.9.1 
and Table A.9.2. 
 
Using a DID estimator,125 I find that Illinois followed nearly the same trend as the 
control states in terms of the proportion of children who exited care to adoption or 
reunification during the first period following the implementation of PBC (Figure 9.1).  
                                                 
125 In section 9.5, I refer to these as the DID-only models.  The dependent variables for these models are 
whether or not the child exited care to adoption, reunification or guardianship. 
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Between the periods 1999-2004 and 2005-2009, however, the proportion of children who 
exited care to adoption in Illinois declined significantly compared to the counterfactual, 
while the proportion of reunifications increased. 
For North Carolina, the proportion of reunifications and, to a lesser extent, adoptions 
was significantly lower than might have been expected based on the trend for the two 
control states.  Particularly noteworthy is the decline in the proportion of reunifications that 
took place following the introduction of PBC: 5 percentage points lower than the 
counterfactual.  Strikingly, this decline appears to have been “counterbalanced” by a 
significant increase in the proportion of children who exited care to guardianship.   
 
9.3 Changes in permanency outcomes for various groups of children 
The above findings suggest that the introduction of PBC may have been accompanied by 
reductions in the share of reunifications for North Carolina, as well as a small decline in 
share of adoptions for both Illinois and North Carolina.  Were these trends more 
pronounced for specific groups of children?  In order to answer this question, I focus on 
permanency outcomes for selected characteristics, including the age, race and placement 
setting of children in care (see also section 4.6).  Exploring this relationship is important 
since the literature has shown that some groups of children have a greater likelihood of 
exiting care through certain permanency outcomes compared to others (Akin 2011; 
Chipman, et al. 2002; Connell, et al. 2006; Potter and Klein-Rothschild 2002; Shaw 2010; 
Weil 1999).  
 
Reunification 
I find that Illinois recorded significantly higher proportions of reunifications for African 
American children compared to the counterfactual based on the two control states, while 
for non-African American children the trend in the proportion of reunifications closely 
mirrored that of the counterfactual (Figure 9.2).  In contrast, in North Carolina the 
proportion of reunifications for both back children and children of other racial backgrounds 
was significantly lower than would have been expected based on the counterfactual in the 
period following the implementation of PBC (1999-2004).  By the period 2005-2009, 
however, the trend was partially reversed, with North Carolina recording more exits to 
reunification among African American children that would have been expected.  For non-
black children, the gap with the counterfactual persisted, with the state experiencing nearly 
15 per cent fewer reunifications than expected.   
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Figure 9.2. The DID estimator for reunifications for Illinois and North Carolina by 
race, age and placement setting 
African American children Children of other racial backgrounds  
 
Infant Over one year of age  
  
Kinship care Other placement settings  
  
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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Focusing on the age of children, the proportion of infants who achieved permanency 
to reunification in Illinois was higher in the period 2005-2009 than prior to the 
implementations of PBC.  Further, the share was 11 percentage points higher than expected 
based on the trend for the two control states.  For North Carolina, on the other hand, while 
there was a slight increase in the share of infants who were reunified during the period 
2005-2009 compared to the period 1999-2004, this proportion remained approximately 15 
percentage points lower than the counterfactual, signaling a possible distortionary 
relationship between PBC and reunification.  For children over one year of age, the 
proportion of children who were reunified with their families declined in both Illinois and 
North Carolina.  However, while in Illinois this trend largely paralleled that of the 
counterfactual, for North Carolina it was significantly lower. 
In both North Carolina and Illinois, children placed in kinship care experienced a 
decline in the proportion of children exiting to reunification.  This is important given that 
children placed with kin were already significantly less likely to reunify with their families 
compared to children in other settings prior to the implementation of PBC.  Compared to 
the counterfactual, children placed with kin in both states performed considerably worse 
than expected in terms of the proportion reunified: 10 percentage points less in Illinois and 
nearly 29 percentage points less in North Carolina.  For children placed in other settings, 
Illinois fared slightly better than what would have been expected based on the trend for the 
non-PBC states, while the trend for North Carolina closely paralleled that of the 
counterfactual.   
 
Adoption 
The proportion of children exiting care through adoption followed very different trends for 
children of different racial backgrounds.  For African American children, the proportion of 
children exiting care to adoption within thirty-six months of entry declined significantly 
between the period 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 in both Illinois and North Carolina.  Further, 
both treatment states recorded a significantly lower proportion of black children exiting 
through adoption than would have been expected based on the trend for states that did not 
employ PBC.  In contrast, the proportion of children of other racial backgrounds who 
exited care to adoption rose and both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a higher 
proportion of children of other racial backgrounds exiting to adoption compared to the 
counterfactual ( see Figure 9.3).  The fact that states that employed PBC witnessed an 
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increase in the disparity of exits to adoption is noteworthy, since relatively little attention 
has been paid to whether PBC is negatively associated with adoption for some groups of 
children.   
 
Figure 9.3. The DID estimator for adoptions for Illinois and North Carolina by race, 
age and placement setting 
African American children Children of other racial backgrounds  
 
Infant Over one year of age  
 
Kinship care Other placement settings  
 
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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Focusing of the age of children, I find that both Illinois and North Carolina recorded 
a pronounced increased in the proportion of infants exiting care to adoption in the period 
immediately following the implementation of PBC.  However, while for North Carolina 
this trend continued during the period 2005-2009, in Illinois much of that gain was eroded.  
Furthermore, while for North Carolina the proportion of children aged one year or less 
exiting to adoption was significantly higher than expected based on the trend for the two 
control states, for Illinois the trend was approximately 10 percentage points below the 
counterfactual.  
In terms of placement settings, the analysis suggest that, while fewer children placed 
with kin exited care to reunification following the implementation of PBC, the proportion 
of children placed with relatives who achieved permanency through adoption increased 
significantly in both Illinois and North Carolina, although for Illinois this gain was only for 
the period 1999-2004.  By the period 2005-2009, the proportion of children placed with kin 
who exited care to adoption in North Carolina was over 11 percentage points higher—or 80 
per cent more—than expected based on the counterfactual.  In Illinois, on the other hand, 
the proportion of children in kinship care who exited care to adoption shifted from being 
significantly above the counterfactual—around 10 percentage points—in the period 1999-
2004, to being 5 percentage points below by the period 2005-2009, 38 per cent less than 
expected based on the trend for the states that did not employ PBC. 
 
Guardianship 
Patterns in the proportion of children exiting to guardianship were remarkably consistent 
for children with different characteristics.  In North Carolina, for instance, the proportion 
of children exiting care to guardianship increased significantly during the period 1996-
1998 and 1999-2004 regardless of the child’s race.  By the period 2005-2009, the 
proportion of both African American children and children of other racial backgrounds 
exiting to guardianship declined significantly in North Carolina, however, remaining 
slightly above the level of the counterfactual (Figure 9.4).  Illinois also recorded a 
significant increase in the proportion of both black children and children of other racial 
backgrounds exiting care to guardianship during the period considered.  However, this 
increase was less pronounced.  Further, the proportion of children exiting to guardianship 
remained below the counterfactual, regardless of the race of the child.   
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Figure 9.4. The DID estimator for guardianship for Illinois and North Carolina by 
race, age and placement setting 
African American children Children of other racial backgrounds  
 
Infant Over one year of age  
  
Kinship care Other placement settings  
  
Illinois 
Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states)  
North Carolina 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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the counterfactual for both infants and children aged over one year, and North Carolina 
performing significantly better for both groups of children. 
While there are similarities in exits to guardianship controlling for children’s race or 
age, I find some clear differences for placement settings.  North Carolina recorded a 
significant increase in the proportion of children placed with kin exiting care to 
guardianship in the period following the implementation of PBC—over 28 percentage 
points, equal to a 52 per cent increase.  During the period 2005-2009, however, some of 
this gain was lost.  Illinois witnessed an almost opposite trend, with the share of children 
placed with kin exiting to guardianship first declining slightly and then increasing by 
nearly 8 percentage points during the period 2005-2009.  In both states, the proportion of 
children placed in kinship care who exited to guardianship was significantly higher than 
the counterfactual: 11 percentage points more for Illinois and 16 percentage points more 
for North Carolina by the period 2005-2009.  For children placed in other settings, on the 
other hand, the proportion of children exiting to guardianship changed little over the period 
1996-2009.  Further, in Illinois it was significantly lower than expected based on the trend 
for non-PBC states, while for North Carolina the trend paralleled that of the two control 
states. 
 
9.4 Changes in permanency goals and in the proportion of children who achieved 
those goals 
Examining how the proportion of permanency outcomes changed over time provides only 
limited understanding of the possible distortionary effect of PBC.  Specifically, since child 
welfare agencies are required to make a permanency plan for every child in care, 
considering how permanency goals for children may have changed over time, as well as 
how many children achieved their permanency goal may offer better insight into the 
possibly distortionary impact of PBC on permanency outcomes.  To do so, I first 
considered how permanency goals for children who exited care within thirty-six months of 
entry had changed over time in the three groups of states, focusing in particular on the 
permanency goals of reunification, adoption and guardianship.  I then examined the 
proportion of children who had “achieved” their stated permanency goal.  Lastly, I focused 
on how permanency goals had changed among children still in care thirty-six months after 
entry. 
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Permanency goals for children who exited care within thirty-six months of entry 
Among children who exited care within thirty-six months of entry, I find that the 
proportion of children with reunification as their permanency goal increased significantly 
in North Carolina, while declining slightly in both Illinois and the states that did not 
implement PBC (Figure 9.5).  By the period 2005-2009, the percentage of children with 
reunification as their case plan in North Carolina was nearly 34 percentage points higher 
than expected based on the counterfactual; a finding which is consistent with the state’s 
most recent self-assessment (North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 
Division of Social Services 2007).  In contrast, in Illinois the share of children with 
reunification as their case plan in the period 2005-2009 was 6 percentage points lower than 
in the period prior to the introduction of PBC, as well as 4 percentage points lower than 
expected based on the counterfactual. 
 
Figure 9.5. The DID estimator for the proportion of children with the 
permanency goal of reunification, adoption and guardianship 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Reunification                                     Guardianship 
Adoption                                             Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states) 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
 
The proportion of children with adoption as their case goal increased significantly in 
Illinois, more than doubling between the periods 1996-1998 and 2005-2009, while it 
declined significantly in North Carolina, falling, during the same time span, to nearly one-
third of its initial value.  Compared to the counterfactual, the share of children with 
adoption as their permanency goal was significantly higher in Illinois, but significantly 
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Lastly, I find that the proportion of children with guardianship as their case goal 
among children exiting care within thirty-six months of entry declined significantly in both 
PBC states during the time period considered.  Further, in both Illinois and North Carolina 
the proportion of children with this case goal plan was significantly lower than the 
counterfactual based on the non-PBC states. 
 
Children who achieved their permanency goal within thirty-six months of entry 
Focusing on changes in the proportion of children who achieved various permanency goals 
over time, I find that for Illinois the proportion of children who achieved their case goal of 
reunification within thirty-six months of entry increased in the first period following the 
implementation of PBC, rising by almost 15 percentage points compared to the period 
1996-1998.  Even though this proportion declined in the subsequent period, it remained 
significantly higher than what would have been expected based on the DID assumption of 
parallel trends (see Figure 9.6).  In contrast, in North Carolina the proportion of children 
who achieved the goal of reunification declined compared to the period prior to the 
implementation of this policy management tool, even though it was slightly higher than the 
counterfactual.  
In relation to adoption, the proportion of children who achieved this case goal within 
thirty-six months of placement increased significantly in both PBC states.  The increase 
was particularly significant for North Carolina, where the proportion of children who 
achieved the permanency goal of adoption more than doubled by the period 2005-2009 
compared to the pre-PBC period.  Further, in both sates the percentage of children who 
exited to the goal of adoption was significantly higher than the trend based on the 
counterfactual.   
For guardianship, both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a significant increase in 
the share of children who achieved this permanency goal within thirty-six months of 
placement.  Further, this increase was significantly higher than what would have been 
expected based on the trend for the two states that did not employ PBC.  
While these trends suggest that the proportion of children achieving their 
permanency goal increased in both Illinois and North Carolina, caution needs to be 
exercised in interpreting these results, particularly for Illinois, given that the share of 
children for whom a case plan had not yet been established increased significantly during 
the time period considered. 
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Figure 9.6. The DID estimator for the proportion of children who achieved 
their permanency goal of reunification, adoption and guardianship 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
  
  
Reunification                                     Guardianship 
Adoption                                             Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states) 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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Permanency goals for children still in care thirty-six months after entry 
Focusing on the case plan of children still in care after thirty-six moths of entry provides 
additional insight into whether the findings presented above are confounded by the 
timeframe chosen for assessing trends in permanency outcomes.  Specifically, given that 
my data are right censored, it is important to ascertain whether, following the 
implementation of PBC, there were significant changes in permanency goals for children 
still in care after thirty-six months.  If gaming occurred, one might expect to find a 
significantly larger share of children with the case plan goal of adoption or guardianship 
post-PBC compared to the period preceding the introduction of this programme 
management tool.  Instead, I find that the proportion of children with guardianship as their 
permanency goal among children still in care after thirty-six months declined in both 
Illinois and North Carolina.  Further, in both states this share was significantly lower than 
the counterfactual based on the non-PBC states.  For adoption, the findings are less 
consistent.  The proportion of children with adoption as their case plan increased in Illinois 
and was significantly larger than the counterfactual.  In contrast, in North Carolina the 
proportion of children with adoption as their permanency goal declined during the period 
considered and was significantly lower than the counterfactual based on the control states.  
 
Figure 9.7. The DID estimator for the proportion of children with the 
permanency goal of reunification, adoption and guardianship among those 
still in care thirty-six months after entry 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Reunification                                     Guardianship 
Adoption                                             Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states) 
Note: The reported values refer to actual proportions.   
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9.5 Permanency outcomes controlling for various confounding factors: multivariate 
models 
The above sections suggest that the use of PBC may be associated with distortionary 
effects on reunification for certain groups of children such as African American children or 
children placed in kinship care.  There is also some evidence that permanency goals may 
have shifted in the states that employ PBC, particularly with reference to reunification and 
adoption.  In order to control for these factors simultaneously, I created a series of 
multivariate statistical models, using logistic regression.126  The dependent variable for 
these models measures whether or not the child exited care to a specific permanency 
outcome, namely: adoption, reunification and guardianship.   
I then included the main covariates discussed in this chapter, including the child’s 
age, race and placement setting as well as whether they had a case goal of adoption or 
reunification.  As in chapters 6 and 7, I performed standard diagnostics and goodness of fit 
tests, including checking for outliers and multicollinearity among the covariates included in 
the models.  Because of issues of collinearity with the DID estimator, I ultimately decided 
not to include time-varying covariates in the models.  The models are summarised in Table 
9.1.  
 
Table 9.1. Schematic representation of the multivariate models 
Covariates Dependent variable Statistical 
method 
DID-only Reunification (model 1) 
Adoption (model 2) 
Guardianship (model 3) 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
DID and time-invariant Reunification (model 4) 
Adoption (model 5) 
Guardianship (model 6) 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Logistic regression 
Note: See Table A.9.1- Table A.9.4 in annex. 
 
The results indicate that there are few differences in the proportion of children who 
exited care to various permanency outcomes between the time-invariant models and the 
                                                 
126 I did not employ multinomial logistic regression or ordinal logistic regression because my models violated 
respectively, the IIA assumption and the parallel regression assumption.  While I do not display the results of 
these models, the predicted probabilities for the DID estimators are consistent with those of the models 
employing logistic regression. 
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models which only contained the DID estimator (see section 9.2).  As in the DID-only 
models, the percentage of children exiting to reunification in Illinois in the model with 
covariates changed little over the time period considered and was slightly higher than the 
counterfactual based on the trend of the two control states (Figure 9.8).  Likewise, the share 
of children who exited care to adoption declined—and significantly more than the 
counterfactual—while the proportion of children who exited to guardianship moderately 
increased—though the trend was not significantly different from that of the counterfactual.  
For North Carolina, the main difference relates to the gap in the proportion of children 
exiting care to reunification and the counterfactual, which in the model with time-invariant 
covariates is even greater that in the DID-only model.   
 
Figure 9.8. Exits from care by type of permanency outcome for Illinois and 
North Carolina: model with time-invariant covariates 
Illinois North Carolina 
  
Reunification                                     Guardianship 
Adoption                                             Counterfactual (based on non-PBC states) 
Note: The reported values refer to modelled proportions.  See also Table A.9.3 and Table A.9.4. 
 
9.6 Summary of the main findings and discussion 
This chapter, which focused on permanency outcomes within thirty-six months of entry, 
identified a number of interesting findings.  Below I briefly summarise and discuss some of 
the most important of them, focusing in particular on reunification, adoption and 
guardianship. 
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Reunification 
My analysis confirms that, while reunification remained the most common permanency 
outcome in both Illinois and North Carolina, the share of children exiting to reunification 
declined in both states during the period 1996-2009.  The decline was particularly 
noteworthy for North Carolina, where the proportion of children exiting to reunification 
fell by 13 percentage points over this period.  Controlling for various time-invariant 
covariates, North Carolina appears to have recorded an even more significant decline in the 
proportion of children exiting to reunification both in absolute terms and compared to the 
counterfactual based on the non-PBC states.  This result is consistent with the findings by 
McBeath and Meezan (2006, 2008, 2010), according to which the use of PBC may be 
accompanied by negative distortionary effects on reunification. 
My analysis also suggests that, while in North Carolina nearly all groups, regardless 
of their age, race or placement setting, witnessed a decline in the proportion exiting to 
reunification within thirty-six months of entry, Illinois experienced a somewhat different 
trend.  Specifically, for some groups of children, including African American children and 
infants, there appears to have been a significant increase in the proportion of children 
exiting care to reunification. 
Given that both states implemented PBC, why did the two states experience 
somewhat different trends? Further, why did certain groups of children in Illinois record an 
increase in the proportion of reunifications within thirty-six months of entry?  There are a 
number of possible explanations.  First, Illinois modified its managed contract system to 
include “performance measures related to timely and frequent engagement of families with 
reunification goals in case planning and decision making” (Department of Children and 
Family Services, State of Illinois 2009 p 81).  Second, the state significantly increased 
financial reimbursement to private sector providers for services to support reunifications.  
Third, Illinois introduced a number of initiatives in response to the PIP; many targeted 
explicitly at Cook County where the majority of African American children entering care 
in the state originate from (see also section 8.4).  These initiatives, many of which were 
introduced after 2006, may partially account for the increase in the proportion of 
children—particularly black children—exiting to reunification that took place during the 
period 2005-2009. 
While my findings suggest that the use of PBC may have been negatively associated 
with reunification in North Carolina, it is important to note that a number of other policy or 
contextual variables, besides PBC, may have contributed to this outcome.  The lack of 
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communication with clients, for instance, may be an important factor.  Responses from a 
survey with legal and judicial stakeholder in North Carolina suggest that, while the 
majority of those interviewed were satisfied with efforts by the state to promote 
reunification, there was nonetheless a concern that:  
“(m)any families don’t really understand what their responsibilities are.  Sometimes 
the social workers assume the families understand when they don’t.  Guidelines for 
reunification could be clearer” (North Carolina Department of Health and Human 
Services, Division of Social Services 2007 p. 47). 
 
Focusing on the proportion of children who achieved the case goal of reunification 
within thirty-six months of entry, I find that both Illinois and North Carolina recorded a 
higher share compared to the counterfactual based on the non-PBC states.127  This suggests 
that, while the proportion of reunifications may have declined overall in North Carolina, 
the share of children who achieved their stated case plan among those who had 
reunification as their permanency goal was not significantly lower than expected based on 
the assumption of parallel trends.  Further, since an increasing share of children in North 
Carolina had reunification as their permanency goal—both among children who exited care 
within thirty-six months of entry and among children still in care after that threshold—it is 
possible that part of the decline in the overall share of reunifications that took place in 
North Carolina between 1996 and 2009 is be due to an effort to better align permanency 
case goals with the needs of children in care and their families, rather than a deliberate 
attempt to game the system by shifting to permanency outcomes other than reunification.  
 
                                                 
127 This finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have identified a negative association between PBC 
and reunification (McBeath and Meezan 2006, 2008, 2010) and needs to be interpreted with caution, 
especially in the case of Illinois.  During the period considered, the share of children with no established case 
plan goal increased significantly in Illinois.  It is possible therefore, that the higher proportion of children 
achieving the permanency goal of reunification in Illinois is a result of a type of “gaming” behaviour.  
Specifically, reunification may have been assigned as a case plan only to children more likely to meet their 
goal, while children who were less likely to achieve their case plan were “left” without a clear case goal.  
This argument does not apply to North Carolina, where the share of children with no clear case goal declined 
significantly over the time period considered.  
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Adoption 
My analysis suggests that in both Illinois and North Carolina, the proportion of children 
exiting care to adoption was lower than expected based on the trend for the counterfactual.  
The overall share of children exiting to adoption did not increase significantly during the 
period considered, although it did rise in the first period following the introduction of PBC 
in Illinois and during the second period in North Carolina.  Further, compared to the trend 
for non-PBC states, neither Illinois nor North Carolina recorded significantly higher shares 
of children exiting to adoption, implying that the use of PBC was not associated with 
improved adoption outcomes compared to the two states that did not employ this 
performance management tool.  These findings appear to be at odds with the concern that 
the use of quantitative targets to promote permanency might lead to an overreliance on 
adoptions (Department of Children and Family Services, State of Illinois 2003; Mitchell, et 
al. 2005). 
My analysis also suggests that different groups of children may have experienced 
different trends with regard to adoption.  The share of African American children who 
exited to adoption, for instance, declined significantly in Illinois.  Further, both Illinois and 
North Carolina recorded significantly lower proportions of adoptions of black children than 
what would have been expected based on the trend for the counterfactual.  In contrast, the 
proportion of children of other races exiting to adoption increased in both states and was 
greater than expected based on the trend for the two states that did not employ PBC.  I 
identified a somewhat similar finding for placement settings, with the proportion of 
children in kinship care exiting to adoption increasing, and those in other placement 
settings declining.  The overall finding that neither Illinois nor North Carolina experienced 
an increase in the share of children exiting to adoption compared to the counterfactual is 
somewhat unexpected given the considerable resources dedicated by the two states to 
promoting adoption, as well as the fact that North Carolina uses PBC primarily for this 
purpose.  It also stands in contrast with much of the literature, which has emphasised the 
positive relationship between the use of PBC and adoption (Berlin 2007; Blackstone, et al. 
2004; Vargo et al. 2006; Zinn 2009).   
There are a number of possible explanations for these findings.  First, in this analysis 
I only focused on permanency outcomes within thirty-six months of entry.  Yet previous 
research shows that most adoptions do not take place in the first years following placement 
(Akin 2011; Connell, et al. 2006; Wulczyn 2004).  By choosing a relatively short 
timeframe, my analysis may be underrepresenting the number of adoptions which actually 
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took place in the two states.
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  This alternative explanation, however, is not supported by 
the finding that—at least for North Carolina—the share of children with adoption as their 
permanency goal declined among children still in care thirty-six months after entry.  
Second, much of the literature that has emphasised the positive relationship between 
adoptions and PBC has focused on the stocks of adoptions, i.e., the number of adoptions 
taking place in a certain year, regardless of when the child entered care.  State-wide 
assessments in both Illinois and North Carolina suggests that much of the increase in 
adoptions which occurred in those two states following the introduction of PBC resulted 
from efforts to expedite the adoption of children who were already in care; what is 
sometimes referred to as the “backlog” of adoption cases.  Since my analysis focuses on 
entry cohorts, this effect might be less visible. 
Third, because of the success in promoting adoptions of children already in the out-
of-home care system, “the number of homes available for future adoptions may have 
declined” (Department of Children and Family Services, State of Illinois 2003 p. 148).  
While both Illinois and North Carolina have stepped-up their efforts to recruit potential 
adoptive parents through public service announcements and programmes such as the 
Corporate Partnership for Recruitment of Adoptive Families, the Casey Family program, 
the One Church One Child programme, the PALS book and NC KIDS, recruitment of 
adoptive parents remains a challenge in both states. 
Fourth, if, as a result of efforts to divert lower risk children out of the formal care 
system, the overall population of children entering care became more difficult to serve (see 
also chapter 8), agencies may have found it more challenging to find adoptive families for 
such children, owing to their increased medical, behavioral and other needs.  Further, since 
caregivers receive larger compensation—i.e., higher than standard out-of-home care 
rates—for caring for children with more intensive needs, caregivers of such children would 
also have a disincentive to adopt, since doing so might mean losing the additional funding 
(Berlin 2007; Berrick 1997; Geen 2000). 
While it is troubling that fewer African American children exited to adoption 
compared to children of other racial backgrounds, there may be a number of factors which 
put this finding in a different light.  One such factor could be that “(m)any relatives 
                                                 
128 In the U.S., the median length of stay in care from the date of latest removal from home to the date of 
discharge to adoption was 29.4 months (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for 
Children and Families, Children's Bureau 2012d). 
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indicate a desire to assume long-term responsibility for the children in their care, but are 
uncomfortable with the legal processes involved in adoption” (Department of Children and 
Family Services, State of Illinois 2009 p. 74).  The literature suggests that African 
American children are more likely to be placed with kin compared to children of other 
races; a difference, which in turn, might explain the lower proportion of adoptions for 
black children (Barth 1997, 2005; Berrick, et al. 1994; Grogan-Kaylor 2000).  Another 
explanation could be that the “pool” of African American families available for adoption is 
smaller.  Evidence from North Carolina suggests that this may be the case.  Over the past 
years, the state has taken steps to address the shortage of black adoptive families through a 
targeted recruitment campaign aimed at attracting African American adoptive families.  
Identifying adoptive parents of the same racial background as the child is important since 
there is still a preference for same-with-same adoptions in the United States, in spite of the 
1994 Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) which described this practice as discriminatory 
(see also chapter 3).129  
While my analysis does not support the finding that PBC may have had a 
distortionary impact on reunification by shifting resources and priorities to services for 
adoption, there is a legitimate concern, owing to the rising numbers of adoptions and 
placements with guardians, about the increasing burden of what Barth (2009 p. 64) refers 
to as “post-permanency” services.  Specifically, the amount of resources dedicated to 
promoting adoption has greatly increased compared to the federal budget dedicated to 
placements in out-of-home care (DeVooght, et al. 2008).  The reasons for this shift are 
complex and go beyond the scope of this study.  However, one of the main motivations 
appears to have been financial interest (Anyon 2011), since by discharging children from 
the formal care system states are “able to save significant sums on the dependency-related 
and public child welfare oversight costs” (Berlin 2007 p. 9).  A second motivation might 
stem from a deep-seated ideological opposition in the United States for providing financial 
support to birth families and particularly minorities; what Geen (2004 p. 141) has described 
as “societal and policy concerns regarding the responsibility family members have to each 
other”.  The belief that subsidising birth families is “antithetical to mainstream American 
values” (Iglehart 1994 p. 108) may also explain the preference for dedicating more 
financial resources to support post-permanency funding for children in “new” families, 
                                                 
129 The MEPA made it illegal to base considerations relating to the choice of placement setting or adoption on 
race or ethnicity (see also section 3.5). 
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rather than supporting programmes to rehabilitate birth families and promote reunification 
(Roberts 2002).  
While this strategy may be effective in promoting adoptions in the short run, serious 
concerns have emerged in both Illinois and North Carolina with regard to post-permanency 
services.  These concerns may partially explain the marked decline in the proportion of 
children in both states with adoption as their stated permanency goal.  The declining share 
of children with adoption as their case plan goal is otherwise counterintuitive, given what 
McBeath and Meezan (2009) have referred to as shift in the “hierarchy of permanency” 
away from reunification towards adoption and guardianship, resulting, at least in part, from 
the increased emphasis placed on achieving permanency in a timely manner in the United 
States. 
 
Guardianship 
The chapter indicates that both Illinois and North Carolina experienced a significant 
increase in the proportion of children exiting care to guardianship and that this change was 
shared across the various groups of children considered in the analysis.  The increase was 
particularly pronounced for North Carolina where the proportion of children exiting to 
guardianship was significantly higher than what would have been expected based on the 
trend for the counterfactual.  Inclusion of various time-invariant covariates did not 
significantly modify this relationship.  This finding is also consistent with that of McBeath 
and Meezan (2010 p. i121) who also concluded that children were being pushed “quickly 
towards any permanency option that [met] performance milestones”.   
While there is a positive association between the use of PBC and increased exits to 
guardianship in the two states considered it is likely, as indicated in previous chapters, that 
many other factors besides the use of PBC may have contributed to this outcome.  One 
such factor, already anticipated in chapter 5, is the title IV-E waiver demonstration 
programme, which allows states to use federal funding to extend subsidies to families for 
assuming guardianship of children who would have otherwise remained in out-of-home 
care.  Through this programme, guardians—who can be related or unrelated to the child as 
well as licensed or unlicensed130—receive higher levels of compensation than what they 
would have been entitled to through TANF.  In practice, this means that such states can 
                                                 
130 Both Illinois and North Carolina require unrelated guardians to be licensed caregivers. 
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remove the financial disincentive many related caregivers face when children exit from the 
formal out-of-home care system (see also section 3.5). 
Strikingly, assessments of these programmes differ somewhat from my results.  An 
evaluation conducted by the Children and Family Research Center and Westat, Inc., for 
instance, suggests that in Illinois the programme to subsidise guardianship was very 
successful, increasing “overall permanency by 6.4 percentage points over what it would 
have been without the demonstration” (Department of Children and Family Services, State 
of Illinois 2009 pp. 140-141).  In contrast, my analysis, based on multi-year prospective 
cohorts, indicates that, while the proportion of children existing to guardianship increased 
in the state, this trend was not significantly different from that of the counterfactual, 
suggesting that other factors related to the use of guardianship besides PBC may have 
intervened.  
Conversely, I identify a significant increase in exits to guardianship in North 
Carolina, among children exiting care within thirty-six months of entry.  Yet the state 
discontinued its demonstration waiver programme in 2008, citing a number of challenges, 
including in recruiting and retaining guardians.  In reality the programme may have been a 
victim of its own success since counties appear to have:  
“used significant portions of their capped allocations to pay the foster care 
maintenance expenses of non-IV-E eligible children in order to free up local funds for 
innovative child welfare programs; however, the use of flexible funds for foster care 
maintenance gradually eroded North Carolina’s cumulative child welfare savings to 
the point that it had to terminate its waiver demonstration before the cost neutrality 
limit was exceeded and the State started losing money” (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families 2011c p. 32). 
 
While it is not clear what the implications of this discontinuation will be, given that 
guardianship accounted for approximately one-fifth of all children who achieved 
permanency within three years of entry during the period 2005-2009, it is likely that this 
change will contribute to a significantly decline in the timeliness of exits from care in 
North Carolina. 
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10 Conclusions, limitations and implications for practice and further 
research 
 
10.1 An overview of what this study sought to accomplish 
Over the past twenty years, the use of PBC in child welfare services has become more 
widespread.  More than half of all states in the United States are using PBC in some part of 
their child welfare system.  Proponents of PBC often view it as a useful tool to “fix” what 
they perceive as an otherwise broken system.  Critics tend to view PBC as disruptive to 
organizational capacity and, worse, potentially detrimental to the needs of those very 
clients the child welfare system is seeking to benefit, namely children and their families.  
While the use of PBC remains controversial in child welfare, relatively little is known 
about how effective such programme management tools have been in achieving their stated 
objectives.  Furthermore, there is still a relatively limited evidence base on whether PBC is 
accompanied by various negative distortionary effects, particularly with regard to 
permanency outcomes 
In this study, I have focused on the use of PBC in relation to the objective of 
reducing the amount of time children spend in care before achieving permanency.  I chose 
to focus on timeliness because it is both a widely-shared policy objective in the United 
States and a relatively simple construct to measure compared to more complex concepts 
such as child wellbeing or safety.   In choosing to focus on timeliness, I was aware that 
there is no consensus on whether reducing the amount of time children spend in care 
should be pursued in the first place, given that shorter amounts of time in care may be 
associated with higher permanency disruptions as well as unwarranted infringements of 
parental rights to family privacy and intimacy (Archard 1993; McDonald, et al. 2006; 
Wulczyn 2004). 
To explore the relationship between PBC and timeliness of exits, I identified four 
states, two of which had implemented PBC—Illinois and North Carolina, and two of which 
had not—New Jersey and Washington.  Using multi-year entry cohorts created with the 
AFCARS dataset, I then compared trends in the timeliness of exits and various factors 
related to timeliness over the period 1996-2009.  I followed each cohort children for a 
maximum of three years from their time of entry into care.   
In chapter 1, I indicated that at the time of undertaking this study I had two main 
aims: first, to contribute to developing a more methodologically sound evaluation of 
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differences in the timeliness of exits from care for states that employ PBC compared to 
non-PBC states; and second, to add to the evidence base on the relationship between PBC, 
timeliness and permanency outcomes.  Having completed this study, my understanding of 
my contribution to existing knowledge has evolved.   
With regard to my first objective, I believe to have made a contribution to addressing 
some of the methodological limitations
131
of previous research by using a set of outcome 
measures that I consider to be more “valid”.  Specifically, I employed multi-year, multi-
state entry cohorts and examined a more complete spectrum of permanency outcomes.  
This represents a step forward compared to some of the previous research which, as seen in 
chapter 3, relied on exit cohorts or PIT estimates and focused on a limited set of 
permanency outcomes, notably reunification or adoption.  I also sought to address some of 
the limitations of previously employed research designs by: (1) focusing on differences in 
the timeliness of permanency outcomes both before and after the enactment of PBC; 
(2) seeking to minimise the confounding effect of secular trends by using a control group, 
selected on the basis of a series of replicable criteria; and (3) controlling for differences 
among states in some of the factors known in the literature to be associated with the 
timeliness of exits from care. 
Having completed this study, I have come to a better appreciation of the complexity 
of assessing the impact of a policy intervention such as PBC in the absence of a monitoring 
framework designed explicitly for that purpose.  While I have realised that the research 
design, dataset and methods employed in this study allow me to draw only limited 
inferences on the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes, I 
have acquired a better understanding of the main features that a monitoring framework 
designed to explore this type of relationship might require.  I return to discuss some of 
these aspects in sections 10.4 and 10.6 below. 
With regard to my second objective, I contend that this study makes a contribution to 
the existing knowledge-base on the relationship between PBC and timeliness by providing 
information on two states that implemented this programme management tool: Illinois and 
                                                 
131
 As indicated in chapter 1 and 3, many of the existing studies: (1) were based on PIT estimates or exit 
cohorts; (2) did not consider timeliness in relation to all permanency outcomes; (3) only focused on the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes in one locality or point in time; and (4) did not take into consideration 
various confounding factors known to be associated with the timeliness of permanency outcomes, including 
the age and race of children entering care or their placement setting.   
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North Carolina.  My findings indicate that, in these two states, PBC is positively associated 
with reductions in the average amount of time children spend in care, expressed in terms of 
various outcome measures.  This relationship is discernible both in absolute terms and 
compared to a counterfactual based on a set of control states.  With the dataset and 
methods employed, however, I am unable to determine whether these outcomes are the 
result of PBC alone or a combination of other factors, including secular trends, which I am 
not able to quantify or control for in my study as presently conceived.  I discuss the 
implications for future research in section 10.6 below.  
While my findings are insufficient to attribute a causal relationship between PBC and 
timeliness, they shed some light on some of the “mechanisms” through which changes in 
the timeliness of permanency outcomes are achieved.  Specifically, I find that once a series 
of theoretically relevant covariates and interactions are included in my models, the positive 
relationship between PBC and timeliness “disappears”, suggesting that the interpretation of 
my findings depends, in part, on the type of outcome measure employed.  The fact that the 
adjusted averages, which take into account changes in the composition of the out-of-home 
care population served as well as the type of placement settings employed, fail to identify a 
positive relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes, raises the 
question of whether incentives structures for PBC should be realigned based on a series of 
more complex measures than the “raw” state-level averages currently in use.  I return to 
discuss this aspect in section 10.4 below.  
In this chapter, I review my main findings related to the four research questions 
outlined in chapter 1.  I then provide an overview of the limitations of this study focusing 
on its research design, the choice of treatment and control groups, as well as the methods 
employed.  Lastly, I present some implications for practice and theory, as well as areas for 
further research. 
 
10.2 Summary of the main empirical findings 
In this study I sought to address four interrelated research questions.  Below I review my 
main empirical findings in relation to each of these questions, as well as some of the 
challenges that I encountered in the course of the analysis. 
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Do states that employ PBC record more timely exits from care compared to states that do 
not employ PBC?  
The underlying hypothesis for this question, which I addressed in chapter 6, is that, based 
on the theory of social exchange, agencies operating under a regime that links 
compensation to the achievement of timely permanency outcomes would have a greater 
incentive to reduce the average amount of time children spend in care compared to 
agencies compensated through more traditional approaches such as the number of clients 
served or services provided.   
Using the multi-year prospective cohorts created with the AFCARS dataset, I started 
by focusing on differences in the timeliness of permanency for PBC and non-PBC states.  
The initial comparison revealed that non-PBC states recorded more timely permanency 
outcomes, however, these findings were prejudiced by the fact that they did not control for 
initial differences in levels.  Using a DID estimator, indicated that between 1996 and 2009, 
the two treatment states performed better than the counterfactual based on the control states 
in terms of a number of outcome measures.  These findings are consistent with those of 
several previous studies (Alpert, et al. 2011; Garstka, et al. 2012; Haslag, et al. 2012; 
Shaver 2006; Vargo, et al. 2006).  
While these findings are important, I argue that their validity is undermined by the 
fact that they do not account for differences across states in child populations served or in 
how those populations had changed over time.  To address this limitation, I created a set of 
statistical models using the statistical software package Stata 13, which included both time-
invariant and time-varying covariates identified in the literature as being predictive of the 
timeliness of exits from care.  I also created a multilevel statistical model, which sought to 
control for time-invariant fixed effect.  The results suggest that controlling for various 
covariates, especially time-varying ones, significantly changes the interpretation of the 
relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  In 
particular, this relationship shifts from being positive to being negative, suggesting that 
states that employed PBC did not record more timely exits from care compared to a set of 
control states once adjusted averages were considered.  The fact that my results change 
once relevant covariates and interactions are included in the analysis is consistent with the 
findings of Meezan and McBeath (2003a), who also found that agencies which employed 
PBC did not record more timely permanency outcomes compared to the ono-PBC 
agencies, after controlling for various mediating and confounding factors. 
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However, as indicated in chapter 6, these findings need to be interpreted with caution 
owing to a number of limitations.  These include: (1) the dearth of detailed information on 
a number of factors found to be associated with the timeliness of permanency outcomes; 
(2) the lack of random assignment for the controls; (3) concerns about violations of the 
assumption of parallel trends, which might confound the interpretation of the ATE; and 
(4) the potentially endogenous nature of the relationship between the treatment and the 
outcome as well as some of the theoretically relevant covariates included in the models, 
including TPR, placement setting and permanency outcome.  I return to discuss these 
issues in section 10.3 below. 
 
Do states that employ different models of PBC experience different outcomes in terms of 
the timeliness of exits?  
In chapter 7, I sought to elaborate on the findings of chapter 6 by focusing not only on PBC 
and non-PBC states, but also distinguishing between the two treatment states, namely 
Illinois and North Carolina.  My motivation for focusing on these two states separately was 
partially dictated by the fact they had followed somewhat different approaches to 
implementing PBC, with Illinois using a so-called caseload method and North Carolina a 
pure pay-for-performance model.  Because the “costs” of failing to achieve permanency 
targets was higher for agencies in North Carolina, I expected the latter to experience more 
timely permanency outcomes, post-PBC, compared to Illinois.  An additional motivation 
for considering the two states separately was that I wanted to ensure that the findings in 
chapter 6 were not simply the result of having “bundled” together the two treatment states. 
My analysis, using the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts, indicates that North 
Carolina recorded more timely exits from care compared to Illinois.  Controlling for initial 
differences in levels, I found that both states experienced a significant reduction in the 
average amount of time children spent in care, as well as an increase in the proportion of 
timely exits over the time period considered.  For Illinois, much of this change was due to 
an increase in the proportion of very timely exits, while North Carolina experienced a 
decline in the share of very timely exits which was counterbalanced by a significant 
increase in somewhat timely exits.   
My analysis also confirms what had already emerged in chapter 6: namely that after 
controlling for various covariates found to be associated with the timeliness of exits, the 
overall relationship between the use of PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcomes 
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was no longer positive.  The fact that the interpretation of the relationship between PBC 
and timeliness changes depending on the type of measure employed, with a positive 
relationship for the so-called “raw” averages but not for the adjusted averages, may also 
shed light on why, in the absence of an experimental design, interpreting trends for states 
that employ PBC remains so challenging and why different experts have researched such 
different conclusions on the relationship between PBC and the timeliness of exits (see also 
chapter 3). 
While these results suggest that, on average, the use of PBC was not associated with 
improved timeliness of exits in the treatment states once theoretically relevant covariates 
and their interactions were included in the models, there was an exception: the proportion 
of children exiting care in a somewhat timely manner in North Carolina.  However, while 
this finding appears to support the second hypothesis outlined in chapter 2, I am unable to 
draw causal inferences about the link between the use of PBC and improvements in 
somewhat timely permanency outcomes, owing to limitation with my research design as 
well as the lack of detailed information on other factors which might be associated with the 
timeliness of exits, including services to enable children to achieve permanency more 
quickly, as well as various structural or organisational factors (see also Garstka, et al. 2012; 
McBeath and Meezan 2009, 2010). 
 
Is there evidence of various types of gaming, including “cherry picking” among states that 
employ PBC?  What other mechanisms might influence the timeliness of exits in PBC 
states?  
In chapters 6 and 7, I focused mainly on the relationship between the use of PBC and the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes both compared to the control states and for different 
models of PBC.  In chapter 8, I sought to expand on this analysis, by exploring factors 
which might explain “why” Illinois, North Carolina and the two control states experienced 
different trends.   
Recognising that the overall timeliness of exits is affected both by the amount of 
time different groups of children spend in care as well as by the relative size of those 
groups compared to each other, I first examined whether there had been changes in the two 
PBC states in the timeliness of various groups of children exiting care, focusing on their 
race, age and placement setting.  I found that Illinois had recorded significant reductions in 
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the amount of time African American children spent in care, while both Illinois and North 
Carolina had registered higher shares of timely exits for children placed with kin.   
Using a counterfactual scenario, I established that reductions in the amount of time 
black children and children placed with kin spent in care had contributed to improving the 
overall timeliness of exits in the two PBC states.  While this finding is interesting, it does 
not mean that the use of PBC can explain these changes.  Instead, I argue that other factors 
may have intervened.  For example, the fact that Illinois introduced a number of services 
targeted explicitly at Cook County—the county that hosted the overwhelming majority of 
African American children in the state’s out-of-home care system—was cited as a possible 
reason for the improved timeliness of permanency outcomes for black children in that state.  
I also identified the introduction of a subsidised guardianship waiver demonstrations for 
title IV-E as one of the factors which might account for the improved timeliness of exits 
among children placed in kinship care.  
Focusing on the composition of children entering care, I found that the proportion of 
African American children entering care declined significantly in both Illinois and North 
Carolina compared to children of other racial backgrounds.  As a result of this change, both 
states recorded a significantly higher proportion of timely exits compared to the scenario 
where no change in racial disparity at entry had occurred.  I also found that the proportion 
of children placed in kinship care increased in both Illinois and North Carolina, however, 
this change was smaller than might have been expected based on the trend for the two non-
PBC states.  
One of the concerns expressed in the literature is that agencies operating under a 
regime of PBC would be under pressure to game the system in order to meet their required 
performance targets.  Agencies that are unable to improve the timeliness of children exiting 
care through the provision of various services would have an incentive to modify the 
composition of children entering care.  Given that my analysis had identified a significant 
decline in the proportion of African American children entering care as well as an 
improvement in the timelines of exits for selected “marginal” groups, I sought to explore 
whether these trends might be construed as a sign of gaming.  
My evidence on the existence of “parking” is somewhat inconclusive.  Both Illinois 
and North Carolina recorded a marked decline in racial disproportionality at entry 
following the introduction of PBC.  For Illinois this decline was more pronounced than for 
the counterfactual.  While these findings are noteworthy, they are not sufficient to claim a 
deliberate attempt to “game” the system, since the control states also experienced a striking 
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decline during the same period.  Rather if “parking” did take place, it occurred within the 
context of a broader secular tend towards reducing over-representation of black children 
entering care.  
Other indirect measures of gaming—namely, comparisons based on incidents of 
maltreatment and trends of racial disparity at entry for various localities—also do not 
support the hypothesis of deliberate attempts to screen out children who would have 
otherwise been less likely to exit care in a timely manner.  Instead, there is some evidence 
that, especially for Illinois, efforts to reduce caseloads by diverting lower-risk children out 
of the formal care system, may have increased pressure on child welfare agencies to accept 
any client, even those hardest to serve, which in turn may have reduced agencies’ ability to 
achieve their permanency targets in a timely manner.  
 
Is the use of PBC accompanied by reductions in reunifications compared to other 
permanency outcomes? 
In my final analytical chapter—chapter 9—I examined whether, as previously suggested by 
a number of studies, the use of PBC might be accompanied by distortionary effects on 
reunification.  The underlying hypothesis I sought to explore was whether states that 
employed PBC might be more likely to pursue alternatives permanency outcomes, once 
timely reunification for a child had been ruled out. 
My analysis reveals that the proportion of children exiting care to reunification 
within three years of entry declined in both Illinois and North Carolina.  For North 
Carolina, this may be a sign of the possible distortionary effect of PBC on reunifications 
since the share of children exiting through this type of permanency outcome was 
significantly lower than what would have been expected based on the trend for non-PBC 
states.  In contrast, in Illinois the decline was not significantly different from that of the 
counterfactual.  Further, the share of African American children who exited care to 
reunification increased significantly in Illinois; a finding which may be linked both to the 
efforts undertaken to improve permanency in Cook County, as well as to reforms 
introduced after the first CFSR to realign performance targets so that they included goals 
related to reunification services.   
In relation to adoption, I found that, against expectations, the share of children 
exiting to adoption in both Illinois and North Carolina was not significantly higher than the 
counterfactual based on the non-PBC states, even after controlling for various time-
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invariant covariates.  These results were unexpected since much of the previous literature 
had identified a positive relationship between the use of PBC and adoption (Berlin 2007; 
Blackstone, et al. 2004; Vargo et al. 2006; Zinn 2009).  My analysis also reveals that the 
share of African American children who exited to adoption declined significantly in 
Illinois, while both Illinois and North Carolina experienced significantly lower proportions 
of black children exiting care to adoption than would have been expected based on the 
counterfactual.  Children of other racial backgrounds did not experience the same trend 
over the time period considered.  While this finding signals a potentially troubling racial 
bias related to the permanency outcome of adoption in the two treatment states, the 
preference voiced by many related, African American caregivers for guardianship, as well 
as difficulties in recruiting black adoptive parents may offer alternative explanations for 
this trend.  
In relation to guardianship, my analysis suggests that both Illinois and North 
Carolina experienced a significant increase across nearly all groups of children considered.  
The use of subsidised guardianship waivers was identified as a possible reason for the 
higher shares of children exiting to guardianship in the two PBC states compared to the 
control states.   
In addition to focusing on exits to various permanency outcomes, I also considered 
how case goals had changed over time and how the latter were related to changes in the 
shares of children exiting to reunification, adoption and guardianship.  My analysis 
revealed that the proportion of children having reunification as their case plan goal had 
increased in both Illinois and North Carolina and that the share of children who had exited 
to reunification—among those with reunification as their case plan goal—had also 
increased.  I also found that, unexpectedly, the share of children with adoption or 
guardianship as their permanency goal had declined between the period 1999-2004 and 
2005-2009.  While beyond the scope of my analysis, I attributed part of this decline to 
concerns about the costs of post-permanency in the two PBC states.  The fact that North 
Carolina discontinued its subsidised guardianship waiver programme in 2008 might have 
important consequences for future trends in the timeliness of permanency in that state. 
 
10.3 Limitations of the study 
As discussed in previous chapters, this study has a number of limitations.  In the section 
below, I briefly discuss some of the most salient ones , focusing on three major areas: 
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(1) problems with the outcome measures, (2) problems with the research design, and 
(3) limitations with methods employed. 
 
Problems with outcome measures 
Since the 1990s, the child welfare system in the United States has placed an increasing 
emphasis on evaluating outcomes.  There is a perception that quantitative outcomes can 
measure progress in achieving child welfare goals and that these measures, by informing 
policy making, can lead to better practices and outcomes (Testa 2010a).  Yet not enough 
attention has been paid to identifying valid outcome measures.  As indicated in chapter 3, 
many of the studies that have focused on changes in the timeliness of permanency 
outcomes have used PIT estimates or exit cohorts, which give a biased representation of 
the amount of time children spend in care.  Another limitation of the measures frequently 
used, particularly those in the CWOR and the CFSR, is that, while they employ prospective 
measures, they focus on a limited set of permanency outcomes, usually only reunification 
and adoption, overlooking the fact that other permanency options such as guardianship 
have become more widely used in recent years. 
In this study, I have sought to address these limitations by using multi-year 
prospective cohorts as well by considering timeliness of exits in relation to the full 
spectrum of permanency outcomes.  Nonetheless, there are a number of limitations related 
to the measures I employed to assess changes in the timeliness of exits over time.  Probably 
the greatest limitation is that the entry cohorts I created using the AFCARS dataset only 
follow children for the first thirty-six months from the time of entry.  This choice was 
primarily dictated by practical considerations, including difficulties in matching the CID 
for more than three consecutive, annual AFCARS data files at a time (see also section 4.4).  
For most of my analysis, this choice is not problematic since I mainly focus on whether or 
not children exited care in a timely manner; that is to say within twenty-four months of 
entering care.  Whether a child exited care after two years or four years of entry, therefore, 
is irrelevant in the context of my study: it is still an untimely exit.  The choice of timeframe 
however, does make a difference when considering permanency outcomes, since studies 
have shown that the timeliness of exits differs for children who exit to adoption, 
reunification and guardianship (Akin 2011; Connell, et al. 2006; Wulczyn 2004).  The fact 
that my analysis focuses only on the first three years after entry into care, may over-
represent the share of reunifications taking place compared to other permanency outcomes, 
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particularly adoptions.  Furthermore, because of its limited timeframe, my analysis is likely 
to overestimate the timeliness of adoptions since, owing to the lower probability of a child 
being adopted in the first year of entry, children who exit care to reunification have a 
longer timespan to see their placements disrupt compared to children who are adopted.   
Another important limitation is that my entry cohorts do not measure first entry, but 
rather whether a child entered care during a certain fiscal year, regardless of having been in 
care before.  In that sense, my approach differs from the one used by Testa, et al. (2008), 
which seeks to follow a child’s path through care.  Instead, my approach aims primarily at 
exploring more macro-level trends, including changes in state-level averages.  Again, while 
this approach may be appropriate given the aims of this study, it may not be suitable in 
other research contexts.  
In addition to limitations related to the multi-state, multi-year entry cohorts, the 
measures I employed to assess the timeliness of exits are not well suited for measuring 
permanency, since they do not capture re-entries or permanency disruptions (see also the 
discussion below on the AFCARS dataset).  While I made the rather simplistic choice to 
use exits from care as a proxy for permanency (see also chapters 1 and 4), approaches 
which emphasise length of stay in care are increasingly being criticised for failing to give 
an accurate portrayal of permanency, especially given the pressure to close cases quickly 
(Berlin 2007; Karatekin 2014).  The fact that this study does not seek to address the issue 
of placement or permanency instability is a serious shortcoming given that such disruptions 
are known to have a negative impact on the wellbeing and safety of children in out-of-
home care (see also section 10.6 below).  While the outcome measures employed in this 
study do not capture re-entries, the linking procedure used to create the prospective 
cohorts, as well as the fact that the AFCARS dataset only stores the most recent record for 
children who re-enter care multiple times during the same fiscal year, may minimise some 
of the impact of short-term permanency disruptions, signifying that they are less prone to 
capture the type of gaming behaviour Raghavan (2010) anticipates—i.e., discharges of 
children from care followed by immediate re-admissions to “artificially” shorten spells in 
out-of-home care. 
 
Challenges with the research design 
As indicated in chapter 3 and 4, policy assessments require a robust research design.  
Generally RE or RCT are viewed as the most suited approaches for exploring such 
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relationships.  Such designs, however, tend to be uncommon in research on children in out-
of-home care for both ethical and practical reasons.  Further, while RCTs are generally 
considered the most appropriate designs for establishing causal relationships, they too have 
limitations, including with regard to external validity, meaning that findings from RCTs are 
not easily generalised to other populations or contexts.   
QEDs, which generally have lower levels of internal validity compared to RCTs, can 
in some cases be easier to make inferences from.  However, QEDs to generate valid results 
need to fulfil a number of requirements including having a control and treatment group as 
well as information prior to and after the implementation of the policy being evaluated.  As 
indicated in chapter 2, only a limited amount of the research on the timeliness of exits in 
the United States has included these features.  Furthermore, relatively few studies have 
controlled for differences in the child populations served or how those populations changed 
over time.   
In my study, I tried to address some of these limitations by identifying a treatment 
and control group, analysing changes in trends over a fourteen year period, which included 
a pre-PBC period and two post-PBC periods, and controlling for a number of covariates 
identified in the literature as being related to the timeliness of exits.  In relation to each of 
these aspects, however, I made a series of decisions that warrant further scrutiny and 
discussion. 
In relation to the choice of treatment and control, for instance, since no such groups 
had been randomly assigned a priori, I chose to base my comparisons on a set of states 
which had implemented PBC versus a set of states which had not.  In order to minimise the 
differences between the treatment and control states, I used the PSBI/ND framework 
developed by Testa to try to “isolate” the possible effects of PBC from the broader 
differences related to a state’s normative position with regard to the goal of promoting 
timely exits from care.  I restricted my analysis to states which followed the BI approach, 
meaning that they had met or exceeded the provisions related to timeliness outlined in the 
ASFA.  I also sought to match the states in terms of some broad social and demographic 
characteristics, including the proportion of children living in poverty.  In spite of these 
efforts, this approach is clearly simplistic and falls short of the rigorous requirements of 
RCT.  Other aspects which negatively affected my choice of treatment and controls relate 
to constrains imposed by the AFCARS dataset—both in terms of the number of states with 
long enough time series as well as issues related to matching the CID across annual 
AFCARS files.   
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In relation to the choice of timeframe, I decided to group the data into three multi-
year periods.  This choice was dictated both by analytical convenience as well as the need 
to minimise autocorrelation across the multi-year, multi-state entry cohorts.  However, by 
doing so I lost some of the analytical richness of the data.  Another concern I encountered 
was that the pre-PBC period was relatively short compared to the post-PBC period.  To 
ensure that the periods were more comparable, I subdivided the post-PBC period into two 
periods.  Even after doing so, however the length of the three periods remains uneven.  
Further, because states and counties within states implemented PBC at different points in 
time, I tried to exploit this feature in a type of QED, referred to as multiple baseline design.  
However, to ensure more comparable time-frames and minimise the effect of unobserved 
secular trends, I decided to create a random, without-replacement sample of children in the 
two control states, proportional to the size of those counties or states which had 
implemented PBC earlier—namely Cook County, Illinois and North Carolina—compared 
to the entire population of children entering care in Illinois and North Carolina.  I 
“removed” this sample of children from the pre-PBC control group and “added” it to the 
first post-PBC period to ensure that the timeframes covered by the control and treatment 
states were comparable. 
Lastly, while I sought to control for various covariates identified in the literature as 
being associated with the timeliness of exits, my analysis was constrained by the data 
source I selected, namely the AFCARS dataset.  As indicated in chapter 4, this dataset 
contains administrative data for 66 data elements, including on the basic demographic and 
social characteristics of children in care, as well as on their placement and permanency 
characteristics.  I chose this dataset because it covers all children in the formal care system 
in the United States, is available for a relatively long time series, and is comparable across 
states and over time.  However, as anticipated in chapter 4, the dataset also has a number of 
limitations.  These include issues with the reliability and validity of the data as well as 
being ill-suited for studying permanency disruptions and re-entries into care.  Another 
limitation of the AFCARS dataset is that it contains limited or no information on the 
environment the child originates from, the type of services he or she receives while in care, 
the characteristics and qualifications of the caseworkers or administrators involved in each 
child’s case, as well as a number of other policy or contextual variables which have been 
found in the literature to be related to the timeliness of exits.  The limited scope of the 
AFCARS dataset, therefore, makes it difficult to draw conclusive inferences about the 
relationship between PBC and the timeliness of permanency outcome, since information on 
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many potentially confounding variables as well as how they changed over time is not 
available.   
 
Limitations with the methods employed 
I this study I relied exclusively on quantitative methods.  I formulated a series of 
hypotheses related to my research questions based on the analytical and theoretical 
frameworks and constructs outlined in chapter 2 and sought to test those hypotheses 
through a series of statistical methods including logistic regression and multilevel logistic 
regression.  
One statistical technique which I relied on heavily throughout the study is the DID 
estimator; a technique widely used to estimate the average effect of a policy intervention, 
or ATE.  One of the central assumptions of DID is that the average outcome for the 
treatment and control groups follow parallel trends over time, meaning that the treatment 
states would have experienced the same trend as the control states in the absence of the 
policy intervention.  In the case of my study, this assumption may be problematic, since 
trends in my controls states may have also been influenced by other policy or practice 
changes which I am not explicitly controlling for.  While this may signify that my results 
are biased, there are a number of aspects which may mitigate this effect.  The first is that 
my analysis has not only drawn attention to differences in trends between the treatment and 
control states based on the DID estimator but also, more directly, to findings related to 
changes in the timeliness of permanency outcomes for the PBC states themselves.  Second, 
because I treated the control states as a “unit”, I expect some of the variability due to an 
individual state’s policy changes to average out across the group.  Third, I clustered the 
standard errors at the state level to account for the unobserved variability between the 
treatment and control states (Bertrand, et al. 2003). 
Another important assumption of the DID estimator is that observed and unobserved 
variables affect both the treatment and the control group in the same way.  I sought to 
address this issue by including time-varying covariates for variables that I considered more 
theoretically relevant as well as by controlling for latent variables at the county level 
through the use of multilevel models.  However, as indicated above, my study also suffers 
from a number of limitations due to the scope of the AFCARS dataset.  Specifically, there 
are a number of differences between the treatment and control states that I am unable to 
account for, which may have confounded the interpretation of results.  These differences 
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include the size and characteristics of the out-of-home care population served; the 
implementation of additional or alternative policies and practices to expedite permanency; 
and the type of administrative framework employed.  Furthermore, the counterfactuals 
based on the two control states are likely to reflect the environmental and programmatic 
realities of those two states, rather than the “absence” of PBC.  
The methods employed also do not address the potential endogeneity—or reverse 
causality—between the treatment and the outcome.  Specifically, states with lower levels 
of timely exits are more likely to seek to implement strategies that are perceived to reduce 
the average amount of time children spend in care.  Conversely, states that already record 
high aggregate level of timeliness may be unable to improve their performance further.  
This limitation could be addressed in future research by using more complex statistical 
methods including instrumental variable or time-lags for panels of states or counties.  The 
methods employed could also seek to explore more systematically the potentially 
endogenous relationship between selected theoretically relevant covariates—namely, TPR, 
placement setting and permanency goals—and this type of programme management tool.  
In this study, I chose not to use some of the more sophisticated statistical methods 
often used in QED to make inferences about the relationship between a policy intervention 
and a specific outcome, including PSM as well as SCM for comparative case studies.  One 
of the requirements for these methods is that all variables related to the probability of 
treatment are included in the model (Wooldridge 2009).  Various diagnostics tests 
conducted on the multivariate models discussed in chapters 6 and 7, as well as a Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition, undertaken to quantify how much of the variability between the 
treatment and control states could be attributed to the covariates included in the model, 
indicated the latter “explained” only a limited share of the difference in the timeliness of 
exits between the two groups.  Given these limitations, I felt that I did not have sufficient 
information on the covariates to use these methods; a limitation that underlies the methods 
presented in this analysis as well. 
Lastly, in this study I made the decision not to use qualitative or mixed research 
methods.  Some of these techniques, especially in-depth interviews with key informants, 
might have been useful for approaching issues such as “cherry picking” or exploring 
whether the use of PBC is associated with additional distortionary effects on permanency 
outcomes, besides the ones captured through quantitative methods.  Aspects which have 
been identified in the literature as being related to the achievement of performance targets 
in systems that use PBC and which could have been explored through qualitative or mixed 
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methods include the impact of PBC on staff motivation and morale, the degree to which 
relevant stakeholder were included in developing PBC benchmarks, as well as how well 
information on PBC goals and targets was shared with administrators and frontline workers 
(Collins-Camargo, et al. 2013; Department of Children and Family Services, State of 
Illinois 2003; Elder, et al. 2012; Garstka, et al. 2012; Lawrence-Webb, et al. 2006).  I tried 
to address this limitation by supplementing my research with relevant findings from other 
studies which had used focus groups or in-depth interviews with various stakeholders.  In 
doing so, I gave particular attention to the information collected by states themselves 
through their state-wide child welfare assessment exercises as well as qualitative research 
cited in various CFSR and PIP documents.   
While I recognize that relying exclusively on quantitative methods is a limitation, at 
the same time, I believe that, given the emphasis PBC assigns to quantitative outcomes and 
targets, this approach is, nonetheless, well-suited for assessing whether states have 
achieved, or fallen short of, their own stated objectives.  This is, in my opinion, the 
minimum requirements such programme management tools must satisfy in order to be 
considered effective.  Likewise, I believe that the AFCARS, in spite of its limitations, is 
the most appropriate dataset for carrying out this type of research, since ultimately it is one 
of the main data sources against which state performance in child welfare is assessed in the 
United States. 
 
10.4 Implications for practice 
My study has identified a number of implications for practice.  Some of these relate to the 
elements needed to better assess the impact of a programme management tool such as 
PBC.  Others are more practical in nature and refer to changes that could be made to 
improve the administrative data currently collected in the United States on children in out-
of-home care.  The main implications are as follows: 
First, payment structures related to PBC should take into account adjusted levels of 
timeliness in addition to “raw” state-level averages.  Current practices generally do not 
consider differences among states in terms of levels of timeliness or the composition of 
caseloads.  As a result, the evidence base on the relationship between the use of PBC and 
its stated outcomes is often difficult to interpret (see also section 10.6).  States with lower 
initial levels of timeliness and more “difficult” caseloads often fall short of the expected 
performance standards, in spite of implementing programme management tools such as 
PBC.  Yet it is clearly inappropriate to “penalise” such states for the more complex and 
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challenging needs of the clients they serve.  Progress in such states, therefore, should be 
assessed not only taking into account initial levels of timeliness, but also how such levels, 
measured in terms of relevant outcomes, changed over time.  In addition, changes in the 
composition of the out-of-home care population should be considered to ensure that 
improvements in outcome measures are not the result of “cherry picking” or “parking” 
alone.   
While adjusted averages are clearly important for assessing progress for the so-called 
“underperforming” states, raw averages are still necessary for monitoring performance in 
states that already meet or exceed national standards for timeliness.  Specifically, there 
should be a recognition that states where children already spend a limited amount of time 
in care are unlikely to be able to improve their performance further.  PBC payment 
structures, therefore, should recognise that such states will likely record smaller gains in 
timeliness than the less performing ones. 
Second, a more complex set of outcome measures aimed at measuring timeliness 
should be developed.  While quantitative targets are necessary to promote accountability 
and ensure that federal and statewide resources are apportioned in an equitable manner, the 
design of such targets is not straightforward.  As indicated in chapters 1 and 4, the U.S. 
government monitors timeliness in relation to a series of thresholds.  Yet this approach is 
clearly inadequate to capture a conceptually and methodological complex construct such as 
permanency.  For instance, timeliness might have a very different “meaning” if children re-
enter care or are maltreated after being discharged.  Exploring whether children who exit 
care in a timely manner are more likely to experience a permanency disruption, or be 
victimised or even killed compared to children who remain longer in care might also help 
inform policymakers about the effectiveness of programme management tools such as PBC 
in contributing to “good” decision-making about children’s safety and wellbeing.  This is 
particularly important from a policy perspective if pressure to fulfill aggregate, state-level 
performance targets is compelling child welfare practitioners to discharge children 
prematurely from the out-of-home care.   
Third, on the basis of the two points raised above, I content that the CFSR and 
CWOR measures related to the timeliness of exits should be reviewed and expanded.  
These measures should, to the extent possible, focus on entry cohorts and consider the full 
spectrum of permanency outcomes.  As the measures currently are formulated, they over-
emphasise differences in levels, without paying enough attention to how these levels may 
have changed over time.  Furthermore, the CFSR measures related to timeliness should be 
 213 
 
redesigned to control for adjusted state averages, in addition to the “raw” state-level ones 
currently being employed.  By failing to take into account differences in basic social and 
demographic characteristics of the out-of-home care populations, the CFSRs are literally 
comparing “apples and oranges”.  As this and other studies have shown, the client mix is 
closely associated with performance and, therefore, needs to be factored into the 
monitoring framework.  Failing to do so may create an incentive to game the system in 
various ways including through “parking” and “cherry picking”.  It is important to 
underscore that controlling for differences in child population served does not imply that 
lower standards should be applied for some children in meeting the ASFA’s goals of child 
safety, permanency or wellbeing.  Instead it means that greater recognition should be given 
to efforts made by states to improve their performance, taking into account the diverse 
needs of the children and families they strive to serve and support.  Other steps that should 
be undertaken to improve the CFSR and CWOR include developing composite measures of 
permanency disruptions that are more closely aligned with the measures aimed at assessing 
timeliness as well as measures that explicitly examine the relationship between the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes, child maltreatment and child fatalities.   
Fourth, prior to introducing a new programme management tool, states should 
establish a monitoring system with well specified outcome measures and timelines.  To the 
extent possible, this monitoring framework should build on the data elements collected in 
the AFCARS, using common concepts, definitions, and timeframes.  In developing this 
system, states should seek, where appropriate from an ethical and practical perspective, to 
randomly assign treatment and control groups to the programme management initiative 
being piloted.  Further, the timeframe for monitoring performance should be long enough 
for the effect of the initiative to be observed as well as to capture permanency disruptions 
and re-entries into care.   
Fifth, a number of relatively simple, practical changes should be made to the 
AFCARS dataset.  One such change could be to assign a unique identifier to every child 
who enters the out-of-home care system and ensure that this ID “follows” each child until 
the age of majority.  This would make it easier to create the entry cohorts, even for children 
who moved across state-lines, as well as to monitor permanency disruptions and re-entries, 
even if they occurred years after a child had exited the care system.  A second change 
could be to include a unique identifier for each child welfare agency.  This would make it 
possible to more effectively compare agency performance over time within and across 
states.  States could also be encouraged to link any additional databases they maintained, 
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containing information, for instance, on specific policy initiatives or practices, to the 
AFCARS dataset using the unique child and agency identifiers.  Clearly, extreme care 
would have to be exercised to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of the children so 
identified.  Researchers could be given access to the linked cohort files, with the same 
measures to protect children’s identity as are currently employed in the AFCARS, while 
information on agencies could be aggregated at an appropriate level. 
 
10.5 Implications for theory 
Through this study I have used the theory of social exchange to frame my research 
hypotheses and explain why PBC states are expected to record more timely exits from care 
compared to states that do not utilise this programme management tool.  As indicated in 
chapter 2, the theory of social exchange postulates that systems respond to financial 
incentives or penalties by “aligning” their performance to the collective goals and 
objectives identified by the system.  Yet throughout this study I have raised a number of 
questions about how this theory might “work” in practice.  Further, I have outlined some of 
the elements necessary for a more nuanced theoretical framework to explore how PBC 
might shape the timeliness of permanency outcomes.  I briefly discuss four of these below: 
First, any theoretical framework designed to help conceptualise how the 
implementation of a programme management tool such as PBC might contribute to 
expediting children’s exits from care should explicitly recognise that a number of social, 
economic and political factors besides financial incentives influence a system’s 
performance.  Factors such as the size and composition of the out-of-home care caseloads, 
budgetary considerations and constraints, different attitudes towards various permanency 
outcomes, the availability of different placement settings, as well as secular trends such as 
changing attitudes towards racial disproportionality or placement with kin are illustrations 
of aspects that might contribute to shaping the timeliness of permanency outcomes, beyond 
the influence of PBC alone. 
Second, the theoretical framework should recognise that systems are often affected 
by the so-called “principal-agent problem” (see also chapter 2).  To the extent possible, 
such frameworks should seek to ensure that states and contractors share common 
objectives and goals.  In addition, they should seek to address concerns related to gaming 
by ensuring that compensation structures take into account the client mix served and by 
encouraging relevant stakeholders to make decisions that emphasise children’s safety and 
wellbeing rather than simply the maximisation of profits. 
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Third, the framework should recognise that decision making processes in the “real 
world” are likely to be affected by more complex considerations than mere rational 
interests.  Evidence suggests that decisions regarding placement or permanency are often 
based on “legal mandates, scarcity of placements, available community services, and cost” 
(Berliner and Fine 2001 p. 11).  In addition, normative stands such as the notion that 
"blood is thicker than water" (Weil 1999 p. 9) or that children are better off when placed 
with a relative rather than a stranger (Dubowitz 1994 p. 553) are known to influence the 
way in which different child protection systems approach the objective of promoting 
timeliness. 
Fourth, the theoretical framework should seek to address the issue of “information 
asymmetry” by ensuring that knowledge of the programme management tool and its stated 
objectives is broadly disseminated.  Caseworkers should be made aware of how PBC is 
implemented in their context, as well as how progress in achieving relevant targets is 
monitored and assessed.  Furthermore, the child welfare system should be encouraged to 
share lessons learned on a periodic basis, and those should be used to inform changes to the 
programme objectives as well as outcome measures employed.   
 
10.6 Areas for future research 
This study underscores the need for more research on the relationship between PBC and 
timeliness of exits from care.  Still too little is known not only about whether PBC is 
associated with improved permanency outcomes, but also on whether it is accompanied by 
various distortionary effects, including on permanency outcomes.  This study has identified 
a number of important findings, including the possibility that compositional effects may 
explain some of the changes in the timeliness of exits recorded by states that employ PBC.  
The study has also established some potentially relevant relationships between the use of 
PBC, the timeliness of exits and permanency outcomes for various groups of children.  
However, as indicated above, the study also has a number of limitations, which could be 
explored and possibly addressed in future research.  There are a number of areas, therefore, 
where additional research is needed.  These are briefly summarized below. 
First, the evidence base on the relationship between PBC and timeliness of 
permanency outcomes needs to be broadened in scope to include a wider set of states.  A 
preliminary step could be to assess whether other states, besides Illinois and North 
Carolina, experienced similar trends, using a similar method to the one employed in this 
research.  Further, this study could be repeated using a different pool of control states, to 
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ensure that the interpretation of the results is not prejudiced by their selection.  The 
advantages and limitations of the more traditional approaches to case management, which 
tie compensation of agencies to the number of children served, also need to be more clearly 
documented.   
Second, in this study I briefly compared the timeliness of exits for two states that 
employed different models.  Though the results are consistent with my initial hypothesis, 
the analysis did not draw any definitive conclusions about the relationship between various 
approaches to promoting timely exits using PBC and the actual outcomes.  Additional 
studies could seek to better explore these relationships by including larger samples of states 
and possibly developing a more detailed classification of state practices based on the 
analytical framework proposed by Testa (2001, 2008).   
Third, more research is needed on whether PBC has different effects on different 
groups of children.  My research raises the possibility that this may be the case for some 
groups, particularly for African American children.  More studies are needed to explore 
whether these findings apply for other groups and are valid in other contexts.  The 
questions is not simply whether programmes “work or not (i.e. that they are ‘evidence-
based’ or not); rather, the question is whom they work for, why and in what contexts” 
(Axford and Morpeth 2013 p. 269).   
Fourth, as indicated in the sections above, the entry cohorts used in this study have a 
number of limitations.  One such limitation is that they only follow children for three years 
from the time of entry.  Measures of timeliness that fail to incorporate “reasonable” enough 
timeframes to account for permanency failures, could engender, either purposefully or 
unintentionally, negative distortionary behaviours.  Research that considers a longer time-
span from the date of entry is needed so that the relationship between PBC and 
permanency outcomes that take longer to be achieved can be studied.   
Fifth, it would be important to assess whether the use of PBC is accompanied by 
additional distortionary effects than the ones considered, including on placement 
instability, permanency disruptions and child maltreatment.  Assessing this relationship 
based on more nuanced measures of permanency, which seek to better quantify 
permanency disruptions and even child fatalities, might provide greater insight into the 
effectiveness of PBC.  Further, it might shed light on whether pressure to fulfill aggregate, 
state-level performance targets related to timeliness might lead to premature discharges 
from out-of-home care; potentially compromising the safety and wellbeing of the children 
this programme management tool is seeking to benefit. 
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Lastly, a more in-depth assessment of whether there is evidence of gaming, including 
“cherry picking”, in states that employ PBC is needed to complement the very preliminary 
findings identified in this study.  Preferably this research would include a qualitative 
component, such as in-depth interviews, to better explore the nature of any relevant 
finding, particularly with regards to the provision of services to children in out-of-home 
care and their families.  
 
10.7 Conclusions 
The results in my analysis suggest that the relationship between the use of PBC and the 
timeliness of exits is complex and difficult to interpret in the absence of more rigorous 
research designs, richer data sources and a larger sample of treatment and control states.  
My findings indicate that, for the two states considered, there may be a positive 
relationship between the use of PBC and the amount of time children spend in care both in 
absolute terms and compared to a counterfactual based on two control states.  However, 
owing to limitations in the methods and research deign employed, I am unable to determine 
whether this outcome is the result of PBC alone or a combination of other factors, 
including secular trends.  This study also suggests that the interpretation of the relationship 
between PBC and timeliness may depend on the type of outcome measure employed.  
Specifically, I find that once I adjust the outcome measures for a series of theoretically 
relevant covariates and interactions, the relationship between PBC and timeliness is no 
longer positive.  This casts doubts on the “mechanisms” through which changes in the 
timeliness of permanency outcomes are achieved.  From a policy perspective, therefore, 
taking into account base levels of timeliness as well as the type of out-of-home care 
population served is a worthy objective.  This study also indicates that PBC may be 
accompanied by some distortionary effects on reunification, though this finding is not 
consistent across the two states considered.  The evidence about the possible relationship 
between the use of PBC and various “gaming” behaviours such as “cherry picking” should 
also be explored further in future research.   
One of the main contributions of this study is that it provides a relatively 
straightforward approach to measuring timeliness, by using perspective cohorts, 
considering the full spectrum of permanency outcomes and controlling for differences in 
out-of-home care populations served at the state and local level.  Further, while, all 
findings in this study need to be approached with caution, taking into account the 
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limitations described above, they represent, in my opinion, a step towards being able to 
more critically assess the impact of a programme management tool such as PBC.  
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Table A.1.1. Composite CFSR and CWOR measures related to  
the timeliness of permanency 
Composite measures 
Timeliness 
threshold 
Measure 4.1: Of all children reunified with their parents or caretakers at the time of 
discharge from foster care during the year, what percentage were reunified in less than 
12 months from the time of entry into foster care? 
12 months 
Measure C1.1: Of all children discharged from foster care to reunification during the 
year who had been in care for eight days or longer, what percentage were reunified in 
less than 12 months from the date of the latest removal from home? 
12 months 
Measure C1.2: Of all children discharged from foster care to reunification during the 
year who had been in care for eight days or longer, what was the median length of stay 
(in months) from the date of the latest removal from home until the date of discharge to 
reunification? 
.. 
Measure C1.3: Of all children who entered foster care for the first time in the 6-month 
period just prior to the year shown, and who remained in care for eight days or longer, 
what percentage were discharged from foster care to reunification in less than 12 
months from the date of the latest removal from home? 
12 months 
Measure C1.4: Of all children discharged from foster care to reunification in the 12-
month period prior to the year shown, what percentage re-entered care in less than 12 
months from the date of discharge? 
12 months 
Measure 5.1a: Of all children discharged from care during the year to a finalized 
adoption, what percentage were discharged in less than 12 months from the date of the 
latest removal from home? 
12 months 
Measure C2.1: Of all children discharged from foster care to a finalized adoption during 
the year, what percentage were discharged in less than 24 months from the date of the 
latest removal from home? 
24 months 
Measure C2.2: Of all children discharged from foster care to a finalized adoption during 
the year, what was the median length of stay in care (in months) from the date of latest 
removal from home to the date of discharge to adoption? 
.. 
Measure C2.3: Of all children in foster care on the first day of the year who were in care 
for 17 continuous months or longer, what percentage were discharged from foster care 
to a finalized adoption by the last day of the year? 
12 months 
Measure C2.4: Of all children in foster care on the first day of the year who were in 
foster care for 17 continuous months or longer, and who were not legally free for 
adoption prior to that day, what percentage became legally free for adoption during the 
first six months of the year? 
Six months 
Measure C2.5: Of all children who became legally free for adoption in the 12-month 
period prior to the year shown, what percentage were discharged from foster care to a 
finalized adoption in less than 12 months from the date of becoming legally free? 
12 months 
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Table A.1.2. Summary of provisions contained in U.S. federal laws aimed at 
promoting timely exits from out-of-home care 
Provision aimed at promoting timely exits from care In: 
Grounds for the fast-track provision 
1
  
 (a) Abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse of the child 
(b) Voluntary manslaughter of a sibling of the child 
(c) Aiding or abetting in the murder or voluntary manslaughter of sibling of the child 
(d) Felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or sibling of the child 
(e) The parental rights to a sibling of the child were terminated involuntarily 
ASFA (1997) 
Time limits for the termination of parental rights  
 In care fifteen of the previous twenty-two months ASFA (1997) 
Time limits for the review of cases  
 At least once every six months  ASFA (1997) 
Time limits for permanency hearings  
 Within twelve months of the initial placement and every twelve months thereafter  ASFA (1997) 
Concurrent permanency planning 
2
  
 For children whose permanency plan is reunification ASFA (1997) 
Adoption incentives  
 Adoption assistance payments for children under age eighteen (for children meeting 
income eligibility requirements or with special needs) 
 
ASFA (1997); 
APA (2003); 
FCSIAA (2008) 
 
Adoption incentives for states that increase the number of adoptions above the level 
of 1996  
ASFA (1997)  
Notes:  
1
 A series of exemptions from exercising reasonable efforts to preserve or reunite families. 
2
 An additional, alternative permanency plan to be pursued concurrently, rather than sequentially for 
children whose primary permanency plan is reunification. 
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Table A.6.1. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states: DID-only model 
 Amount of time 
spent in care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 1.591*** 0.706*** 0.593*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00248) (0.00268) (0.00173) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 3.415*** 0.407*** 0.298*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00266) (0.00248) (0.00169) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 1.600*** 0.725*** 0.556*** 0.169*** 
 (0.00837) (0.00162) (0.00181) (0.00136) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 2.850*** 0.508*** 0.336*** 0.172*** 
 (0.00865) (0.00178) (0.00168) (0.00135) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 1.906*** 0.676*** 0.500*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0001) (0.00202) (0.00216) (0.00164) 
Post-PBC-2nd period #PBC state 2.750*** 0.529*** 0.331*** 0.198*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00219) (0.00207) (0.00175) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.6.2. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: DID-only model 
 Amount of time 
spent in care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.00887 0.0938*** -0.150*** 0.466*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0198) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.316*** -0.143*** -0.377*** 0.514*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0206) 
PBC state 1.824*** -1.253*** -1.234*** -0.0408* 
 (0.0184) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0245) 
Post-PBC-1st period# PBC state -0.574*** 0.315*** 0.324*** 0.0665** 
 (0.0219) (0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0280) 
Post-PBC-2nd period# PBC state -0.980*** 0.635*** 0.531*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0291) 
Constant 1.591*** 0.876*** 0.376*** -2.060*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0172) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared .. 0.0387 0.0380 0.0070 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
252 
 
Table A.6.3. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states:  
time-invariant model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 1.882*** 0.653*** 0.519*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00261) (0.00255) (0.00187) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 3.062*** 0.469*** 0.363*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0130) (0.00269) (0.00260) (0.00162) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 1.745*** 0.703*** 0.525*** 0.174*** 
 (0.00804) (0.00165) (0.00170) (0.00141) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 2.634*** 0.544*** 0.381*** 0.162*** 
 (0.00831) (0.00172) (0.00168) (0.00130) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 2.015*** 0.654*** 0.473*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00952) (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.00167) 
Post-PBC-2nd period #PBC state 2.691*** 0.536*** 0.338*** 0.201*** 
 (0.00998) (0.00208) (0.00194) (0.00177) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.6.3b. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states:  
time-invariant model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (6) (7) (8) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 0.655*** 0.520*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0026) (0.00255) (0.00188) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 0.468*** 0.362*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.00162) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 0.704*** 0.525*** 0.175*** 
 (0.00165) (0.00171) (0.00141) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 0.543*** 0.380*** 0.162*** 
 (0.00172) (0.00168) (0.0013) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 0.654*** 0.473*** 0.180*** 
 (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.00168) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #PBC state 0.535*** 0.338*** 0.201*** 
 (0.00209) (0.00195) (0.00177) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value.  Models with the variable age instead of age square and infant. 
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Table A.6.3c. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states:  
time-invariant model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (6) (7) (8) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 0.658*** 0.523*** 0.125*** 
 (0.00265) (0.00266) (0.00189) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 0.463*** 0.363*** 0.0998*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00264) (0.00158) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 0.694*** 0.510*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00176) (0.00144) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 0.549*** 0.386*** 0.161*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00173) (0.00130) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 0.657*** 0.477*** 0.179*** 
 (0.00204) (0.00207) (0.00167) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #PBC state 0.539*** 0.343*** 0.199*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00201) (0.00176) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value.  Models without TPR and the permanency goal of adoption and reunification. 
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Table A.6.4. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-invariant model 
 Amount of time 
spent in care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post-PBC-1st period -0.136*** 0.252*** 0.0259* 0.413*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0200) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.134*** 0.00209 -0.224*** 0.448*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0209) 
PBC state 1.180*** -0.840*** -0.763*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0254) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state -0.292*** 0.0798*** 0.0630*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0283) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state -0.504*** 0.292*** 0.0983*** 0.355*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0298) 
Sex 0.0575*** -0.0477*** -0.0562*** 0.0137 
 (0.00773) (0.00770) (0.00788) (0.00959) 
Age (squared) -0.00210*** 0.00205*** 0.00196*** -0.000504*** 
 (4.71e-05) (4.91e-05) (4.75e-05) (6.28e-05) 
Infant -0.00999 0.0346*** -0.186*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0129) 
Black 0.417*** -0.360*** -0.300*** -0.104*** 
 (0.00848) (0.00829) (0.00863) (0.0105) 
Kinship care 0.658*** -0.527*** -0.793*** 0.302*** 
 (0.00929) (0.00885) (0.00955) (0.0109) 
Hispanic 0.0875*** -0.0937*** -0.0274** -0.106*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0175) 
Case goal (adoption) -0.0761*** 0.0986*** -0.349*** 0.514*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0166) (0.0200) (0.0199) 
Case goal (reunification) 0.0514*** 0.000261 -0.176*** 0.281*** 
 (0.00984) (0.00975) (0.00981) (0.0131) 
Number settings 0.304*** -0.245*** -0.392*** 0.226*** 
 (0.00504) (0.00493) (0.00515) (0.00608) 
TPR 1.200*** -1.180*** -1.667*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0125) 
Constant 1.192*** 1.236*** 1.057*** -2.516*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0243) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared .. 0.1084 0.1573 0.0272 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.6.4b. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-invariant model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (6) (7) (8) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.250*** 0.0242* 0.413*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0199) 
Post-PBC-2nd period -0.000798 -0.227*** 0.449*** 
 (0.016) (0.0155) (0.0209) 
PBC state -0.851*** -0.768*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0254) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state 0.0831*** 0.0644*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0283) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state 0.299*** 0.105*** 0.357*** 
 (0.022) (0.0227) (0.0298) 
Sex -0.0539*** -0.0597*** 0.0108 
 (0.00769) (0.0079) (0.0096) 
Age 0.0254*** 0.0343*** -0.0203*** 
 (0.00072) (0.00071) (0.00091) 
Black -0.358*** -0.304*** -0.0957*** 
 (0.00827) (0.0086) (0.0105) 
Kinship care -0.548*** -0.799*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0108) 
Hispanic -0.0983*** -0.0295** -0.108*** 
 (0.014) (0.0139) (0.0175) 
Case goal (adoption) 0.0807*** -0.374*** 0.522*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0199) (0.0198) 
Case goal (reunification) -0.0212** -0.187*** 0.272*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0131) 
Number settings -0.246*** -0.389*** 0.220*** 
 (0.00491) (0.0051) (0.00607) 
TPR -1.186*** -1.684*** 0.298*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0125) 
Constant 1.265*** 0.961*** -2.349*** 
 (0.018) (0.0178) (0.0241) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared 0.1067 0.1559 0.0264 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Models with the variable 
age instead of age square and infant. 
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Table A.6.4c. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-invariant model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (6) (7) (8) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.172*** -0.0577*** 0.423*** 
 (0.0149) (0.014) (0.0199) 
Post-PBC-2nd period -0.00639 -0.200*** 0.423*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0148) (0.0208) 
PBC state -0.850*** -0.722*** -0.258*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0252) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state 0.194*** 0.168*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0282) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state 0.328*** 0.103*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0217) (0.0296) 
Sex -0.0375*** -0.0433*** 0.00964 
 (0.00752) (0.00758) (0.00956) 
Age (squared) 0.00302*** 0.00329*** -0.00109*** 
 (4.72E-05) (4.52E-05) (6.09E-05) 
Infant -0.171*** -0.457*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0103) (0.011) (0.0127) 
Black -0.368*** -0.309*** -0.113*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00822) (0.0104) 
Kinship care -0.474*** -0.708*** 0.280*** 
 (0.00862) (0.00925) (0.0108) 
Hispanic -0.0466*** 0.0289** -0.131*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0175) 
Number settings -0.277*** -0.430*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0048) (0.00497) (0.00604) 
Constant 0.952*** 0.531*** -2.144*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0202) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0748 0.1006 0.0209 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Models without TPR and 
the permanency goal of adoption and reunification. 
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Table A.6.5. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states:  
time-varying model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 1.081*** 0.710*** 0.573*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0125) (0.00260) (0.00282) (0.00308) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 3.840*** 0.346*** 0.287*** 0.0784*** 
 (0.0143) (0.00307) (0.00286) (0.00136) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 0.802*** 0.776*** 0.616*** 0.244*** 
 (0.00852) (0.00150) (0.00190) (0.00221) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 3.629*** 0.393*** 0.270*** 0.119*** 
 (0.00925) (0.00200) (0.00168) (0.00113) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 0.979*** 0.752*** 0.589*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00186) (0.00232) (0.00255) 
Post-PBC-2nd period #PBC state 3.848*** 0.357*** 0.216*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0108) (0.00216) (0.00168) (0.00154) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.6.5b. Predicted probabilities of DID for various measures of 
timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states: time-varying model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 0.714*** 0.576*** 0.197*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00275) (0.00305) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 0.341*** 0.284*** 0.0768*** 
 (0.00299) (0.00281) (0.00132) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 0.776*** 0.613*** 0.252*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00186) (0.00218) 
Post-PBC-1st period #PBC state 0.391*** 0.271*** 0.117*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00168) (0.00107) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 0.752*** 0.585*** 0.253*** 
 (0.00181) (0.00225) (0.00252) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #PBC state 0.357*** 0.218*** 0.139*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00168) (0.00145) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value.   
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Table A.6.5c. Predicted probabilities of DID for various measures of 
timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states: time-varying model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 0.626*** 0.495*** 0.112*** 
 (0.00319) (0.00305) (0.00198) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 0.491*** 0.385*** 0.115*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00322) (0.00223) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 0.692*** 0.519*** 0.157*** 
 (0.00209) (0.00218) (0.00153) 
Post-PBC-1st period #PBC state 0.551*** 0.380*** 0.183*** 
 (0.00209) (0.00201) (0.00176) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 0.682*** 0.516*** 0.156*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00269) (0.0018) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #PBC state 0.519*** 0.316*** 0.222*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00225) (0.0023) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value.  Models without TPR and the permanency goal of adoption and reunification. 
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Table A.6.6. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-varying model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post-PBC-1st period -0.128*** 0.289*** 0.0275* 0.414*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0157) (0.0148) (0.0200) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.0939*** 0.0743*** -0.178*** 0.428*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0166) (0.0158) (0.0211) 
PBC state 2.759*** -2.158*** -1.643*** -1.186*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0308) (0.0281) (0.0384) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state 0.0677*** -0.119*** -0.321*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0346) (0.0312) (0.0395) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state 0.110*** -0.192*** -0.566*** 0.428*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0371) (0.0336) (0.0417) 
Sex 0.0431*** -0.0450*** -0.0544*** 0.0227** 
 (0.00653) (0.00890) (0.00841) (0.00993) 
Age (squared) -0.00288*** 0.00344*** 0.00272*** -0.000103 
 (3.97e-05) (5.73e-05) (5.10e-05) (6.47e-05) 
Infant -0.0951*** 0.119*** -0.202*** 0.466*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0177) 
Infant#PBC states #Pre-PBC 0.282*** -0.263*** -0.107** -0.322*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0441) (0.0435) (0.0486) 
Infant#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period 0.112*** 0.00644 0.215*** -0.438*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0303) 
Infant#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period 0.0717*** 0.0491 0.262*** -0.455*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0335) 
Black 0.0892*** -0.0120 -0.135*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0153) 
Black#PBC states#Pre-PBC 0.233*** -0.361*** -0.203*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0354) (0.0325) (0.0406) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period 0.329*** -0.614*** -0.286*** -0.387*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0236) (0.0224) (0.0257) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period 0.172*** -0.454*** -0.0870*** -0.425*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0277) (0.0262) (0.0291) 
Kinship care 0.821*** -0.798*** -1.098*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0167) 
Kinship#PBC states #Pre-PBC -0.276*** 0.130*** -0.00121 0.164*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0374) (0.0362) (0.0422) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period -1.187*** 1.233*** 1.120*** 0.0512* 
 (0.0192) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0276) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period -1.200*** 1.295*** 1.164*** 0.00641 
 (0.0212) (0.0284) (0.0278) (0.0299) 
Hispanic 0.0523*** -0.0858*** -0.0191 -0.0822*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0180) 
Case goal (adoption) 0.242*** -0.115*** -0.352*** 0.298*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0214) 
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 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PBC states #Case goal (adoption) -3.776*** 3.024*** 1.158*** 2.550*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0229) (0.0290) (0.0241) 
Case goal (reunification) 0.268*** -0.239*** -0.354*** 0.170*** 
 (0.00834) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0135) 
PBC states #Case goal (reunification) -3.491*** 3.926*** 2.339*** 1.697*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0197) (0.0137) (0.0171) 
Number settings 0.220*** -0.231*** -0.385*** 0.275*** 
 (0.00429) (0.00576) (0.00553) (0.00635) 
TPR 1.248*** -1.369*** -1.579*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0145) 
Constant 1.147*** 1.273*** 1.106*** -2.609*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0251) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared .. 0.2949 0.2381 0.0928 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.6.6b. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-varying model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.287*** 0.0247* 0.417*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.02) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.0730*** -0.183*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0211) 
PBC state -2.195*** -1.660*** -1.254*** 
 (0.03) (0.0275) (0.0373) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state -0.0767** -0.274*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0304) (0.0384) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state -0.131*** -0.503*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0326) (0.0404) 
Sex -0.0554*** -0.0602*** 0.0192* 
 (0.0089) (0.00839) (0.00992) 
Age 0.0418*** 0.0436*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.00083)3 (0.00076) (0.00094) 
Black -0.0116 -0.142*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0153) 
Black#PBC states#Pre-PBC -0.379*** -0.211*** -0.343*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0323) (0.0404) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period -0.603*** -0.276*** -0.408*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0256) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period -0.439*** -0.0775*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0262) (0.0291) 
Kinship care -0.843*** -1.117*** 0.460*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0166) 
Kinship#PBC states #Pre-PBC 0.140*** 0.00885 0.166*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0421) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period 1.232*** 1.125*** 0.0578** 
 (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0276) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period 1.287*** 1.169*** 0.0106 
 (0.0283) (0.0278) (0.0298) 
Hispanic -0.0924*** -0.0208 -0.0893*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.018) 
Case goal (adoption) -0.144*** -0.381*** 0.313*** 
 (0.019) (0.0212) (0.0213) 
PBC states #Case goal (adoption) 3.020*** 1.189*** 2.477*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0286) (0.0235) 
Case goal (reunification) -0.278*** -0.371*** 0.163*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0135) 
PBC states #Case goal (reunification) 3.891*** 2.328*** 1.707*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0137) (0.0171) 
Number settings -0.236*** -0.385*** 0.272*** 
 (0.00574) (0.00551) (0.0063) 
TPR -1.370*** -1.597*** 0.141*** 
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 Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
 (0.0126) (0.0139) (0.0144) 
Constant 1.339*** 1.018*** -2.414*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0248) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared 0.2916 0.2381 0.0928 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Models with the variable 
age instead of age square and infant. 
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Table A.6.6c. Models for various measures of timeliness for PBC and non-
PBC states: time-varying model 
 Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.194*** -0.0414*** 0.415*** 
 (0.015) (0.0141) (0.02) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.0689*** -0.144*** 0.409*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.021) 
PBC state -0.605*** -0.516*** 0.0321 
 (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0343) 
Post-PBC-1st period#PBC state -0.0371 -0.111*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0378) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#PBC state -0.120*** -0.390*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0398) 
Sex -0.0369*** -0.0428*** 0.00922 
 (0.00755) (0.00761) (0.00957) 
Age (squared) 0.0030*** 0.00326*** -0.00101*** 
 (4.75E-05) (4.55E-05) (6.12E-05) 
Infant -0.301*** -0.554*** 0.427*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0172) 
Infant#PBC states #Pre-PBC 0.0457 0.0269 -0.210*** 
 (0.033) (0.0378) (0.0453) 
Infant#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period 0.237*** 0.185*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0276) 
Infant#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period 0.337*** 0.301*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0284) (0.0306) 
Black -0.0956*** -0.207*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0127) (0.012) (0.0152) 
Black#PBC states#Pre-PBC -0.433*** -0.260*** -0.508*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0281) (0.0387) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period -0.545*** -0.285*** -0.579*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0244) 
Black#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period -0.382*** -0.0565** -0.619*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0276) 
Kinship care -0.768*** -1.028*** 0.451*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0166) 
Kinship#PBC states #Pre-PBC -0.0704** -0.158*** -0.217*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0326) (0.0401) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-1st period 0.604*** 0.695*** -0.261*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0224) (0.0261) 
Kinship#PBC states #Post-PBC-2nd period 0.708*** 0.797*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0281) 
Hispanic -0.0383*** 0.0351*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0175) 
Number settings -0.274*** -0.428*** 0.235*** 
 (0.00485) (0.00501) (0.0061) 
Constant 0.928*** 0.551*** -2.292*** 
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 Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (10) (11) (12) 
 (0.0152) (0.0146) (0.021) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0810 0.1056 0.0244 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Models without TPR and 
the permanency goal of adoption and reunification. 
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Table A.6.7. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for PBC and non-PBC states:  
DID fixed-effects model and time-varying fixed-effects model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely 
Covariates (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Pre-PBC #Non-PBC state 1.475*** 0.728*** 1.031*** 0.726*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0024) (0.0122) (0.0024) 
Pre-PBC #PBC state 3.328*** 0.425*** 2.924*** 0.403*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0028) (0.01331) (0.0028) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #Non-PBC state 1.509*** 0.739*** 0.742*** 0.784*** 
 (0.0082) (0.00159) (0.0082) (0.0016) 
Post-PBC-1
st
 period #PBC state 3.032*** 0.483*** 2.989*** 0.383*** 
 (0.0087) (0.00187) (0.00869) (0.0019) 
Post-PBC-2
nd
 period #Non-PBC state 1.819*** 0.688*** 0.942*** 0.747*** 
 (0.0098) (0.002) (0.0098) (0.002) 
Post-PBC-2nd period #PBC state 3.084*** 0.477*** 3.348*** 0.330*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00231) (0.01069) (0.0023) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.7.1. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
DID-only model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 1.584*** 0.706*** 0.593*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0123) (0.00248) (0.00268) (0.00173) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 3.896*** 0.322*** 0.215*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0162) (0.00300) (0.00264) (0.00198) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 2.296*** 0.617*** 0.502*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0234) (0.00491) (0.00505) (0.00322) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 1.594*** 0.725*** 0.556*** 0.169*** 
 (0.00822) (0.00162) (0.00181) (0.00136) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 3.412*** 0.394*** 0.268*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0122) (0.00242) (0.00220) (0.00165) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 2.270*** 0.629*** 0.408*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0118) (0.00247) (0.00252) (0.00213) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 1.898*** 0.676*** 0.500*** 0.176*** 
 (0.00983) (0.00202) (0.00216) (0.00164) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 3.555*** 0.374*** 0.252*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0159) (0.00313) (0.00281) (0.00211) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 2.109*** 0.662*** 0.399*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00283) (0.00293) (0.00264) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.7.2. Models for various measures of timeliness for Illinois, North 
Carolina and non-PBC states: DID-only model 
 Amount of time 
spent in care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.00954 0.0938*** -0.150*** 0.466*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0198) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.314*** -0.143*** -0.377*** 0.514*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0206) 
Illinois 2.312*** -1.620*** -1.669*** -0.0644** 
 (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0192) (0.0270) 
North Carolina 0.712*** -0.401*** -0.369*** 0.0159 
 (0.0264) (0.0240) (0.0231) (0.0361) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois -0.494*** 0.220*** 0.437*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.0323) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina -0.0359 -0.0391 -0.231*** 0.322*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0275) (0.0263) (0.0394) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois -0.655*** 0.371*** 0.582*** -0.366*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0244) (0.0258) (0.0353) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina -0.501*** 0.339*** -0.0405 0.499*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0286) (0.0275) (0.0402) 
Constant 1.584*** 0.876*** 0.376*** -2.060*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0172) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared .. 0.0641 0.0505 0.0171 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.7.3. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
time-invariant model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 1.853*** 0.656*** 0.519*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0117) (0.00258) (0.00251) (0.00191) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 3.775*** 0.339*** 0.230*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0154) (0.00298) (0.00263) (0.00201) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 1.360*** 0.773*** 0.721*** 0.0873*** 
 (0.0229) (0.00362) (0.00375) (0.00259) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 1.727*** 0.705*** 0.525*** 0.177*** 
 (0.00781) (0.00163) (0.00168) (0.00143) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 3.293*** 0.414*** 0.290*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00240) (0.00221) (0.00161) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 1.902*** 0.684*** 0.489*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0114) (0.00221) (0.00237) (0.00206) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 2.020*** 0.651*** 0.469*** 0.180*** 
 (0.00925) (0.00198) (0.00195) (0.00168) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 3.492*** 0.382*** 0.262*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0151) (0.00304) (0.00273) (0.00208) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 2.151*** 0.646*** 0.386*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0128) (0.00271) (0.00262) (0.00267) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.7.4. Models for various measures of timeliness for Illinois, North 
Carolina and non-PBC states: time-invariant model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post-PBC-1st period -0.127*** 0.255*** 0.0307** 0.400*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0200) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.167*** -0.0276* -0.248*** 0.426*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0162) (0.0158) (0.0209) 
Illinois 1.922*** -1.482*** -1.536*** -0.188*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0279) 
North Carolina -0.493*** 0.655*** 1.114*** -0.421*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0270) (0.0276) (0.0378) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois -0.356*** 0.104*** 0.332*** -0.273*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0253) (0.0327) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 0.669*** -0.767*** -1.292*** 0.595*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0298) (0.0301) (0.0402) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois -0.450*** 0.236*** 0.445*** -0.311*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0278) (0.0357) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 0.623*** -0.681*** -1.528*** 0.951*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0318) (0.0323) (0.0420) 
Sex 0.0523*** -0.0440*** -0.0528*** 0.0152 
 (0.00753) (0.00790) (0.00804) (0.00964) 
Age (squared) -0.00173*** 0.00174*** 0.00174*** -0.000642*** 
 (4.59e-05) (5.02e-05) (4.84e-05) (6.32e-05) 
Infant -0.0596*** 0.0789*** -0.157*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0130) 
Black 0.325*** -0.283*** -0.237*** -0.0675*** 
 (0.00828) (0.00855) (0.00882) (0.0106) 
Kinship care 0.597*** -0.490*** -0.776*** 0.343*** 
 (0.00907) (0.00912) (0.00974) (0.0110) 
Hispanic 0.0700*** -0.0781*** 0.000820 -0.117*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0176) 
Case goal (adoption) 0.0548*** -0.0339** -0.517*** 0.473*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0200) 
Case goal (reunification) 0.277*** -0.228*** -0.340*** 0.140*** 
 (0.00982) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0134) 
Number settings 0.497*** -0.433*** -0.584*** 0.202*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00537) (0.00568) (0.00643) 
TPR 1.277*** -1.299*** -1.791*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0126) 
Constant 0.880*** 1.561*** 1.316*** -2.385*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0187) (0.0184) (0.0244) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared   0.1429 0.1838 0.0369 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.7.5. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
time-varying model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 1.191*** 0.724*** 0.569*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00251) (0.00286) (0.00288) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 3.493*** 0.335*** 0.257*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0195) (0.00379) (0.00368) (0.00363) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 3.345*** 0.470*** 0.504*** 0.0393*** 
 (0.0279) (0.00826) (0.00677) (0.00142) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 0.956*** 0.777*** 0.595*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0086) (0.00153) (0.00190) (0.00215) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 3.244*** 0.354*** 0.303*** 0.137*** 
 (0.0144) (0.00288) (0.00290) (0.00239) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 3.65*** 0.429*** 0.273*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0146) (0.00350) (0.00274) (0.00182) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 1.181*** 0.749*** 0.561*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00196) (0.00240) (0.00262) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 3.515*** 0.317*** 0.266*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0187) (0.00330) (0.00353) (0.00296) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 4.074*** 0.370*** 0.178*** 0.158*** 
 (0.017) (0.00383) (0.00238) (0.00271) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.7.6. Models for various measures of timeliness for Illinois, North 
Carolina and non-PBC states: time-varying model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post-PBC-1st period -0.130*** 0.290*** 0.0430*** 0.404*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.0200) 
Post-PBC-2nd period 0.110*** 0.0554*** -0.186*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0167) (0.0160) (0.0211) 
Illinois 2.302*** -2.359*** -1.828*** -0.211*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0346) (0.0318) (0.0406) 
North Carolina 2.154*** -1.485*** -0.359*** -1.875*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0548) (0.0438) (0.0597) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois -0.0149 -0.242*** 0.143*** -0.506*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0416) (0.0383) (0.0483) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 0.540*** -0.624*** -1.524*** 0.980*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0590) (0.0470) (0.0603) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 0.0317 -0.303*** 0.119*** -0.647*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0462) (0.0426) (0.0549) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 0.738*** -0.790*** -2.037*** 1.334*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0619) (0.0498) (0.0622) 
Sex 0.0444*** -0.0432*** -0.0541*** 0.0198** 
 (0.00656) (0.00903) (0.00852) (0.00991) 
Age (squared) -0.00236*** 0.00321*** 0.00235*** -0.000353*** 
 (4.00e-05) (5.83e-05) (5.16e-05) (6.49e-05) 
Infant -0.0379*** 0.0692*** -0.236*** 0.431*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0176) 
Infant#Illinois#Pre-PBC 0.0434 0.129*** 0.0328 -0.337*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0466) (0.0506) (0.0520) 
Infant#Illinois #Post-PBC-1st period -0.0554** 0.320*** 0.0657* -0.173*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0347) (0.0374) (0.0377) 
Infant#Illinois #Post-PBC-2nd period -0.0905*** 0.319*** 0.152*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0437) (0.0464) (0.0478) 
Infant#North Carolina#Pre-PBC -0.0946 0.160 0.323*** -0.260*** 
 (0.0627) (0.104) (0.0835) (0.0984) 
Infant#North Carolina #Post-PBC-1st period -0.0888*** 0.265*** 0.537*** -0.437*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0420) (0.0396) (0.0402) 
Infant#North Carolina #Post-PBC-2nd period -0.0111 0.160*** 0.446*** -0.436*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0479) (0.0446) (0.0421) 
Black 0.0952*** -0.0297** -0.126*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0153) 
Black#Illinois #Pre-PBC 0.416*** -0.364*** -0.213*** -0.588*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0397) (0.0389) (0.0462) 
Black#Illinois #Post-PBC-1st period 0.350*** -0.349*** -0.178*** -0.597*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0303) (0.0293) (0.0346) 
Black#Illinois #Post-PBC-2nd period 0.303*** -0.332*** -0.136*** -0.513*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0375) (0.0367) (0.0440) 
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 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Very timely Somewhat 
timely 
Covariates (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Black#North Carolina #Pre-PBC -0.0702* 0.0360 0.0120 -0.0717 
 (0.0405) (0.0678) (0.0543) (0.0688) 
Black#North Carolina#Post-PBC-1st period 0.0550** -0.309*** -0.165*** -0.143*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0325) (0.0293) (0.0318) 
Black#North Carolina#Post-PBC-2nd period -0.0319 -0.326*** -0.0208 -0.276*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0391) (0.0344) (0.0352) 
Kinship care 0.831*** -0.808*** -1.141*** 0.480*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0167) 
Kinship#Illinois 0.194*** -0.0682 -0.390*** -0.150*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0415) (0.0469) (0.0471) 
Kinship#North Carolina -0.0769*** 1.450*** 0.881*** 0.352*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0737) (0.0627) (0.0734) 
Kinship#Illinois #Post-PBC-1st period -0.364*** 0.354*** 0.255*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0480) (0.0539) (0.0540) 
Kinship#Illinois #Post-PBC-1st period -1.122*** 1.037*** 1.481*** -0.388*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0786) (0.0671) (0.0777) 
Kinship#North Carolina #Post-PBC-2nd 
period 
-2.190*** 0.716*** 0.538*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0526) (0.0576) (0.0600) 
Kinship#North Carolina #Post-PBC-2nd 
period 
-1.740*** 0.813*** 1.105*** -0.456*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0812) (0.0692) (0.0784) 
Hispanic 0.0474*** -0.0769*** 0.00835 -0.115*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0180) 
Case goal (adoption) 0.249*** -0.0842*** -0.458*** 0.312*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0196) (0.0216) (0.0211) 
PBC states#Case goal (adoption) -2.051*** 1.720*** 0.608*** 1.349*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0149) 
Case goal (reunification) 0.402*** -0.420*** -0.438*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.00863) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0138) 
PBC states#Case goal (reunification) -1.892*** 2.980*** 1.311*** 0.873*** 
 (0.00684) (0.0180) (0.00906) (0.0104) 
Number settings 0.420*** -0.424*** -0.592*** 0.252*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00606) (0.00596) (0.00663) 
TPR 1.318*** -1.417*** -1.725*** 0.0903*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
Constant 0.859*** 1.582*** 1.354*** -2.455*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0208) (0.0195) (0.0253) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Pseudo-R squared .. 0.3154 0.2560 0.0845 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.7.7. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities of DID for various 
measures of timeliness for Illinois, North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
DID fixed-effects model and time-varying fixed-effects model 
 Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely  Amount of 
time spent in 
care 
Timely 
Covariates (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 1.358*** 0.716*** 1.177*** 0.751*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00246) (0.0126) (0.00246) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 3.449*** 0.300*** 3.56*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0173) (0.00295) (0.01729) (0.00295) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 1.988*** 0.625*** 3.289*** 0.47*** 
 (0.0236) (0.00488) (0.02361) (0.00488) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 1.401*** 0.726*** 0.97*** 0.789*** 
 (0.0086) (0.00163) (0.0086) (0.00163) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 2.97*** 0.371*** 3.302*** 0.325*** 
 (0.0136) (0.00243) (0.0136) (0.00243) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 1.962*** 0.638*** 3.603*** 0.466*** 
 (0.0125) (0.00246) (0.0125) (0.00246) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 1.711*** 0.674*** 1.218*** 0.754*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00204) (0.0100) (0.00204) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 3.268*** 0.321*** 3.599*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0163) (0.00305) (0.0163) (0.00305) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 1.799*** 0.671*** 4.025*** 0.395*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0028) (0.0142) (0.00364) 
Observations 327,644 327,644 327,644 327,644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.7.8. Average annual number of children exiting care in North 
Carolina in a timely, very timely and somewhat timely manner by type of 
permanency outcome 
  
Race 
Type of permanency 
outcome 
Pre-PBC 
Post-PBC (2nd 
period) 
Timely exits Total Reunification 2,010 2,096 
 
 
Adoption 414 460 
 
Black Reunification 892 705 
  
Adoption 200 114 
 
Other race Reunification 1,118 1,391 
 
 
Adoption 214 346 
Very timely exits Total Reunification 1,707 1,387 
 
 
Adoption 309 81 
 
Black Reunification 736 464 
 
 
Adoption 153 17 
 
Other race Reunification 971 923 
 
 
Adoption 156 64 
Somewhat timely exits Total Reunification 303 709 
 
 
Adoption 105 379 
 
Black Reunification 156 241 
 
 
Adoption 47 97 
 
Other race Reunification 147 468 
   
Adoption 58 282 
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Table A.9.1. Predicted probabilities of DID for timeliness of adoption, 
reunification and guardianship for Illinois and North Carolina and non-PBC 
states: DID-only model  
 Reunification  Adoption Guardianship 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 0.804*** 0.0807*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00169) (0.00120) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 0.734*** 0.159*** 0.0692*** 
 (0.00481) (0.00398) (0.00276) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 0.672*** 0.148*** 0.123*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00453) (0.00420) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 0.753*** 0.112*** 0.0524*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00130) (0.000920) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 0.689*** 0.193*** 0.0679*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00291) (0.00185) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 0.500*** 0.145*** 0.286*** 
 (0.00308) (0.00217) (0.00278) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 0.716*** 0.121*** 0.0874*** 
 (0.00231) (0.00167) (0.00145) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 0.694*** 0.152*** 0.110*** 
 (0.00449) (0.00350) (0.00304) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 0.537*** 0.171*** 0.207*** 
 (0.00348) (0.00262) (0.00282) 
Observations 213,193 213,193 213,193 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table A.9.2. Models of DID for timeliness of adoption, reunification and 
guardianship for Illinois and North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
DID-only model  
 Reunification  Adoption Guardianship 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) 
Post-PBC-1st period -0.293*** 0.359*** 0.305*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0263) (0.0370) 
Post-PBC-2nd period -0.485*** 0.455*** 0.854*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0277) (0.0368) 
Illinois -0.398*** 0.764*** 0.602*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0375) (0.0535) 
North Carolina -0.696*** 0.679*** 1.238*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0426) (0.0503) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 0.0755** -0.120*** -0.326*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0439) (0.0637) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina -0.423*** -0.377*** 0.740*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0479) (0.0554) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 0.289*** -0.505*** -0.349*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0489) (0.0645) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina -0.0804** -0.282*** -0.238*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0491) (0.0562) 
Constant 1.411*** -2.433*** -3.200*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0228) (0.0320) 
Observations 213,193 213,193 213,193 
Pseudo-R squared 0.0352 0.0112 0.0864 
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Table A.9.3. Predicted probabilities of DID for timeliness of adoption, 
reunification and guardianship for Illinois and North Carolina and non-PBC 
states: time-invariant model 
 Reunification  Adoption Guardianship 
Covariates (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-PBC#Non-PBC state 0.774*** 0.00698*** 0.0397*** 
 (0.00325) (0.000359) (0.00126) 
Pre-PBC#Illinois 0.788*** 0.0652*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.00494) (0.00348) (0.00132) 
Pre-PBC#North Carolina 0.908*** 0.00313*** 0.0691*** 
 (0.00308) (0.000203) (0.00299) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Non-PBC state 0.792*** 0.00322*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.00201) (0.000134) (0.000903) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois 0.777*** 0.0478*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.00358) (0.00206) (0.00103) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina 0.508*** 0.0103*** 0.216*** 
 (0.00391) (0.000468) (0.00301) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Non-PBC state 0.735*** 0.00983*** 0.0589*** 
 (0.00270) (0.000418) (0.00112) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 0.780*** 0.0189*** 0.0458*** 
 (0.00456) (0.00137) (0.00151) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina 0.502*** 0.0267*** 0.150*** 
 (0.00415) (0.00120) (0.00254) 
Observations 213,193 213,193 213,193 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All other covariates are at 
their mean value. 
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Table A.9.4. Models of DID for timeliness of adoption, reunification and 
guardianship for Illinois and North Carolina and non-PBC states:  
time-invariant model 
 Reunification  Adoption Guardianship 
Covariates (4) (5) (6) 
Post-PBC-1st period 0.106*** -0.777*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0487) (0.0380) 
Post-PBC-2nd period -0.213*** 0.345*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0535) (0.0382) 
Illinois 0.0836** 2.295*** -0.301*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0749) (0.0562) 
North Carolina 1.062*** -0.806*** 0.585*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0718) (0.0572) 
Post-PBC-1st period#Illinois -0.172*** 0.447*** -0.0819 
 (0.0417) (0.0843) (0.0660) 
Post-PBC-1st period#North Carolina -2.366*** 1.980*** 1.108*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0807) (0.0605) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#Illinois 0.162*** -1.633*** 0.0362 
 (0.0452) (0.105) (0.0672) 
Post-PBC-2nd period#North Carolina -2.072*** 1.821*** 0.453*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0909) (0.0636) 
Sex -0.0163 -0.0363 -0.0165 
 (0.0116) (0.0253) (0.0156) 
Age (squared) -0.00419*** -0.0115*** -0.00214*** 
 (6.82e-05) (0.000239) (9.40e-05) 
Infant -0.790*** 0.814*** -0.226*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0298) (0.0237) 
Black 0.0254** -0.552*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0278) (0.0168) 
Kinship care -1.111*** 0.0193 1.574*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0299) (0.0163) 
Hispanic 0.136*** -0.210*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0461) (0.0287) 
Case goal (adoption) -0.777*** 2.165*** -1.407*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0464) (0.0517) 
Case goal (reunification) 1.126*** 0.0172 -1.149*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0373) (0.0183) 
Number settings -0.239*** 0.0391** 0.128*** 
 (0.00808) (0.0181) (0.0112) 
TPR -2.681*** 5.717*** -1.257*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0371) (0.0312) 
Constant 1.860*** -5.010*** -2.247*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0673) (0.0399) 
Observations 213,193 213,193 213,193 
Pseudo-R squared 0.2854 0.7307 0.2094 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
